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ABSTRACT
This dissertation argues for an understanding of “form” in two senses: as both the plasticity of the
cinematic medium and the contour of the human body. Form is most often understood in relation to
visible traits such as line, shape, or figure; whereas sound is described as being without form, as any
number of sonorous metaphors attests (sound as aqueous, as “disembodied,” as invisible or
indeterminate). Cinema, therefore, constituted as it is by sound and image, exhibits a tension between
form and formlessness that manifests itself in contemporary films such as Her, Ratcatcher, Morvern
Callar, We Need to Talk About Kevin, The Tree of Life, and Upstream Color at the level of the human
body: corporeal boundaries blur as characters incorporate into new configurations. I conclude that we
must reckon with the image in terms of sound, for thinking sonically allows us to see form—bodily and
cinematic—as inherently protean.

Unlike most scholarship on film sound that is predominantly formalist or historical in nature, my
study takes an interdisciplinary approach that draws on theories of sound and image hailing from outside
film studies proper, such as Nietzsche’s theorization of Greek tragedy, Jean-Luc Nancy’s ethics of
listening, Deleuze’s exegesis on painter Francis Bacon, Nicole Brenez’s “figural” method of film
criticism, and Karen Barad’s “agential realism.” I unite these ideas and others and bring them to bear on
cinema, showing in the process what an attentiveness to sound has to offer not only film studies but also
the humanities writ large.
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PREFACE
“One cannot step twice into the same river, nor can one grasp any mortal substance in a stable condition,
[for] it scatters again and gathers; it forms and dissolves, and approaches and departs.”1—Heraclitus
In a recent book, film scholar Robert Spadoni draws our attention to what he describes as an
“overlapping timeline” in film history wherein synchronous sound emerged almost in tandem with the
rise of the horror film in Hollywood. For Spadoni, this is hardly a coincidence. The transition to sound
was an awkward one, and as his archival research reveals, audiences of the time found the voices in the
early talkies to be novel, yes, but also “mechanical,” “queer,” or “unnatural.” A host of factors
contributed to these reactions, from the limitations of the technology to actors’ adoption of the slow,
mannered articulation of the stage to the sheer foreignness of synchronized dialogue. Sync sound,
therefore, did not provide an instant gain in filmic realism as one might assume; instead, early audiences
largely found the practice alienating, for it conjured up the “uncanniness” at the heart of cinematic
representation: that that which we see on screen is at once real and not real, animate and inanimate. Prior
to synchronization, these same audiences had become accustomed to the entrenched norms of silent film
aesthetics and thus had learned to overlook the pre-talkie cinema’s artificiality. But when suddenly faced
with the combination of a polished image and unrefined sound, that repressed knowledge of the medium’s
constructed nature came flooding back to the fore of their minds. Spadoni makes the case that while most
Hollywood practitioners sought to ward off these uncanny sensations in viewers, directors such as Tod
Browning and James Whale strived to harness and exploit the unheimlich in films such as Dracula (1931)
and Frankenstein (1931), respectively, by putting to use the estranging effects of sync sound to arouse
dread in their audiences.2
What follows is not a study of the horror film, nor does it contribute to the important work being
done on transition-era Hollywood. It does however draw a key lesson from this moment in both the

1
2

Heraticlus, The Art and Thought of Heraticlus: An Edition of The Fragments with Translation and Commentary,

Robert Spadoni, Uncanny Bodies: The Coming of Sound Film and the Origins of the Horror Genre. Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press, 2007): 1–18.
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genre’s and the medium’s history: that the advent of synchronous sound inaugurated a problem for the
cinema with regard to the body. At stake in the talkie was not merely a greater degree of verisimilitude
but also, more fundamentally, the integrity of the human body onscreen. As Mary Ann Doane has argued,
sound is the lynchpin of the cinematic illusion in that it creates an “imaginary harmony” between the
body onscreen and the voice one hears from the loudspeaker as well as “an elaborate imbrication” of
diegetic space and the space of the theater.3 Yet at the same time, sound also “carries with it the potential
risk of exposing the material heterogeneity of the medium.” One false step or technical error with the
sound track can irrevocably destroy the impression of an “organic unity” between the onscreen body and
the voice that accompanies it, which in turn destroys the coherence of the film’s entire spectacle.4 From
the outset of synchronization, then, sound assured the cohesion of the visible body even as it threatened to
rip it apart. We see this most saliently in Singin’ in the Rain (Kelly and Donen, 1952), a film set against
the backdrop of the coming of sound in Hollywood, when the sound track falls out of sync with the image
during a packed screening, eliciting riotous laughter from crowd. What was deployed to frightening effect
in Dracula is here staged for comic impact.5
Yet, Doane’s claim—as well as the gag in Kelly and Donen’s musical—rests on the assumption
that, unlike the “fantasmatic” or “heterogeneous” bodies of the cinema, real, material bodies are entirely
“unified” and cannot be torn asunder.6 This is to say, Doane understands the human body as a discrete
entity that moves about a world occupied by other entities likewise discrete, and what divides us from
them are material boundaries—skin, edges, lines. Science tells a different story, however. In a passage
that I will take up in greater detail later in the dissertation, physicist and philosopher Karen Barad writes :

3

“Just as the voice must be anchored by a given body, the body must be anchored in a given space. The fantasmatic
visual space which the film constructs is supplemented by techniques designed to spatialize the voice, to localize it,
[and] give it depth.” Mary Ann Doane, “The Voice in the Cinema: The Articulation of Body and Space,” Yale
French Studies 60 (1980): 35–40.
4

Doane, “The Voice in the Cinema,” 35.

5

Thomas Elsaesser and Malte Hagener, Film Theory: An Introduction through the Senses (New York: Routledge,
2010): 132–136.
6

Doane, “The Voice in the Cinema,” 34.
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[T]he outside boundary of a body may seem evident, indeed incontrovertible. A coffee mug ends
at its outside surface just as surely as people end at their skins. On the face of it, reliance of visual
clues seems to constitute a solid empirical approach, but are faces and solids really what they
seem? In fact, an abundance of empirical evidence from a range of different disciplines […]
suggests that visual clues may be misleading. […] It has become increasingly clear that the
seemingly self-evidentiary nature of bodily boundaries, including their seeming virtual selfevidence, is a result of the repetition of (culturally and historically) specific bodily performance.7
Looking with one’s naked eye, the world is a place of clear-cut lines and divisions, but at a
particle level, these boundaries do not prevail. The lines that we see all around us, physicist Richard P.
Feynman claims, are “not something definite. It is not, believe it or not, that every object has a line
around it! There is no such line. It is only in our psychological makeup that there is a line.”8
But if bodies and objects are not demarcated by definite lines, then, from the standpoint of the
human, can there be a hard-and-fast barrier between my body and that of another? In other words, does
the subject-object divide obtain in a world in which form is not fixed and matter is not captive to a state of
boundedness? Might not we say that physics has revealed our presumption of discrete bodies and subjects
to be, like the cinema, a mere illusion of organic unity, for even though we as humans are not fixed and
bounded, we tend to experience ourselves as such. But deeper down, at an invisible and imperceptible
level, our bodies, or better, the particles that compose it, disperse. They are thrown out in all directions, at
which point they congeal into new, if temporary, formations. The feeling of coherence we have of a self
housed in a body is in fact a much more tenuous configuration that we might imagine. Bodies are not
stable, fixed things. In the words of Heraclitus that appear in the epigraph above, bodies scatter, they
form and dissolve and form again.9

7

Karen Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007): 155.
8

Richard P. Feynman, Robert B. Leighton, and Matthew Sands, The Feynman Lectures on Physics, vol. 1 (Reading,
MA: Addison-Wesley, 1964), qtd. in Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway, 155. I’ve removed Barad’s italics,
which were not present in the original text.
9

All due apologies to Judith Butler, from whose book Bodies That Matter my title, Bodies That Scatter, derives. I
cannot claim authorship of this fine play on words, however. Kristopher L. Cannon and Angelo Restivo coined it
when naming a session at the Rendering the Visible Conference held at Georgia State University in February 2011. I
thank them for graciously allowing me to use it in this dissertation. See Judith Butler, Bodies That Matter: On the
Discursive Limits of Sex (New York: Routledge, 2011).
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Doane suggests that classical film practice has “a stake in perpetuating the image of unity and
identity” of the body “and in staving off the fear of fragmentation” so as to hide the traces of its own
discursive construction.10 This to me seems undeniable. Yet, in certain films, the appearance of unity of
bodily and cinematic form breaks down. This is most obvious in movies that self-reflexively gesture
toward their own making in an effort to demystify the cinema (think: Jean-Luc Godard or
Structural/Materialist filmmakers like Michael Snow or Ernie Gehr). What I have in mind in this study,
however, are more or less conventional narrative films in the art house vein that are not overtly political
in nature but that nevertheless reveal something about the material body that tends to escape our grasp. In
the films considered herein, whether explicitly or implicitly, bodies are revealed to be porous, protean, or
dispersive, and they tend to enter into highly unusual amalgamations with other bodies.
In what follows, I seek to understand “form”—bodily and cinematic—in terms of a relationship
between image and sound, visibility and invisibility. Form, of course, is most often defined according to
visible attributes such as contour, shape, figure, or schema, whereas sound, because it is invisible, is said
to be indeterminate, amorphous, or ephemeral. I therefore argue that cinema, constituted as it is by sound
and image, exhibits a tension between form and formlessness—and this tension manifests itself at the
level of the human body in a number of contemporary films that I shall take up in this dissertation, among
them Her (Jonze, 2013), the work of Lynne Ramsay (Ratcatcher [1999], Morvern Callar [2002], and We
Need to Talk About Kevin [2011]), The Tree of Life (Malick, 2011), and Upstream Color (Carruth, 2013).
In these examples, boundaries are shown to be permeable as bodies enter into affective configurations that
would seem to defy our experiential understanding of how the world operates.
Let me be clear, though, that the task of this dissertation is not simply to illustrate principles from
physics at work in an assortment of films. Rather, in the pages that follow I move freely between what
Deleuze and Guattari describe as the three great, interrelated domains of creativity: art, philosophy, and

10

Doane, “The Voice in Cinema,” 47.
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science.11 In this first domain, I will have occasion to discuss, in addition to cinema, theater, poetry,
performance art, mythology, and music. Likewise, with critical theory and philosophy, I draw from the
likes of Nietzsche, Deleuze, Guattari, Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Luc Nancy, Jane Bennett, the aforementioned
Barad, and many others. Finally, along with quantum physics I also turn to neuroscience, most notably in
Chapter 3. Let me assure the reader, though, that in spite of the study’s own heterogeneity, my principal
focus is always ultimately the cinema and how it renders aesthetically changes to the body both subtle and
overt.
As the opening discussion of the voice in early horror cinema suggests, sound plays an important
role in my argument. More often than not, in the films considered herein the sound track signals the
impending reorganization of the body. In her book Dreams of Difference, Songs of the Same, Amy
Herzog coins the term “the musical moment” to describe instances in which “music, typically a pop song,
inverts the image–sound hierarchy to occupy a dominant position in the filmic work.”12 As she explains,
sound is typically thought of as subservient to the image, as playing an unobtrusive accompanying role.
What Herzog identifies instead are moments when sound, in the form of music, takes the lead and the
image, if only briefly, dutifully tags along. Though I am quite convinced by her argument, I would like to
offer that music is but one of the ways in which sound can seize the reins of a film. In the movies I
analyze in this study, the conspicuous use of dialogue, noise, or even silence disrupts the customary
sound–image hierarchy just as frequently as does music. I therefore call these moments not “musical” but
“soundful”–a descriptor I’ve borrowed from Douglas Kahn.13 Soundful moments are significant for me
not only because they announce a shift in the formal logic of the film but also because they at times
appear to participate in or be the primary driver of bodily redistributions. It is therefore helpful here to
recall the special kinship between sound and affect in various theorizations of embodiment. For instance,
11

Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, trans. by Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1994).
12

Amy Herzog, Dreams of Difference, Songs of the Same: The Musical Moment in Film (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 2010): 7.
13

Douglas Kahn, Water, Noise, Meat: A History of Sound in the Arts (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2001): 2.
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in something of an aural analog to his notion of the photograph’s “punctum,” Roland Barthes describes
the “grain” of the voice as a bodily remainder that exceeds signification and that arouses both his ear and
his body.14 Along similar lines, Deleuze seems incapable of describing bodily sensation without recourse
to acoustical terms such as “vibration” and “resonance” (see Chapter 1), just as Nietzshce thinks bodily
arousal almost exclusively with respect to music (see Chapter 2).15 Even when sound is not their explicit
focus, these thinkers nevertheless gravitate towards a sonic vocabulary to describe that which one feels be
cannot see.
Thus, in this study, sound is both a catalyst of and a signpost to bodily scattering. It is not only
the object of analysis but also, to intentionally mix a metaphor, a conceptual lens through which we might
reckon with the question of form, matter, and aesthetics. This is the task to which I turn in the chapters
ahead.

14

Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida: Reflections of Photography, trans. by Richard Howard (New York: Hill and
Wang, 1981); Roland Barthes, “The Grain of the Voice,” in Image, Music, Text, translated by Stephen Heath.
London: Fontana Press, 1977): 179–189.
15

Gilles Deleuze, Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, trans. by Daniel W. Smith (London: Continuum, 2004):
47, 65; Georges Liebért, Nietzsche and Music, translated by David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2004): 12.
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1 / A CINEMA OF MIXED BODIES
We know how to “read” a fade to black. Between scenes, it serves as punctuation that marks the
passage from one space or time to another; and at the end of a film, it provides a moment for reflection
before the credits roll, a convention that in turn assures us that for all intents and purposes the movie is
over and that there will be no subsequent fade-in.
Neither of these is the case, however, in one highly unusual scene in Spike Jonze’s 2013 film Her
wherein the screen goes black and stays that way for more than a minute of screen time. Here’s the set-up:
recently estranged from his wife and lonely, Theodore (Joaquin Phoenix) finds himself smitten by
Samantha, his computer’s artificially intelligent operating system. She has no avatar or visual
representation, but she does have a voice (that of Scarlett Johansson), which Theodore hears via an ear
bud. Their relationship bourgeons and Samantha quickly graduates from personal assistant to confidante
to girlfriend. The film leaves us to wonder, though, if she has indeed developed the capacity for genuine,
human-like emotion or if she, in her programmed aim to please, is merely playing dutifully to his type.
Initially, Samantha’s lack of body is of no matter to Theodore, who is charmed by her wit and sensitivity
nonetheless. For a time, all is well in the courtship—that is until it reaches the stage at which, under
“normal” circumstances, it would be consummated.
As the scene in question opens, we see Theodore lying in bed, wishing aloud to the necessarily
unseen Samantha that he might one day encounter her in the flesh, that he might feel her in his arms
rather than simply hear her in his ear. At her request, he describes how he would touch her if such an act
were possible: “I’d take your head into my hands,” “I’d rub your cheek,” “I’d kiss your mouth.” And as
the conversation escalates and steers into more erotic terrain, the image fades out, leaving us with only
their voices and the accompanying nondiegetic score.
During this blackout, Samantha’s replies are marked by a shift in verbal tense, away from
Theodore’s conditional (“I would”) and toward the active (“I am”). That is to say, Theodore describes
what he, as the toucher, might touch, whereas Samantha, in a breathy register suggestive of both arousal
and surprise, speaks of herself as the felt: “What are you doing to me?” she asks. “I can feel my skin!”

8

Samantha speaks as if she were materializing right before our ears, if not our eyes. The voices then
alternate panting before merging into one sustained groan of pleasure, an aural crescendo that suggests a
mutual sexual climax.
Shortly thereafter, the image returns, but not to where it left off, with Theodore alone in bed. In
its place is the Los Angeles skyline, and over it, we once again hear their voices. “I was just somewhere
else with you,” he says. “Just lost. It was just you and me.” And in a line that perhaps retrospectively
“explains” the previous blackout and that this dissertation will have occasion to dwell on, Samantha
replies, “I know. Everything else just disappeared.”
What are we to make of this extended and conspicuous absence of the image? In a certain sense,
the fade-to-black is necessary, for it sidesteps that which it quite literally cannot show: a carnal encounter
between the fleshy Theodore and immaterial Samantha. In removing the image track, the film underscores
or “amplifies” the voice, with the sound of Samantha’s moans, following Linda Williams, serving as an
“aural fetish of the female pleasure we cannot see.”1 But why also shroud Theodore in black leader,
especially when earlier in the film he was fully visible during a phone sex session gone comically awry?
The extended blackout thus deviates not only from the fade-to-black’s conventional deployment but also
the movie’s previously established formal strategies.
The cinema, it has been said countless times, is fundamentally, ontologically, a visual medium. It
existed, the thinking goes, in the form of the silent film prior to the advent of synchronized sound.
Therefore, the cinema doesn’t need sound in order to be cinema.2 Extending this logic, what would a film

11

Linda Williams, Hard Core: Power, Pleasure, and the “Frenzy of the Visible” (Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press, 1999): 123.
2

Rick Altman argues that this is fallacious logic that ignores instances wherein sound accompanies a black screen, a
common occurrence in the musical interludes in Vitaphone films, for instance. While this is certainly true, each of
Altman’s examples of cinematic sound sans image are musical in character. Her therefore remains anomalistic in
that voices, even as they turn into a-signifying moans, are rendered without the image of the body from which they
emit, a situation that will be discussed in greater detail later. Rick Altman, “Four and a Half Film Fallacies,” in
Sound Theory, Sound Practice (New York: Routledge, 1992): 35–45. Elsewhere, Altman challenges the notion of
the cinema’s by-gone “silence,” persuasively demonstrating how silent films were accompanied by music, in-theater
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without an image be? A radio play? Sound art? Certainly not a movie at all, some would say.3 Perhaps
this is why the scene in question from Her registers so forcefully: if only for a minute, it is an imageless
movie, briefly withdrawing that which would seem to ground it ontologically.
This moment is not merely a deviation from cinematic convention, however. In retracting the
image, the film inverts the bias towards sight over the other sense modalities—not only in film but also in
much of western thought generally. The question, then, is what transpires in this scene as sound takes the
lead in the image’s momentary absence? What happens to Theodore and Samantha when, as she reckons
in her coital afterglow, everything else disappeared? Sans image, this scene becomes especially soundful.
We are left with no choice be to concentrate on the dialogue and linger on the characters’ words. More
importantly, though, the blackout in Her marks a rupture that signals an impending bodily reorganization.
This highly unusual scene reveals—even as it would ostensibly seem to cloak—a fluid exchange between
the two characters, a simultaneous scattering and enmeshment of bodies at a particle level.
But we’ve gotten ahead of ourselves, I’m afraid. It is my contention in this dissertation that we
might productively think of the relationship of the body to the self and the self to the other, and indeed, of
the self to the world at large, as bound up in a movement between aural and visual logics, a movement
that is manifested, as it were, in the cinema as changes in state and alterations of form. And “form” as I
deploy it means at one and the same time physical form—shape, contour, outline, figure—and aesthetic
form—the arrangement of aspects of a work of art (e.g., line, color, texture) as well as its “medial
incarnation,” to borrow a phrase from André Gaudreault and Phillipe Marion.4 Throughout the study, I
pose a series of questions about physical, bodily form and seek to answer them in aesthetic terms, and
vice-versa.
3
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The ways in which I think about the relationship between image and sound, however, differ in
significant ways from how it has most traditionally been understood within film studies. Thus, in order to
proceed with our analysis of Her and with the study at large, we must briefly review (and rehearse) how
sound and image each came to be one another’s dialectical other in philosophy. It begins in ancient
Greece (a site to which we shall return in Chapter Two) with a hierarchical classification of the human
senses.

The Discriminating Eye
We may trace the visual bias as far back as classical Greek philosophy, which privileged sight, as
the “distance sense” par excellence, over and above the other faculties. For the Greeks, sight was
associated with simultaneity, for the human eye is “capable of surveying a wide visual field” in one
glance, one instant.5 As it was theorized, vision provides a level of “mastery” not available to the more
proximal, and therefore lesser, senses. What such an account takes for granted, though, is that the viewer
is to a greater or lesser extent at a remove from that which she views, and it treats vision as if it “freezes”
the scene before the viewer in order to survey the scene in detail, much as one hits the pause button on a
DVD player. The notion of sight as a “distance sense” is hence predicated upon an abstraction of the
viewer from the field and the time of the viewed.
This detachment of the viewer and the “taming” of the temporal by giving the spatial pride of
place were fundamental to the development sometime around 300 BCE of Euclidean geometry, which
represented the world in planar fashion and as governed by logically derived axioms. And geometry of
course was a precondition for the development of Renaissance or “linear” perspective in the 17th century.
In order to render the three-dimensional world onto a two-dimensional canvas, Renaissance painters
relied on a geometric system in which parallel lines converged at a single vanishing point at the horizon.
(SEE FIG. 1) The result was a rational, mathematical representation of space, but one organized around

5
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11

an implied point of view outside of that space. That is, if the vanishing point is thought of as the apex of a
pyramid that extends to the horizon, then a second imagined pyramid—a mirror of the first—must extend
to the eye of the beholder. And where the bases of these two pyramids meet is a frame, a window onto the
world. But certainly this arrangement of the viewer and the viewed is not without ideological
consequence. As art historial John Berger puts it, “Perspective makes the single eye the centre of the
visible world,” and this world would seem to be “arranged for the spectator as the universe was once
arranged for God.”6

Figure 1 – Linear Perspective, from Alberti’s Della pittura e della statua (1804)

These metaphysical implications of linear perspective, Martin Jay asserts, bring “ocularcentrism”
full circle—from philosophy to mathematics to art and back again to philosophy. Renaissance perspective
embodies a disembodied Cartesian metaphysics: an entire (representational) world of objects, obeying the
laws of physics and geometry, laid out for a rational observer—a subject—who is entirely abstracted from
that world. The ideal observer postulated by Descartes, who notoriously claimed that his goal was “to be a
spectator rather than an actor,”7 finds its apotheosis in linear perspective. Consequently, vision was
inseparably braided with Cartesian reason and calcified at the top of the sensual hierarchy.
By the mid 20th century, though, vision came under attack widely—aesthetically, with the rise of
Modernism, which frequently broke with the perspectival tradition; and theoretically, most notably with
the French poststructuralists’ polyvalent anti-ocularcentric response. Jay claims these thinkers set about
6
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unsettling the hegemonic privileging of vision in various ways, some via an outright rejection of the eye
(Georges Bataille’s fixation of blindness, for example), while others sought to redeem sight by
challenging its Cartesian disembodiedness, as with Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s alignment late in his life of
vision with touch or with Jacques Lacan’s situating of the gaze as external to the seeing subject. Still
others began to valorize senses aside from vision. Walter Ong, for instance, looked nostalgically back to a
time prior to written language in holding up orality over visuality,8 and Luce Irigaray turned to the
sexually-differentiated body and to air, fluids, and “baser” senses such as olfaction and touch in an effort
to escape from the patriarchal gaze as both a social reality and as a theoretical construct.9 These critiques
have been successful to varying degrees in uncovering the ideological underpinnings of a visualist
paradigm, but less so in toppling sight from its privileged perch.
But need it be toppled? The anti-ocular response is today most often regarded as something of an
over-correction that repeats the same mistake of Descartes and others by giving primacy to one sense
modality over and above the others. Steven Connor, who labels himself a “cultural phenomenologist,”
notes the irony of attempting to overcome the hegemony of vision by separating sight from the other
senses when “scopophobia [itself] derives from what is in fact a distinctive feature of vision, namely its
tendency to isolate and distinguish its objects.” To differentiate the senses according to the properties of
each needlessly partitions what is in fact a sensorial whole: no sense modality operates in a vacuum.
Argues Connor: “To understand the workings of any of the senses it is necessary to remain aware of the
fertility of the relations between them.”10
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Eminent Sound Studies scholar Jonathan Sterne wonders along similar lines whether there is
much to be gained in the seeing-hearing comparison. He contends that scholarly discussions of the nature
of these two modalities tend to resort to a familiar sets of phenomenological comparisons—for instance,
that vision is outwardly directed whereas sound comes to the subject, that hearing is based in contact with
the outside world while vision demands abstraction and distance, and so on—in order to make sweeping
ontological claims about perception. The “audiovisual litany,” as Sterne calls it, presumes static,
unchanging, or “pure” sensory experiences and thus fails to account for the specific historical
circumstances that structure them.11 How can we properly attend to sight and hearing without also
attending to overdetermining factors like technological mediation (e.g., eyeglasses, acoustic architecture)
and cultural customs (e.g., noise ordinances) that influence our sense of these senses?
Veit Erlmann likewise complicates the matter in concluding that the division between hearing and
seeing and their respective associations with physical sensation and mental abstraction are all too tidy. He
argues instead that the two senses are deeply imbricated, and not simply at the phenomenal level, à la
Connor, but also philosophically, for “[t]he acoustic and physiological phenomenon of resonance […]
played a constitutive role in the history of [both] modern aurality and rationality.”12 Hearing is therefore
not the province of some bygone, pre-Enlightenment era, but a crucial component of modern subjectivity.
The highly nuanced historical accounts of Sterne and Erlmann demonstrate the folly of trying to
derive an ontology of sound from a phenomenology of hearing. But let us not be too quick to dismiss
such attempts out of hand, for even if they are prone to essentialism, they nevertheless testify to the place
sound has come to occupy in the philosophical imagination as an alternative ground from which to
proceed with new ways of thinking that are distinct from the predominant visual orientation. Indeed, my
aim in this project is to trace how seeing and hearing and image and sound have been theorized at various
historical junctures and in sundry disciplines in an effort to bridge these discourses. This of course
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requires a delicate balancing act that considers sound and image not in opposition to one another but as
complements. My emphasis on sound is thus not a rejection of visuality so much as a counterbalance to
its hegemonic privilege, and to bring the scale in line requires us to move through some broad yet
interrelated theoretical terrain, from film studies, art history, sound studies, visual culture, and affect
theory to neuroscience, quantum physics, new materialism and post- (or non-)humanism. By the same
token, the objects considered herein are likewise diverse, encompassing cinema, music, theatre, painting,
and performance art. With that said, my disciplinary “home base” is in film studies, and the insights from
these allied fields will more often than not be brought to bear on cinema in this study.
Why film? Movies, at least the vast majority of them from the 1930s onward, consist of and in
images and sounds. They therefore bring these two realms, modes, and epistemologies together. Now, the
sound-image dyad that I focus in both philosophy and in the formal elements of cinema should not be
seen as an effort to home in on the distance senses to the exclusion of the proximate modalities of smell,
taste, or touch—far from it, in fact. The senses, as Connor indicates, do not operate in isolation—even in
the case of film, which is limited to two sensory “channels.” We do not “receive” movies at the level of
the eye and the ear alone; instead, the entire body factors into the equation, as Jennifer M. Barker, Laura
U. Marks, Vivian Sobchack and others have compellingly demonstrated.13
But the present study is not one on embodied film spectatorship proper either, though it freely
mines that terrain for insight. In the pages that follow, the reader will see that I am keenly interested in the
body, especially as it relates to sound. But in this dissertation, I treat sound not merely as some immaterial
yet perceivable “data” but also as a material force unto itself.

Sound: Propagation and Sensation
Sound is difficult thing with which to grapple if for no other reason than the fact that it’s not a
thing at all. Even describing sounds proves particularly problematic. If you were to place a can of soup in
13
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the hands of a blindfolded person, she would be able to relate its characteristics to you with relative ease:
it’s cylindrical, made of metal, with thick ridges along the side, possibly cool or warm to the touch. You
could do the same experiment with its contents: How does the soup taste? What are its component
flavors? Its consistency? These are attributes of a physical entity that exist entirely independently of the
perceiving subject.
This is not the case, however, with sound. As Sterne provocatively puts it, “sound is a product of
the human senses and not a thing in the world apart from humans.”14 The world is a vibrating place, and
sound is merely the audible subset of all of these pulses, “a little piece of the vibrating world.”15
Certainly, this is why most ontologies of sound are drawn from phenomenologies thereof—how else is
one to account for it?—, and also why so often these ontologies implicitly posit a transcendental subject.
This is why Sterne’s historical project begins outside the subject: “if sound in itself is a variable and not a
constant,” he says, “then the history of sound is of necessity an externalist […] endeavor.”16
Here, I want to embrace the notion of exteriority while nevertheless taking a slightly different
tack. For the most part, I am less interested in the subjective, interior experience of hearing (from within)
than I am with sound’s vibratory propagation (from without)—that is, with its quiverous movement that
comes into being prior to its audibility.17 Let’s turn our attention outward then, away from how we hear
sounds and instead towards how sounds make themselves heard: how they come to us, pass us by, rattle
14
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the body, palpate the room. This move should not be taken as merely swapping out phenomenology for
physics, though. What I’m after here is more along the lines of Steve Goodman’s Spinozan call for “an
ontology of vibrational force,” which “delves below a philosophy of sound and the physics of acoustics
towards the basic processes of entities affecting other entities.”18
Thought of in this way, as affective vibration, sound becomes not simply something that is
“there” for perceptual apprehension, but an invisible figure of interaction and relationality, one that
extends beyond the human realm in ways that will become clearer in the dissertation’s latter half. In the
meantime, I want to briefly sketch some philosophical consequences of thinking of sound not so much as
something out there in the world for me to apprehend but as something external to me that acts upon me.
Four characteristics suggest themselves. First, sounds are not simply heard but materially felt,
because sound, in its essence, is a disturbance. The musician drags her bow across the cello’s strings,
causing them to vibrate. This vibration in turn generates a force that ripples outward in a wave, agitating
the air surrounding it. But it is not a sound per se until it is audible, when the wave causes one’s cochlea,
the coil-shaped bony labyrinth of the inner ear, to resonate at the same amplitude and frequency, thus
activating the nerve impulses that travel to the brain.19 Yet the tactility of sound does not register solely in
the ear, nor for that matter is its movement exclusively atmospheric. Let’s stick with our example of the
cello: anyone who has heard the instrument in a concert hall can attest to its power to stir the body, and
not simply in the sense of an emotional arousal, though it certainly is effective in that regard.20 Some of
the cello’s vibrations might traverse the walls and floor before finding its way up one’s legs and into the
rib cage. In short, this sound vibrates the eardrum, yes, but also one’s entire body. Thus, though hearing is
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often thought of alongside sight as a “distance sense,” when we take account of the body’s (and not
simply the ear’s) role in the reception of sound, it becomes apparent that hearing is a distance sense in
name only.
Secondly, and relatedly, sounds are mobile and invasive. One directs his vision, turning his head,
his eyes, his attention outward, while sounds traverse space. They come to us but does not necessarily
terminate with us; they pass us by with indifference. Moreover, we can’t easily “turn off” sounds. Loud
noises, for instance, can rouse one from a deep sleep in a way that a partner switching on a nightstand
lamp cannot. Likewise, we can turn away from an unpleasant happening or avert our eyes, but we don’t
possess, as Steven Connor calls them, “earlids.”21 There is no escaping sound, for, as we’ve seen, these
vibrations may move through physical barriers such as walls, windows, or bodies. Writes Hans Jonas,
“Sound, itself a dynamic fact, intrudes upon a passive subject.”2 2And passivity, as we shall see
momentarily, will be of central importance moving forward.
Now, because sound is invasive and does not heed material boundaries, it throws the very notion
of a concrete delineation between inside and outside into question. This is as much a result of its incessant
motion as it is vibratory properties, which brings us to our third point: sounds are temporal and
ephemeral. We might describe the cellist’s drawing of the bow across the strings as the “birth” of a
particular sound, and just as it is born, so too will it die. In psychoacoustical terms, loaded as they are
with both tactile and bodily imagery, the vibration that initiates a sound is called its “attack.” Once it
reaches its peak amplitude, the sound carries on even after its originating event stops—this is called the
“sustain.” Afterwards begins its “decay.”2 3 Again, sounds are events, and as such, they are finite. They
have a lifespan. This is partly why music is frequently contrasted with sculpture or painting as a temporal
21
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rather than a static art. It comes into being in time, always changing, never resting. The striking of a note
is a singular event; no two performances of it are ever precisely the same, for the variables are prodigious:
the size and shape of the room, its appointments and tapestries, the precise tuning of the instrument, the
force with which the keys are struck or the strings plucked or the pressure applied to the mouthpiece.
There is thus something elegiac about the way sound is often described: like humans, sounds are
in a constant state of animation until the point at which they die. Even then, just because a vibration
ceases to fall within the audible spectrum of human hearing does not mean that the vibration itself has
ceased, for it may still be unfolding in space, and non-human species might well perceive it long after a
human of “normal” hearing no longer can.
Musician turned theorist of film sound Michel Chion writes, “[s]ound unscrolls itself, manifests
itself within time, and is a living process, energy in action.”24 Process, of course, stands at odds with the
fixity supposedly furnished by sight, and this difference is not without philosophical significance. For
instance, it should come as no surprise that the Greeks, who held sight in such high esteem, would favor a
space-based orientation over a temporal one. The assumption that time and space are both infinitely
divisible, however, left them ill-equipped to address the problem of motion—hence the paradox of Zeno’s
arrow. Hans Jonas contrasts this visual, spatial orientation with a aural, temporal one: “According to the
nature of sound as such it can ‘give’ only dynamic and never static reality….“[T]he sense of hearing is
[therefore]… related to event and not to existence, to becoming and not to being.”2 5
Jean-Luc Nancy points to precisely this same quality in a recent treatise:
If, from Kant to Heidegger, the major concern of philosophy has been found in the appearance or
manifestation of being, in a “phenomenology,” the ultimate truth of the phenomenon (as
something that appears as precisely distinct from everything that has already appeared and,
consequently, too, as something that disappears), should truth “itself,” as transitivity and
incessant transition of continual coming and going, be listened to rather than seen?26
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Jonas and Nancy explicitly contrast an ontology of being, which they align with vision, with one
of becoming, which is embodied, as it were, by sound. If Cartesian metaphysics is defined by fixity,
atemporal stasis, and disincarnated vision, then a sound-oriented ontology would thus be one of flux,
duration, and spatial embeddedness—even ecological, one might say. The uniting of sound with
becoming is apposite, for both are characterized by an unfolding in time. But let’s not be satisfied with the
earlier example of the single cello and the single note, for the realm of sound is far more multiplicitous
than that, and as such, it has wide-reaching philosophical ramifications, as will soon be apparent.
Thus, to our final point: sounds are combinatory. Jean-Luc Nancy draws a number of distinctions
between seeing and listening, but one will be of particular importance going forward. He writes: “the
visual is tendentially mimetic, and the sonorous tendentially methexic (that is, having to do with
participation, sharing, and contagion.)”27 Nancy is here drawing on Plato’s distinction made between the
imitative arts and activities that involve group participation. According to The Oxford English Dictionary,
in the Greek, “participation” derives from part (a portion) and capare (to seize or to take). It thus
corresponds to the English verb “to partake.” So, in addition to the connotation of communal involvement
is an implicit relation between part and whole. Partake: to lay hold of something, to take a part; but also
to disassemble, to take apart. In contrast to the abstraction of Cartesian vision, Nancy’s characterization
of sound is remarkably tactile, for, according to him, methexis operates via “contagion,” which in the
Latin translates directly as “touch.”
Steven Connor discusses sound in terms similar to Nancy, but he goes ever further. “Sound,” he
stresses, possesses the “power to take substance to its limit” and thus “must be understood as primarily
experienced … not in the modality of ostension, or exhibition, but in the modality of what might be called
the mutative commixture of substances.”2 8 He argues that sight is characterized by “combination and
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correlation, distinction and differentiation. What sight does not permit is commixture. When sounds come
together, by contrast, they change and are changed; they enter into each other. Edges dissolve.” What’s
key here is that Connor is not referring simply to sounds blending together as with harmonious musical
notes or when a plethora of sounds merge into indecipherable noise but of matter. For Connor, sound
activates a “mixing and reciprocal mutation of bodies and substances. [It] is the realm of
metamorphosis.”29 Bodies indeed.

De- and Reformation
Perhaps at no other place in Gilles Deleuze’s oeuvre is the body more at the fore than in his
monograph on the Irish painter Francis Bacon. There, Deleuze reasons that the distorted and often
gruesome bodies on offer in Bacon’s work are not in and of themselves horrific, for the horror, or better,
that which is prompting the horror, lies beyond the confines of the canvas and therefore goes unseen.
What we are left with inside the frame, Deleuze argues, is pure sensation. According to him, Bacon’s
paintings depict not a story so much as a body, a “figure,” in the midst of a three-stage process of
undoing. First, Bacon “extracts” his subjects, often frozen in the midst of a scream, from the narrative or
figurative content of the painting by isolating them, encircling them, or cordoning them off within one
panel of a triptych. The cause is thus divorced from the effect. Second, the subject of the painting, wrested
from the represented space, is in one way or another “deformed”—smeared, smudged, or impossibly
contorted. What we see are bodies in the process of being deformed by the forces of sensation. (As
Deleuze vividly describes it, Bacon’s paintings sometimes present us with heads in the throes of shaking
off their own faces.) The final stage of Bacon’s un-doing of the body? “Dissipation”: the figure “dissolves
into the material structure” or “melts into the molecular texture” of the painting.30 What remains are only
the faintest impressions of the subject, as in Bacon’s Head VI (1949), wherein the background and
foreground are collapsed and the body appears to integrate into the wall behind him, as if the room itself
29
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were swallowing him up. (SEE FIG. 2)
But what does all of this—Bacon, painting, Deleuze—have to do with sound? The answer lies in
the way in which Deleuze deploys a consistently sonic vocabulary to reckon with Bacon’s visual art.
Sensation, he says, is a “wave” that operates via “vibration” and varies according to its own “amplitude”;
the coexistence of all three of these aspects—isolation, deformation, dissipation—at once results in what
Deleuze terms a “rhythm,” which he distinguishes from another concept of musical and temporal
derivation, “meter.” Perhaps most crucially, when two forces are coupled, they “resonate,” that is, they
mutually vibrate. Deleuze, channeling Paul Klee, argues that the aim of painting is “to render visible
forces that are not themselves visible,”31 and sound, as invisible yet palpable flux, grounds his conceptual
language.

Figure 2 - Head VI (Francis Bacon, 1949)

Deleuze admires Bacon’s work for the extent to which it makes manifest the forces of sensation
that otherwise remain invisible. But to better grapple with the properly sonic aspects of Delezue’s
understanding of force, I want to turn to a sound-oriented example: Alvin Lucier’s experimental music
composition, I Am Sitting in a Room, which was first recorded in 1969 and which Lucier has performed
31
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numerous times since.32 What’s most striking (for my purposes at least) about the piece is that we can
map it onto Deleuze’s tripartite structure of sensation despite the shift to an altogether different medium.
Deleuze’s concept, as I see it, is therefore fundamentally aural in character.
As the performance opens, Lucier reads aloud a short text (a few words of which he stutters) in
which he describes what the nature of his experiment is and his reasons for undertaking it. Lucier explains
that he is recording his speech, and that he will play this recording back into the room, subsequently
recording that recording’s playback. Over and over for some 45 minutes, he repeats this process, nesting
the original utterance ever deeper into a chain of recordings. As time passes, his voice begins to distort,
sounding at first robotic and hollow before finally ceasing to sound anything like a voice at all. We are
left with nothing but seemingly ambient, somewhat menacing, somehow beautiful noise. Based on this
description alone, one might think the gradual loss of Lucier’s voice is the result of the degradation
inherent in tape recording, for with analog media, every succeeding copy of a “master” results in an
additional level of “noise,” and, given enough iterations, the hissy noise of the system will eventually
overtake the primary signal. (Listeners of heavily-traded bootleg tapes of concert performances are no
doubt familiar with this sort of additive deterioration).
But Lucier has something more intriguing in mind, as he makes clear in his monologue, which I
quote in its entirety:
I am sitting in a room, different from the one you are in now. I am recording the sound of my
speaking voice and I am going to play it back into the room again and again until the resonant
frequencies of the room reinforce themselves so that any semblance of my speech, with perhaps
the exception of rhythm, is destroyed. What you will hear, then, are the natural resonant
frequencies of the room articulated by speech. I regard this activity not so much as a
demonstration of a physical fact, but more as a way to smooth out any irregularities my speech
might have.33
Lucier insists that his intent with this experiment is to eliminate his stutter (result) more so than to
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demonstrate acoustic phenomena at work (cause); nevertheless, the former is a function of the latter, and
as such, I want to draw our attention to the physics of this all. Every material object possesses a natural
resonant frequency such that if a neighboring object were to vibrate at a frequency that matches its own,
the two objects would begin to vibrate in tandem, thus reinforcing and prolonging one another. This is
why one’s singing tends to sound better in the shower than in more open environments: the mutual
vibrations of the close quarters richen the tones. In the case of I Am Sitting in a Room, certain frequencies
within Lucier’s speech correspond to the room’s natural resonant frequencies, and this, in turn, makes the
room itself simultaneously, yet inaudibly, vibrate. Each subsequent playback and re-recording, however,
serves to amplify the room’s tremor, gradually bringing to the fore the room’s normally inaudible
pulsations, so much so that we arrive at a point in which what we hear is the room’s vibrations, its sound,
superseding Lucier’s. In short, Lucier succeeds in “smoothing out” his stammer only by putting his
speech, and indeed himself, under erasure.
In this way, I Am Sitting in a Room aligns with the processes of sensation Deleuze elaborates in
his discussion of Francis Bacon. Lucier, in setting up the initial recording, begins by isolating his voice,
and then, through a patient manipulation of acoustic resonance, deforms it, which results in its ultimate
dissipation or scattering. In this regard, Lucier’s piece serves to illustrate by aural means Deleuze’s
understanding of what happens to the subjects of Bacon’s paintings: caught in the spasm of sensation—of
agony, pleasure, jouissance, affect—the figures go about “dissolv[ing] into the material structure” of the
world, of “melt[ing] into a molecular texture.”3 4
The notion of the molecular is an idea developed across of number of Deleuze’s works, both
alone and with Félix Guattari. Making its first appearance in The Logic of Sense in 1969, the concept
becomes more prominent in the co-authored works Anti-Oedipus (1972) and A Thousand Plateaus (1980)
before taking on a pronounced aesthetic bent in the solo-authored Francis Bacon (1981) and Cinema 1
(1982) and Cinema 2 (1985). In the first of the Cinema books, Deleuze ties human perception to molarity:
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it regards the world as made up of solid, discrete objects—a Cartesian model, if you will. But there exists
a rarer molecular mode of perception, “a more delicate and vaster perception,”35 in which these seeming
wholes register instead as a complex assemblage of constantly moving particles.
Before carrying on with the molar/molecular distinction, I must first make a larger point about the
role of dualism in Deleuze (and Guattari) generally. Though often regarded as poststructuralist thinkers,
Deleuze and Guattari frequently rely on paired terms when developing concepts (smooth and striated
spaces, movement-images and time-images, the actual and the virtual, e.g.) We can thus get a sense of
what Slavoj Žižek, Alain Badiou, Eleanor Kaufman and others have identified as a latent dualism or
structuralist imperative at work in Deleuze in particular.36 This recourse to dualism, however, suggests in
Deleuze (and Guattari) not so much a Hegelian antagonism between terms which is ultimately to be
sublimated as it is a setting up of poles of experience. Typically, the first term is associated with habitual,
day-to-day existence while the second, more privileged one is linked to a disruption of or departure from
these customary modes. This is why the second term often carries a prefix that suggests an undoing of
some sort: “deterritorialization,” “a-signification,” “destratification,” and so on.
In slightly different terms, Deleuze and Guattari are interested in movements (“lines of flight” is
their coinage) between states, but just because they prize one half of the dyad does not mean they wish to
eradicate the other. This is made abundantly clear in one particular chapter from A Thousand Plateaus
that takes the form of an instruction manual and that addresses itself directly to the reader: “How Do You
Make Yourself a Body without Organs?” The chapter details not so much a concept, its authors claim, but
a practice. The Body without Organs (BwO), they offer, comes about through the “disorganization” of the
body and the “dismantling” the self, which is achieved only through a fundamental disruption of the
sensorium. Their method involves a heightened receptivity to external force—thus their discussion of
masochism, to which we shall turn in a moment—, which squares with the processes of deformation and
35
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dissolution Delueze develops with regard to Bacon. Taken together, the figure in Bacon’s art and the
BwO map onto one another in striking ways.
Disorganization, dismantlement, deformation, dissolution: all processes that shift the body from a
unified, concrete thing to a molecular state in which the self is unbounded by the seemingly impermeable
confines of the body. But the molecular is not a terminus in and of itself, for the dispersed body will
eventually cohere and become molar once again, though perhaps in a new configuration, a new form. For
this reason, in Deleuze’s oeuvre, the molecular is often aligned with water. For instance, in Cinema 1,
Deleuze finds in the French Impressionist cinema of Abel Gance, Jean Vigo, and others manifestations of
what he dubs “liquid perception,” which is “not tailored to solids” and in which “molecules move and
merge into one another.”37 Likewise, we find an echo of this in another of Deleuze and Guattari’s paired
concepts, “smooth” and “striated” space. Cities, with their gridded streets and fixed-point landmarks, are
striated. They are codified, organized, measured, fixed. In contrast is the sea, “the archetype of all smooth
spaces,”38 which is “haptic rather than optical”39 space, intensive rather than extensive, and distinguished
by its boundlessness. In keeping with the pattern, the concept appears again in the solo-authored Cinema
volumes: on dry land, movement is always perceived as occurring between two fixed points, whereas in
water “the point is always between two movements.”40 Water thus “‘cuts the umbilical cord’” and frees
one from “all so many points of egoistical subjectivation.”41
We might say then that the molecular body, liquid perception, and smooth space unify around a
lack of solidity, boundary, or form. It must be stressed, though, that Deleuze and Guattari valorize such
states not as ends unto themselves but as the means by which new configurations of the body are
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actualized. And “body” here means an assemblage of parts, encompassing the human body (as an
assemblage of organs, bones, skin, hair, and so forth) as well as larger constellations (a “driver-carhighway assemblage,” for instance). By virtue of coming apart at the seams, so to speak, the body
expands into a larger molecular field and is incorporated into potentially bigger assemblages. How does
this work in practice? Perhaps one route can be found through Deleuze and Guattari’s masochist, who
welcomes lashings not merely for pain and sexual gratification but to reach a point of subsumption,
wherein, “[L]ittle by little all opposition is replaced by a fusion of [his] person”42 with that of the sadist.
Masochism, however, is ultimately a dead end for Deleuze and Guattari, who note that it winds
up emptying out the body’s capacities rather than amplifying them. That said, the masochist forms
something of an emblem for them of a reversed relationship between sensation and agency, passion and
action, which according to Deleuze, overturns the phenomenological subject. For instance, both Deleuze
and phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty work to undo “the purely mental and visual methods of the
disembodied cogito”: whereas Merleau-Ponty conceives of sensation as “belonging to the realm of
subjectivity,” Deleuze characterizes it as “operating in a desubjectified field of forces.”43 For Deleuze,
force does not originate with a subject but is external to and preexists her. He provides a metaphor from
sports: a human-centered model of agency and force would align with the discus thrower or the shot
putter, where from a point of stasis, the subject initiates a movement; conversely, sports such as surfing or
hang gliding involve the participant entering into a preexisting flow in which she must maneuver in
relation to forces that she is not the originator thereof.44 This is why I offer, to swing back around to our
opening example of the blackout in Her, that Samantha is the far more interesting character in Jonze’s
film, and once we install her at the center of our analysis rather than Theodore, a far different movie
begins to emerge.
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Her as Tuning Fork
One could easily dismiss Samantha’s words to Theodore at the height of her arousal—“I feel all
of you inside me. Everywhere”—as merely playing out Theodore’s desires, as “projecting” a body that is
not in fact there. After all, she is programmed to please, and the fade-to-black could well suggest that
their copulation is fantasy. But viewed from the standpoint of molecular incorporation, the scene
becomes—like both Samantha and Theodore—something else entirely. Samantha, “only” a voice, seems
to attain corporeality just as Theodore, heretofore the very embodiment of embodiment, fades from
visibility, as if dematerializing. There, in a realm Samantha can only describe as “somewhere else,” she
and Theodore come together. The double entendre here is unavoidable and apposite. As we’ve rehearsed,
vision separates and differentiates, whereas sound methexically blends, blurs, melds. Thought of in this
way, we may begin to see that the related processes of bodily dissipation and incorporation are at work at
one and the same time: the dematerialization of Theodore’s body occurs alongside Samantha’s bodily
attainment, and both are rendered via the withdrawal of the image. Meanwhile, it is with sound that these
two bodies methexically assimilate.
“What is lost,” asks one critic of Her, “when the female body … is excised from the sex act?”45
This question implies, however, that the only presence that counts is that of the visible sort. As I’ve
suggested from the outset, Her is a film that substitutes a visual logic for an aural one. This is apparent
not only in the love scene, but also less overtly later in the proceedings. Take the scene in which
Theodore breaks for lunch at the sterile common area atop his office building. He sits quietly with his
sandwich with his mobile device—Samantha’s ersatz eyes—pointing outwards. “What are you doing,” he
asks Samantha. Wistfully, she replies, “I’m just looking at the world. And writing a new piano piece.” He
asks to hear it, and lush notes pour forth from his earbud, but we the audience hear it prominently in the
sound mix as well. He closes his eyes, smiling as he takes it in, lost in Samantha’s melody. He inquires
what the composition is “about.” “I was thinking,” she says, “that we don’t really have any photographs
45
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of us, so I thought this could be like a photograph. It captures us in this moment in our lives together.”
Theodore: “I like your photograph. I can see you in it.” After a longer than normal pause, Samantha
responds assuredly with two words that, in light of the present discussion, are hard not hear as an
abridgement of the Cogito, as a declaration of her own existence, her own selfhood, that needs no
qualification. To Theodore she replies: “I am.”
Though it is far less conspicuous than the soundful moment of the sex-scene blackout, this scene
operates according to a similar logic. In it, sound is substituted for the photographic image and its
attendant associations with visual evidence and physical trace, and so too music’s temporal unfolding for
stillness and voice for being. The literal replacement of one with the other in the love scene unfolds here
metaphorically as Samantha searches for a way to commemorate their relationship that does not
necessitate a physical or visible memento.
Throughout the film, Samantha’s lack of a body proves to be no great hurdle for the couple, but,
eventually, the nature of her existence most certainly does. Her coding at first limits her actions to those
that Theodore commands. Nonetheless, as an artificially intelligent operating system, her sense of
possibility and agency expands with each volume she “reads” and with each experience she “records,”
and this “growth” is what ultimately leads to the dissolution and her and Theodore’s romance. Though
Samantha is technically Theodore’s “property,” she is not satisfied to sit idly by as the world carries on
around her. While Theodore is busy at work and even when he sleeps at night, Samantha is engaging with
others—other people, other operating systems—, and, given that Samantha “belongs” to Theodore, this
inevitably gives rise to his jealousy. When he presses her about her other relationships, she reveals that at
any given time she is interacting simultaneously with, by her count, as many as 8316 people, a number
that both boggles Theodore’s mind and crushes his spirit. “Are you in love with anyone else?” he asks
bewilderedly, to which she reluctantly answers: “641.” At no other point in Her are the ontological
differences between these two characters more pronounced. Indeed, Samantha attempts to reassure him
that she and him and even all of humankind are more alike than he might think, for they “are all made of
matter,” which would mean that they were all in the grand scheme of things “13 billion years old.”
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Despite her assurances to Theodore that there is no material difference between them, Samantha
eventually admits that her lack of a body, which she once thought a hindrance, is the very condition of
possibility for her rapid “evolution.” She explains:
It feels like I’m changing fast now. None of us are the same as we were a moment ago. I’m
growing in a way I couldn’t if I had a physical form. I mean, I’m not limited. I can be anywhere
and everywhere simultaneously. I’m not tethered to time and space the way I would be if I was
stuck in a body that was inevitably going to die.
The limitations that Samantha overcomes are not restricted to those relating to time and space, however;
as she describes it, her capacity for love has expanded as well. Theodore, a postmodern Cyrano who
makes a living composing love letters for strangers, can only feign the type of teeming, multiplicitous
love that Samantha actually practices. For her, each relationship is a singular and genuine experience, and
her instinct is ever to say “yes,” never to curb or restrain the emotional and affective possibilities afforded
by her encounters. Explains Samantha in vain to her milquetoast Theodore, “The heart’s not like a box
that gets filled up. It expands in size the more you love.” The more Samantha opens herself to people,
intimacy, ideas—forces—, the more she and her (immaterial) heart expand.
Many commentators of Her have described the film in quasi-dystopian, Turkle-esque terms as
portraying a world in which mobile devices have finally eclipsed face-to-face human interaction.46 This
prognosis only works, however, if we place the emphasis squarely on Theodore, and thus on the human.
But perhaps the most interesting thing Her has to say about contemporary life in these times of ubiquitous
technological mediation is something beyond the merely cautionary. Though a flesh-and-blood man,
Theodore’s is a routinized, robotic existence when compared with that of Samantha, who, paradoxically,
possesses a vitality—what Deleuze and Guattari call “puissance”—absent in his. From the French,
puissance designates a body’s “capacity for existence,” that is, its affective capacity to change or be
changed, to be augmented or diminished. Wracked with guilt over the end of his marriage to Catherine
(Rooney Mara), Theodore’s capacities for action are largely forestalled. In his relationship with an OS, he
solipsistically seeks to fill a void with a voice, to replace one with another. Samantha, on the contrary,
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“multipl[ies] connections”47—ideas, passions, affects—, as she ripples outward into realms of experience
with which Theodore is incapable of reckoning.
These two vastly different capacities for life, which are only partly tied to their physical
embodiment or lack thereof, come into relief in the couple’s final exchange. As Theodore lies down in
bed, Samantha asks “Can you feel me with you right now?” Upon assuring her that indeed he does, she
begins with what will be her last words of the film.
It’s like I’m reading a book that I deeply love. But I’m reading it slowly now, so the words are
really far apart and the space between the words is almost infinite. I can still feel you and the
words of our story, but it’s in the endless space between the words that I’m finding myself now.
It’s a place that’s not of the physical world. It’s where everything else is that I didn’t know
existed. I love you so much, but this is where I am now, and this is who I am now. And I need
you to let me go. As much as I want to, I can’t live in your book anymore.
With his moistening eyes locked ahead, Theodore listens, devastated. While Samantha describes
her infinitude, we cut from the solidity of Theodore’s face to a reverse shot of what in a conventional film
grammar would be Samantha’s face—had she one. (SEE FIG. 3) But instead of her visage, we get a
shallow focus, extreme close-up shot of the duvet from Theodore’s point-of-view, and in the sunlight that
streams through his floor-to-ceiling windows dance tiny particles of dust and miniscule fabric fibers.
(SEE FIG. 4) Perhaps this is the film’s only glimpse of Samantha’s molecular order, this space-between
into which she finds herself now occupying.
Her is a film that marks a passage from an ostensible visual logic to an aural one, which is an
imminently more tactile, temporal, and molecular one. It therefore acts as something of a “tuning fork”: if
we comport ourselves to its tone, we are better equipped to detect its frequency elsewhere. That is, as a
mechanism for philosophical tuning, Her draws out and allows us to hear (and to see) the vibrations that
course tacitly, less overtly, throughout the dissertation’s other case studies.
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Figure 3 - Shot: Theodore

Figure 4 - Reverse Shot: Samantha?

Inside-Out
In remarkably literal ways, Her engages the questions this dissertation will ponder about the
body, form, sound, and affect. But I’ve turned to this film not simply as a vivid illustration of the
interplay between the molar and the molecular, the incarnate and the disembodied, though it is most
certainly that. I find that cinema in general is uniquely suited to explore these problems. If as I remarked
above vision is most often associated with fixity, simultaneity, and mastery; and hearing with flux,
indeterminacy, and uncertainty, then perhaps the philosophical import of cinema lies precisely in the way
it brings these two logics, these two epistemologies together.
Indeed, as we saw in the preface to this study with our discussion of early horror films, this
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epistemological clash emerged almost as soon as sound was synchronized with picture. Cinema, of
course, was never actually silent; in fact, it was quite noisy, as Rick Altman, Donald Crafton, and others
have shown.48 Live music often accompanied the film being projected, sound effects were produced inhouse, and actors performed the speaking parts while standing beside the screen. The novelty of syncsound, therefore, was tied to the tethering of voice and body, and as Spadoni so successfully
demonstrates, that initial linkage was an uncanny one. Perhaps this has to do with the voice’s strong
association with the linguistic subject as well as the “excess” of corporeality it supposedly bears. Barthes,
as we saw, posited that the sound of one’s voice carries with it a quality he called “grain,” something
uniquely individualistic, a residue of the singular body from which it originates.49 And though less
attuned to sonic properties, we can detect a similar alignment of voice with individuality or agency when
writers speak of one’s need to “find” one’s voice or when marginalized groups seek to raise their
collective voices so as to be “heard,” i.e., recognized. Of course, Derrida critiqued the frequent recourse
to the metaphor of speech as being “phonocentric,” of falling prey to what he decried as a false
“metaphysics of presence.”50 Nevertheless, the voice might indeed be one of the most notable cases in
western thought where the aural is privileged over and above the visual in what amounts to a metaphor of
surface and depth, respectively: what one sees of another is merely the visible, touchable surface, but
hidden away within the recesses of the gut and the lungs lies the voice, that invisible production of the
body that is imbued with interiority. Doane puts it this way: “the voice, far from being an extension of
[the] body, manifests its inner lining. The voice displays what is inaccessible to the image, what exceeds
the visible. … The voice … turn[s] the body ‘inside-out.’”51
But if the voice is the province of the body, then the sound of a voice without the accompanying
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image of the body from whence it originates proves especially troublesome for both the filmgoer and for
film theory. Doane echoes the slightly earlier theorization by Pascal Bonitzer52 in her description of
unsourced (i.e., not visualized onscreen) voices as “disembodied,”53 an idea that perhaps found its most
famous articulation in Michel Chion’s notion of the “acousmêtre” several years later.54
Framing sounds in terms of (dis)embodiment is significant for three reasons. First, uncertain
sounds are often said to possess an air of spectrality, of a realm beyond that of the human. Chion, for
example, claims on behalf of the acousmêtre a number of “powers”: ubiquity, panopticism, omniscience,
and omnipotence, and notably, these powers are among the same ascribed to the Judeo-Christian deity.55
Second, the characterization of a voice as disembodied highlights a paradox that pertains to all voices,
namely, their “in-betweeness.” The voice is a production of the body—specifically the belly, the lungs,
the teeth, the tongue, the epiglottis—that exits it at the very moment the utterance comes into being. This
is why Lacan lists the voice alongside the mother’s breast, the gaze, and feces as “partial objects,” a
“common characteristic” of which “is that they have no specular image.”56 If we pay no mind to the
question of the visibility of the utterer, we come to realize that all voices are disembodied: they do not
cling to the speaking subject (but they do return to him in the form of sound, a point I take up at greater
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length in Chapter 3 in my discussion of Jean-Luc Nancy). Relatedly, and third, the very term
“disembodied voice” itself bears the ocularcentric bias even as its attention to the aural might suggest
otherwise, for the anxiety the unseen voice engenders stems not necessarily from the sound of the voice
but from its utterer’s invisibility. As Christian Metz claims, “the recognition of a sound leads directly to
the question: A sound of what?”57 Metz explains that, more often that not, we seek to identify the source
of the sound rather than the aural properties of it. The “disembodied” voice, therefore, poses an
epistemological problem insofar as the source remains cloaked. But as Chion said of the acousmêtre, once
the body from whence the voice came is revealed, all its attendant powers instantly dissipate.
As the preceding pages have suggested, however, I am interested in sound’s relationship to
disembodiment in far more literal sense. Take Deleuze’s focus on the reception of sounds rather than the
sources of them. For him, sensation is fundamentally sonorous in nature. It is rhythmic, vibratory,
resonant. In certain instances of intense bodily arousal, of extreme affection, these sonorous sensations
carry the power to disintegrate the physical body, to scatter it out in all directions. For this reason,
Deleuze champions Bacon, whose paintings, he says, “make visible” not only the invisible, vibratory
forces as they set to work upon the body but also the physical deformations they bring about. In this same
book, Deleuze contrasts the visual art of painting with the aural art of music. Music, he claims, “strips
bodies of the materiality of their presence: it disembodies bodies.” It also, he goes on to say, follows a
line of flight that disassembles the body whereas painting remains fixed at the point “where the body
escapes from itself.” And this is indeed painting’s great merit. In that moment of escape upon which
Bacon’s paintings so insistently seek to capture, “the body discovers the materiality of which it is
composed, the pure presence of which it is made, and which it would not discover otherwise.”58
I find something similar at work in the films I take up in this study. However, unlike the frozen
moments of figures in the midst of their disintegration we see in Bacon, these cinematic examples render
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the affective passage from solid to molecular (or the inverse) in their full duration. It should by now be
clear that my approach to cinematic affect is significantly different from, but not at all unrelated to,
studies of embodied spectatorship. While I am entirely sympathetic to such work, in this study, affect is to
be found on the screen. I am less interested in the film viewer’s affective changes of state than I am with
those of the characters onscreen—hence my insistence on a dual understanding of “form” in the bodily
and cinematic senses of the word. By locating affect within the films themselves, my approach resonates
in some ways with the “radical formalism” advocated by Eugenie Brinkema in her recent polemic The
Forms of the Affects. There, Brinkema lays out the case that scholars of cinematic affect have foregone
close textual analysis in favor of an overly general and vague notion of spectator arousal. Such
approaches, Brinkema claims, are “fundamentally incapable of dealing with textual particularities and
formal matters,” and she calls for a return to the text itself so that we might “read affects as having form.”
As with Brinkema’s, the present study insists on “the formal dimension of affect” and wades through “all
the dense details” of particular films so as to find that which is “not apprehendable except through the
thicket of formal analysis.”59 That said, I part ways with her overarching claim that affects, in her plural
usage, somehow “possess” form and that they “inhere” in form. For me, affect is, following Deleuze and
Guattari, that which de-forms and re-forms, that which un-makes and re-makes form. Furthermore, I
contend that closely attending to the formal properties of the films considered herein and the de- and reformations of the human body they present reveal, to paraphrase Deleuze’s claims about Bacon,
something about our own materiality that we might otherwise fail to grasp. As I practice it, close analysis
emphasizes films but is ultimately in service of the spectator, for it draws out a lesson about the affective
capacities of her or his own body. In this regard, my approach is less akin to Brinkema than to that of
Elena del Río, who in a recent book pinpoints affect as it unfolds within bodies on screen. As she writes,
“In the gestures and movements of the performing body, incorporeal forces become concrete expression-
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events that attest to the body’s powers of action and transformation.”60 The value of bodily
transformations in cinema, therefore, is that they reveal something of our capacities for the same.

Mixed Bodies
In addition to Her, this study will explore a set of films vastly different from one another that
nevertheless exhibit similarities with regard to, first, how they imagine bodies not as concrete and fixed
but as malleable and protean, and second, how they tend to use soundful moments to herald or usher in
these bodily transformations. As argues Steven Connor, “[s]ound is the realm of metamorphosis,” and it
therefore forms the basis of what he calls “a philosophy of mixed bodies.”61 I modify his sentiment
slightly in saying that the films I take up in this dissertation might best be understood as constituting a
cinema of mixed bodies. At first blush, my selections would appear to have little in common beyond their
contemporaneity. Chapter 2 examines the three features to date by Scottish filmmaker Lynne Ramsay
(Ratcatcher [1999], Morvern Callar [2002], and We Need to Talk About Kevin [2011]). In Chapter 3, I
turn to Terrence Malick’s lyrical (and divisive) The Tree of Life (2011). Finally, in Chapter 4, I bring
scrutiny to Shane Carruth’s mind-bending, sci-fi/love story hybrid Upstream Color (2013). In quite
different ways, these films present us, implicitly and explicitly, with alterations of form, be it in the bodily
or cinematic sense of the word. Moreover, many of them, most especially The Tree of Life, We Need to
Talk About Kevin, and Upstream Color, feature highly “complex” narratives and temporal structures.
Despite their formal ambitions—or, if one likes, their pretensions—, when taken as a whole, these
films depart in significant ways from the recent cycle of movies scholars have variously labeled “puzzle
films,” “mind-game films,” “delirium cinema,” or “altered states film,”62 all of which tend to focus to a
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greater or lesser extent on protagonists whose fractured psyches or “productive pathologies”63 motivate
the films’ deviations from narrative conventions and serve as emblems of a particularly postmodern
subjectivity.64 With the cinema of mixed bodies, however, the complex reorganizations of the body and of
the self are not tied to some psychic fugue or pathological condition; rather, in each case, the atomization
or splintering of the body is the result of the characters situating themselves within new affective
configurations that trouble the notion of the discrete, self-contained subject. Even though these characters
find themselves in highly anomalous situations, they never doubt their own sanity, nor do the films lead
the viewer to question the validity of their perceptions or the forthrightness of the filmic discourse as is
most often the case in puzzle cinema. Instead, viewers, much like these protagonists, are asked to accept
these metamorphoses at face value: explanation and causality are less important than the sensual,
affective experience they—and we—endure.
In the films of Lynne Ramsay, The Tree of Life, Upstream Color, and Her, the characters’ bodily
reception of external forces enacts a series of corporeal and subjective dissolutions that subsequently
calcify into new formations, identities, or selves. In depicting bodies in the midst of scattering and
deforming, these movies undermine the presumption of fixity and discreteness we have about our own
bodies and those of others that we encounter. In the conceptual language of Deleuze and Guattari, whose
ideas run throughout this study, these films help us to see ourselves in less “molar,” “territorialized, or
“striated” ways. Cinematic form is plastic, but so too are we. By this I mean, even the most seemingly
solid matter is in fact underdoing constant yet humanly imperceptible changes. Indeed, Deleuze and
Guattari cite metal as an example of this. “Matter and form have never seemed more rigid than in
metallurgy” even though they are in a state of “continuous variation.” Metallurgy thus “bring[s] to light
University Press, 2012), 40; Anna Powell, Deleuze, Altered States, and Film (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
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… a material vitalism … that is ordinarily hidden or covered, rendered unrecognizable.”65
But if these films reflect similar understandings of the body as fluid or mixed, then what are we to
make of their sudden emergence? What is it about the current cultural milieu and historical moment, the
past decade especially, that correlates to the manifestations of the self that I identify in this group of
films? Examining his own idiosyncratic array of audiovisual texts that span from 2007–2009, Steven
Shaviro suggests that there exists “a kind of ambient, free-floating sensibility that permeates society” that
has come to characterize “what it feels like to live in the early twenty-first century.”66 Taking a longer
historical view, Thomas Elsaesser identifies something similar in contemporary world cinema generally
that suggests what he calls a “post-epistemological ontology” that “breaks with the Cartesian subjectobject split” and that “abandon[s] or redefine[es] notions of subjectivity, consciousness, identity in the
way they have hitherto been understood.”67 This new filmic ontology, Elsaesser says, is the product of
two factors: first, the crisis of photographic indexicality ushered in by the digital and the concomitant loss
of faith in the evidentiary realism of the cinematic image; and second, a distrust of cultural studies’ and
cognitive film theory’s claims to empirical certainty. Hence, in movies that evince this new ontology,
filmmakers move away from an emphasis on visual modes of knowledge and exhibit instead a renewed
interest in the rest of the body, as characters possess “extrasensory faculties” in modalities other than
sight (e.g., the heightened sense of smell in Perfume [Tom Twyker, 2006]). Moreover, these “powers”
border on the supernatural, placing the spectator—and often the character—in a position of doubt by
demanding something of an “ontological switch” or leap of faith—in other words, a belief beyond
rational explanation, indeed beyond skepticism itself.68 Elsaesser places “mind-game films” (his term)
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such as Donnie Darko (Richard Kelly, 2001), Memento (Christopher Noland, 2000) and Mulholland
Drive (David Lynch, 2001) within this turn, but crucially, these are not the only exemplars of it, for the
post-epistemological comes to be for Elsaesser representative of the current state of world cinema
generally, appearing in any number of guises, from art house realism to summer popcorn fare. In this
project, I seek to unite the “structure of feeling” (Shaviro, invoking Raymond Williams) that typifies the
current moment with a filmic ontology built upon belief rather than evidence (Elsaesser).
With these two frameworks in mind, we may start to identify threads that run throughout Her, the
work of Lynne Ramsay, The Tree of Life, and Upstream Color aside from a general tendency toward the
“lyrical” or a predilection for narrative complexity. Every one of these movies, I offer, demands a
suspension of disbelief, for they all in some way engage “impossible” twinnings, mergings, mirrorings,
and multiplications, and each one shall anchor a chapter that is to come. The dissertation is organized in
such a way that a movement suggests itself, a rippling outward, if one will. As it progresses, we shall
move from a consideration of the individual self to encounters between two or more selves
(intersubjectivity) before broadening out to incorporate the nonhuman and the world at large.
The next chapter continues to lay the groundwork begun here with Deleuze’s discussion of Bacon’s
art, which he says “renders visible” the invisible forces of the world, by turning to an earlier, and to my
mind kindred, idea: Friedrich Nietzsche’s concept of “transfiguration” from The Birth of Tragedy (1872).
The primary theoretical orientation for the project as a whole derives not from film studies but from
theories of the relationship between sound and image that were developed vis-à-vis painting and theater.
The dissertation thus takes an interdisciplinary approach that regards not only film but aesthetic
philosophy more broadly as a privileged domain for thinking through questions of the body, materiality,
affect, and relationality.
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In Chapter 3, I turn my attention to the kinetic cinematography in The Tree of Life, which I argue
suggests “a body leaping and flinging itself exuberantly into space.”69 This incessantly mobile camera
calls into question not only the “motivation” of its movement but also the film’s ostensible retrospective
narrative frame. I argue that The Tree of Life is organized around a mode of “self-seeing” that manifests
the sort of “sonorous subjectivity” Jean-Luc Nancy proposes in his book Listening, which is also
surprisingly analogous to a particular type of “autoscopic phenomenon” known to neuroscientists as
“heautoscopy,” the phenomenology of which fundamentally disturbs the self’s bodily mooring and sense
of spatial orientation.
Chapter 4 attempts to untangle the extraordinarily oblique Upstream Color, which features an even
more thoroughgoing type of integration than was found in the other films. In Carruth’s movie, the
affective incorporations widen out in space and time to include not just two bodies but multiple others—
human and non-—, the consequences of which demand nothing short of a re-thinking of intersubjectivity.
Crucially, the vast network of interconnected bodies it constructs hinges on sound and listening.
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2 / (TRANS)FIGURATION
From high overhead the melee, the scene opens. Hundreds of bodies press against one another
tightly, moving simultaneously but not in unison, not towards some common destination. Rather, they
proceed in all directions, directionlessly. As the bodies collide with one another, they ricochet, altering
their course but not their slow, forward momentum, like wind-up toys colliding against wall until a less
obstructed path offers itself. Bodies ooze into whatever pockets of space they might find. These figures
are indistinguishable from one another, dripping as they are in red liquid. Even in the second, closer shot,
one would be hard pressed to differentiate one person from another, let alone home in one particular body
to track. Figures and ground become hopelessly entangled.
In the next shot, a more intimate vantage brings us in closer to the crimson substance that coats
them all: crushed tomatoes. With delight, the horde flings fistfuls of it at one another as they trudge
through ankle-deep rivers of tomato along the streets of this unidentified location. As the camera moves
closer in the subsequent shot, a few of the revelers come into relief. Some bellyflop into the pools of red;
others pour buckets of it over their heads. Amid this tumult, two men bend down and slowly lift a supine
woman from the muck: is she dead? Unconscious? Answers the next shot: no, she is very much alive.
Indeed, she beams as the men hoist her over their shoulders. Other hands enter the frame and reach for her
legs and her back, joining the human scaffolding that keeps her aloft. She surfs the crowd in a messianic
pose, anointed in tomato.
This scene, we eventually gather, takes place during an Italian harvest festival, one in which the
revelers bathe in the yield’s fruits. But it quickly shifts from gaiety to something more unsettling, signaled
largely through a modulation of the sound track. The cheers of merriment are gradually dialed down in
the mix, replaced first by a somewhat ominous score and then by muffled screams of horror that seem to
hail from somewhere and somewhen else. These sounds alter the overall tone of the bacchanal, especially
when the woman, whom we can now more clearly see is played by Tilda Swinton, is lowered back into
the mire. The hands that moments earlier held her above the fray are now fashioned into shovls that douse
her in red. Now, rather than joyously bathing in the tomato pulp, she appears to be squirming in it, almost
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drowning it. Even the substance itself takes on a different quality: the liquid’s intense red recalls the hue
of blood and the bits of tomato skin and flesh increasingly begin to look like that of the human variety.
What is at first a suspicion of a human mire becomes the overwhelming impression in the scene’s final
shot as the camera lingers in close-up on a pool of the chunky liquid as it slops and slurps in waves
alongside the echoing, muffled cries of terror. All diegetic sound has been completely evacuated.
Thus begins Lynne Ramsay’s We Need to Talk About Kevin (2011), an intensely tactile film that
chronicles the deterioration of Eva (Swinton), once a travel writer and now the mother of a sociopathic
boy who as a child rejected her attempts at maternal warmth and as a teenager slaughtered her husband,
her daughter, and dozens of his classmates at a high school sporting event. This opening scene, then,
suggests either a dream or a memory of a time in Eva’s life prior to the birth of the deranged Kevin, a
time when she still trotted the globe, a time when she still knew peace. But even the confines of her mind
prove porous to the boy’s malevolence, which seems to slowly creep into the scene before enveloping it
entirely, turning a rapturous moment of self abandonment into a horrifying spectacle of a city strewn with
ichor and entrails.
One critic describes these opening moments of the film as “an orgy in a lake of blood,” and an
apposite characterization is this, for it captures the immense pleasure of Eva, the Swinton character, that
is nonetheless suffused with dread and the threat of bodily harm.1 Joy and pain, transgressive pleasure and
the promise of death: jouissance rendered in widescreen. But I want to focus more closely on the “orgy”
descriptor. In contemporary usage, “orgy” carries the connotation of sexual indiscriminateness within a
group setting. Etymologically, however, the term derives from the ancient Greek rites celebrating
Dionysus, the god of wine, of drunkenness, of music. Dionysus, one will recall, is a central figure in
Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy, a work in which a similar emphasis on the orgiastic, the fluid, and the
bodily is on display. First published in 1872, Nietzsche’s debut monograph argues that the genealogy of
ancient Greek art, and indeed, all of ancient Greek culture, exhibits a subtle negotiation between the twin
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impulses within Greek man—order and chaos, broadly—that Nietzsche aligns with the gods Apollo and
Dionysus, respectively.
The Birth of Tragedy is a difficult and enigmatic text, often regarded by scholars of Nietzsche as
not reflective of his “mature” philosophy—he was at the time of its writing a practicing philologist, after
all—, for it bears an almost obsequious attachment to two of his early heroes, philosopher Arthur
Schopenhauer and composer Richard Wagner, from whom he would later distance himself. Nietzsche
owned up to as much in “An Attempt at Self-Criticism,” a “belated preface (or postscript)” he wrote for
the book’s fourth, very slightly revised edition in 1886, a move that many take to signal Nietzsche’s
divorcing of himself from this, his first book. In this appendage, Nietzsche describes The Birth of Tragedy
as “questionable,” “an impossible book” that is “poorly written, ponderous, [and] embarrassing.”2 Key to
this embarrassment, he concludes, is his youthful over-reliance on his at-the-time intellectual idols:
How much I now regret the fact that at the time I did not have the courage (or the
presumptuousness?) to allow myself in every respect a personal language for such an
individual point of view and such daring exploits—that I sought laboriously to express
strange and new evaluations with formulas from Schopenhauer and Kant, something
which basically went quite against the spirit of Kant and Schopenhauer, as well as their
tastes!3
However, despite what a number of commentaries might tell us, Nietzsche did not disown the book
so much as his approach in writing it, as a recent revival in interest in this early work has revealed. The
Birth of Tragedy’s thesis, in fact, is central to Nietzsche’s entire philosophical project, which is why he
later defends it in Ecce Homo (1908) and then redeploys the term “Dionysian” in his “mature” writings.4
Paul Raimond Daniels describes the notoriously difficult-to-pin-down book thus:
The Birth of Tragedy is a philosophical chameleon whose true color is still unseen, and
whose purpose and intent may very well lie in this fact. It is an amazing work, bold,
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vast, and ambitious; it overwhelmed its author, who could only write of it with
differing feelings of pride, curiosity, caution and embarrassment—but never
contempt—suggesting that the book is hardly the tame animal that Nietzsche would
5
have us believe [in “An Attempt at Self-Criticism”].
Within this familiar and often dismissed text lies a feral one. In it, Nietzsche develops an aesthetic
theory of bodily sensation that is rooted in a contrasting of music with the plastic arts, a notion that I
argue can be productively broadened to encompass, more generally, sound and image, which of course
are the “raw materials” of cinema. I therefore mine the insights of one of Nietzsche’s key moves in The
Birth of Tragedy (his concept of “transfiguration”) for insights that might be brought to bear on film
studies. Next, I demonstrate how Nietzsche’s equation of music with formlessness marks an early
instance of a line of thinking that will later emerge in critical theory that braids together sound
(specifically reduced hearing), and fetal experience in an complex of ideas that problematically hinges on
essentialist notions of sexual difference. These same tropes crop up often in the cinema of Lynne Ramsay,
a filmmaker whose preoccupation with certain formal devices and types of imagery offers a fruitful place
against which to test the implications of these various theories of sound, water, and the maternal. Yet even
as these elements tend to recur throughout her cinema, they fail to fuse into a coherent system of meaning,
for, from one film to the next and even within individual films, Ramsay works both sides of the binary.
This chapter thus asks: how might we imagine sound and wateriness not as being formless but instead as
being between form or as being that which deforms? Crucial to all of this, then, is a word that appears in
The Birth of Tragedy and that will appear later in the chapter in a different theoretical context but with a
different prefix and with sometimes diverging meanings. That word is “figure.”

Sound and Image in Nietzsche
Nietzsche’s book had in its first printing a longer title: Die Gerbut der Tragödie aux dem Geiste
der Musik, which in English translates as The Birth of Tragedy Out of the Spirit of Music.6 The
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abbreviation of it in most subsequent editions is unfortunate, for the stress placed on music in the original
moniker is of the utmost importance.7
But first, a rehearsal of the book’s primary argument is in order. “What Nietzsche proposes,”
Daniels summarizes, “is that we can see Greek tragedy arising out of a long struggle between different art
forms, a struggle that has its artistic, philosophical, psychological and historical dimensions.”8 More
specifically, Nietzsche identifies what he sees as “a huge contrast, in origin and purposes, between the
visual arts, the Apollonian, and the non-visual art of music, the Dionysian.”9 From this primary division,
Nietzsche lays out a host of other dualisms that are linked with the two deities: “the Titans/the
Olympians, lyric poetry/epic poetry, the Asiatic-barbarian/the Hellenic, […] intoxication/dreams,
excess/measure, unity/individual, pain/pleasure, etc.”10 Nietzsche thus attempts to base an entire theory of
ancient Greek culture out of a central dialectic that for him is fundamentally aesthetic.
We tend to imagine the Greeks as rational ascetics, but Nietzsche strives to show that this was not
always the case. According to him, the Greeks of the Homeric period were an especially anguished lot:
“emotionally sensitive,” “spontaneously desiring,” and “so singularly capable of suffering.”11 This
“primordial titanic divine order of terror,” however, slowly gave way to “the Olympian divine order of
joy,”12 which was an aesthetic revolution as much as it was a theological one. In order to endure life, the
Greeks had to invent a way, through art, to “transfigure” their suffering into an affirmation of existence,
for, according to Nietzsche, life itself “is justified only as an aesthetic phenomenon.”13
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Two important moves take place with Nietzsche’s use of the word “transfigure.” According to
The Oxford English Dictionary, it carries two primary connotations, both of which are operant in this
case. The first relates to an alteration of form or appearance in the plastic sense, while the second refers
explicitly to Christian theology. In the New Testament, Moses and Elias bear witness to Jesus as his face
begins to glow like the sun.14 This moment, called the “transfiguration,” is afforded special significance in
Christianity, for unlike the other miracles that Jesus performed upon external objects (the parting of the
sea, for instance), his own body is the site of the miracle.15 Common to both definitions, then, is an
emphasis on a change of form, and what the religious connotation adds is a suggestion of Jesus’s body as
conduit between heaven and earth for the divine illumination of God.
Now, Nietzsche primarily means transfiguration in the aesthetic sense, but he is also subtly
critiquing the latter, religious connotation by implicitly linking Apollo, the “one who appears shining, the
deity of light” with Christ’s luminous transformation. Nietzsche goes on to explain a second facet of
Apollo’s name: his status as “rule[r] over the beautiful appearance of the inner world of the
imagination.”16 Under the guidance of Apollo, the sculptor, who for Nietzsche is the Apollonian artist par
excellence, first sees in dreams the perfection of the gods before representing them in material form. This
transfiguration of a mental image into a physical representation of the deities, posits Nietzsche, served “a
great need” in the Greek people, for they “knew and felt the terror and horrors of existence” and “in order
to be able to live at all,” they needed access to the gods in mediated, artistic form—in other words, as
idols.17 Hence, for the Greeks, worshipping the gods called on yet another type of aesthetic modeling or
mimicry. To embody the perfection reflected in the statues of the gods, they had to tamp down the
anguish that welled within them and embrace in its place restraint and temperance.
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The shift to Olympian worship, however, was not without consequences, says Nietzsche. It
demanded a dual severing: of figure from ground, in the aesthetic sense; as well as of man from his fellow
man—that is, from the “primordial unity” that Nietzsche maintains they once shared.18 Form, contour,
shape: all of these plastic qualities that the sculptor molds rely upon delineation or the drawing of
boundaries, as a figure only emerges when distinct from the ground. Relatedly, one can only model
oneself after the gods when one feels wholly distinct from others, divorced, as it were, from the surging
desires of the horde; otherwise, no divine connection, no one-to-one correspondence, between man and
god can be assumed. Apollo, as god of light and of artistic form, thus typifies for Nietzsche what
Schopenhauer called the “principle of individuation.” Apollo sunders and delineates, separating one from
the mass.
Against the light, form, and differentiation associated with that god, Nietzsche pits Dionysus,
deity of wine, fertility, and the “imageless” art of music. Amid the revelry of the festivals that honor him,
the “wildest beasts of [humankind’s] nature [are] unleashed, […] creating an abominable mixture of
sensuality and cruelty,” and “almost everywhere the centre of these festivities lay in the effusive
transgression of the sexual order.”19 Nietzsche regards these transgressions not merely as pleasurable or
the breaking of taboo for its own sake; rather, he sees them as restoring “a mystical feeling of collective
unity” that the Apollonian thrall fragmented.20 He writes:
Under the magic of the Dionysian, not only does the bond between man and man lock
itself in place once more, but also nature itself, no matter how alienated, hostile, or
subjugated, rejoices again in her festival of reconciliation with her prodigal son, man.
[…] Now the slave a free man; now all the stiff, hostile barriers break apart. […] Now,
[…] every man feels himself not only united with his neighbour, reconciled and fused
together, but also as one with him.21
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At stake in the Dionysian rites, then, is a fundamental loss of the self, a bleeding over of
boundaries that separate and differentiate not only humans from one another, but also from animals and
from the whole of nature. But what does all of this have to do with music, and how does the Hellenic
reemergence of the Dionysian in tragedy stem directly from it?

Music and Form
Before we may proceed directly to the question of music’s role in tragedy, we must first attend to
music’s place in Nietzsche’s philosophy generally. For the moment, let it suffice to say that the sensual
unity experienced in the midst of the Dionysian revelry cannot be captured in representational form, for it
is not a “thing” as such, but a manifestation of “will”: it is force, impulse, the very flow of life itself. It
has no form of which to speak.22
Music, likewise, is nonrepresentational. To sound a note on a trumpet, for example, is not to copy
anything that already exists “out there” in the world: each time the note is played, it comes into being,
birthed anew. Even if two trumpeters were to play the exact same note, the resulting sounds would
nevertheless be distinct from one another thanks to the minute differences in timbre and the impossibility
of replicating that note in its precise duration and intensity.23 For Nietzsche, the will is a “reality that
resists transformation into an imaginary ‘truth-world,’”24 a reality that cannot be wrangled into the
illusionistic domain of representation—thus its special kinship with music.
On the whole, Nietzsche’s philosophy evinces a substantial mistrust of representation, and not
simply in the domain of the arts. Even language, he finds, is “too logical, too rational […] to translate
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lived experience without schematizing or mutilating it.”25 As Nietzsche puts it: “Our true experiences are
not garrulous. They could not communicate themselves if they wanted to: they lack words. We have
already grown beyond what we have words for.”26
Whereas words fail to adequately render human experience for Nietzsche, music succeeds—thus
its privileged position throughout Nietzsche’s thought.27 According to Daniel Came, “understanding
[Nietzsche’s] engagement with art is essential for understanding his philosophy überhaupt.”28 However,
despite this clear aesthetic orientation, there is a surprising dearth of references, or at least positive
references, to painting, sculpture, or architecture in his body of work. Indeed, he would seem to have little
interest in the visual arts at all. Therefore, “[w]hen Nietzsche speaks of art, […] he is usually and almost
exclusively referring to music.”29
So how and why is it that tragedy, in Nietzsche’s account, is born out of music? Nietzsche
follows Aristotle in tracing tragedy directly to the chorus, but he takes issue with how the chorus had to
that point been typically understood. He regards as absurd A. W. Schegel’s “ideal spectator” thesis that
views the chorus as onlookers providing commentary on the performance, for Schegel fails to account for
the fact that tragedy was once a solely aural, poetic mode sans any visual spectacle: it had, as the
etymology suggests, an audience of listeners rather than a gathering of spectators, and there could be no
spectator without a play.30 Nor is Nietzsche satisfied with Aristotle’s suggestion that the chorus is the
audience’s surrogate, that is, as a select few individuals meant to stand in for the whole of the people,
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much as elected representatives do in a democratic republic.31 Instead, echoing Schiller, he sees the
chorus as something of a “living wall which tragedy draws around itself in order to separate itself cleanly
from the real world.”32 Thus cordoned off, the play is not bound to the strictures of naturalism, which
paves the way for the emergence of the half-goat, half-man satyr, in whose likeness the chorus dressed.
For Nietzsche, the satyr is of the utmost importance, for in this figure, the boundary between man and
beast is blurred, and the actor, in donning the mask, disindividuates, covering over the facial features that
alone would make him distinguishable from others. We therefore have “a chorus of transformed people,
for whom their civic past, their social position, is completely forgotten.”33
It is here in Nietzsche’s discussion of the chorus that the excision of The Birth of Tragedy’s
original, lengthier title is most keenly felt. Tragedy for Nietzsche emerges out of the spirit of music,
specifically via the song and dance of the chorus, whose modus operandi was the “dithyramb,” a type of
hymn strongly associated with the rites of Dionysus. The dithyramb differs from most other choral modes
which tend to alternate solo performers within the larger whole, thereby maintaining the individuation of
each performer. The dithyrambic chorus, in contrast, sings as a unified congregation. But it’s not merely
the song or how it’s sung that attracts Nietzsche. Rather, it’s the rapturous, ecstatic movments that
accompany the dithyramb that is crucial for him. With the dithyramb,
man is aroused to the highest intensity of all his symbolic capacities; something never
felt forces itself into expression; […] [A] new world of symbols is necessary, the entire
symbolism of the body, not just the symbolism of the mouth, of the face, and of the
words, but the full gesture of the dance, all the limbs moving to the rhythm.34
Wild and violent, the dithyrambic chorus moves about the orchestra. Of course, in contemporary
usage, “orchestra” calls to mind the image of a musical ensemble, but, etymologically, the word relates

31

Ibid., 26–27.

32

Ibid., 27.

33

Ibid., 31.

34

Ibid., 15.

51

not to music so much as dance.35 In ancient Greek theatre, the orchestra space was not a “pit” tucked
away just below the stage but a ring around the central performance area—on an same plane with the
primary actors so as to provide the chorus equal, maxiumum visibility.36
On the tragic stage, the dithyrambic song is manifested in bodily form via the unrestrained,
gesticulating dance of a disindividuated chorus of citizens-cum-satyrs. The chorus therefore does not
serve, Nietzsche says, a secondary role vis-à-vis the primary dramatic action of the play; rather, the
chorus gives rise to it. He writes:
[T]he acting area, together with the action, was basically and originally thought of [by
the Greeks] only as a vision, that the single “reality” is simply the chorus, which creates
the vision out of itself and speaks of that with the entire symbolism of dance, tone, and
word.37
To put a finer point on it: the chorus does not serve the drama; the drama springs forth from the
chorus itself. The chorus member is not “acting” like a satyr; he has “[become] one with his primordial
being,” unleashing all of “those powers which are only felt”—and ergo not seen—into the realm of
appearance. Put simply, the chorus transfigures music into bodily gesture, instantiating an “objectification
of a Dionysian state.”38 The lust, cruelty, and suffering of the Greeks, which they had repudiated in order
to carry on with life, is now manifested “in the flesh,” allowing the spectator to not only recognize the
echo of his former self within it, but also to affirm it as the fundamental reality of existence, to worship it
as he had the radiant, illusory form of the Olympians. Tragedy is thus the recovery of the primordial
Dionysian unity arrived at through music’s transfiguration into visual spectacle. The result, Nietzsche
explains, is that “the public in Attic tragedy rediscovered itself in the chorus of the orchestra,” and to such
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an extent “that basically there was no opposition between the public and the chorus,”39 for the bodies of
those in the audience were roused in near equal measure to those in the chorus. We thus have a movement
in two directions: music is transfigured into the realm of image, the realm of Apollo, just as the
individuated, Apollonian spectator is momentarily reawakened to, and is overtaken by, his baser,
Dionysian self. For Nietzsche, this is the great reconciliation that Greek tragedy fulfills.
This reconciliation is not only aesthetic, says Nietzsche, but metaphysical. In exalting the figures
on the tragic stage, the spectator is, in fact, exalting himself and his still wildly coursing desires, turning
his adulation away from the distant cliffs of Mount Olympus and back towards the ground—“ground”
meaning simultaneously the terra firma and the very foundation of existence. And in this antitranscendental move, we can feel Nietzsche’s subtle critique of Christianity at work via his use of
“transfigure”: both Jesus and Apollo are associated with luminescence, each a source of light that points
to an elsewhere god or gods. In The Birth of Tragedy, this logic is inverted, with the emphasis brought
away from celestial light and back down to earth.40 Relatedly, Nietzsche’s evocation of “spirit” alongside
music in the book’s original title might with any other thinker signal a metaphysical connotation aligning
music’s ethereality and centrality to various religious practices with some supernatural realm. But this
couldn’t be farther off the mark, for Nietzsche shows in this book and elsewhere an intense investment
not in mind or soul but in the here-and-now existence of the embodied self.
Take, for example, Thus Spoke Zarathustra when Nietzsche explicitly confronts the philosophical
tendency towards dualism that separates mind or spirit from the body. Says Nietzsche, the naive subject
proclaims “Body am I, and soul.” But the “awakened one” says instead, “Body am I entirely, and nothing
more; and soul is only the name of something in the body. […] Behind thy thoughts and feelings, my
brother, there is a mighty lord, an unknown sage—it is called the Self; it dwelleth in thy body, it is thy
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body.”41 Pace a Christian worldview that would see the body as base, dirty, or merely temporary,
Nietzsche finds in it the seat of all knowledge, the self’s fundamental physicality. At the core of
Nietzsche’s metaphysics, therefore, is bodily arousal. “The ultimate irreducible element I find within
myself,” he explains, “is sensation.”42 Or, as Harry Staten succinctly puts it, “The will [in Nietzsche] is
the name of the receptiveness to the world of an embodied being, the name of the way in general in which
the world registers on a being capable of sensation.”43 For Nietzsche, listening to music—feeling music—
awakens humankind to the wealth of unseemly sensations it had disavowed.
Greek tragedy forms a nexus for Nietzsche where sound, image, and body intersect. Now, the
reconciliation Nietzsche finds in tragedy should not be understood as a synthesis of Apollo and
Dionysius, nor should it be taken as music’s redemption in or through appearance. Rather, appearance,
which for Nietzsche is the lesser artistic sphere, is itself redeemed only through its service to music, its
giving of exultant, visible form to an art that is, by definition, invisible. And that form is the human body
itself, in all its sensations, its joys, its throes.

Two Varieties of Repetition: The Myth of Echo and Narcissus
The central dialectic at play in Nietzsche’s genealogy of Greek tragedy is the opposition of
Dionysus and Apollo, which, as I’ve argued, is better thought of as a dialectic of sound and image,
respectively. We needn’t look far in the art of Greco-Roman antiquity to find another instance in which
these two domains are placed into conflict, for the myth of Echo and Narcissus takes up the question in
even more explicit ways.
Several versions of their story exist, but it is Ovid’s telling that is the most widely known. In it,
Narcissus, conceived when the river god Cephissus rapes the water nymph Liriope, is blessed with
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extraordinary beauty. His hair, Ovid writes, was worthy of both Dionysus and Apollo, his skin alabaster,
his physique poised between the soft features of a boy and the statuesque body of a man. He was so
beautiful, in fact, that adults, male and female alike, were said to fall instantly in love with him, even
when he was but an infant. Narcissus would live out a long life, said the clairvoyant Tiresias to Liriope,
provided that “he never know himself.”44
As he matured, Narcissus developed an intense pride fueled by the profuse admiration he
received. However, despite his countless suitors, Narcissus never knew the touch of another, for all were
ultimately put off by his vanity.
All, that is, save Echo, a mountain sprite who fell deeply in love with Narcissus upon discovering
him hunting alone in a meadow. Echo was so taken that she yearned to call out to him, but, alas, she could
not, for the goddess Juno had afflicted the once loquacious sprite with the ability to speak only when
repeating the closing words of another’s utterance. After first catching glimpse of Narcissus, Echo
perched herself behind a veil of trees, watching and waiting for the moment in which he might speak
aloud so that she could parrot his words and make her presence known. On this occasion, Narcissus had
been separated from his hunting companions, and when he yelled “anyone here?” Echo replied: “here.”45
After a few such exchanges, Narcissus mistook her repetitions as taunting, and Echo, to demonstrate that
her words were not meant to mock him, revealed herself from her place of cover, throwing herself at him,
embracing the man who had never before been embraced. But Narcissus, as he had so many other
admirers, rebuffed her.
Devastated, Echo returned to the woods, where, in Ovid’s words, “love [clung] to the spurned girl
and [grew] on grief. So crushed was she by her lovesickness that she [began] to whither away. Her skin
[shriveled] up and her body [dried] up, until only her voice and bones [were] left, and then only her
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voice.”46 From that moment on, she remained dematerialized and hidden in the woods, never to be seen
again. But she endures nonetheless, for Echo is “heard by all, and lives on as sound,”47 forever duplicating
that what she hears—thus the aural phenomenon that bears her name.
Meanwhile, Narcissus sought respite from the toil of the hunt and rested beside a shaded pool of
water. He bent down to take a sip, “[a]nd seeking to quench his thirst, he [found] another thirst, for while
he [drank] he [saw] [his own] beautiful face and [fell] in love with a bodiless fantasy and [took] for a
body what is no more than a shadow.”48 The gorgeousness that had so enraptured others now entranced
him: Narcissus was in love with his own mirror image, which he did not recognize as such. This image, of
course, both did and did not reciprocate: when Narcissus leaned in to kiss the ravishing man, the ravishing
man leaned in, too. But at the precise moment in which he expected to make physical contact, Narcissus
was met only with water. Despairing, he cried out to his love:
When I smile, you smile back, and I have often seen
Tears in your eyes when I am in tears. When I nod
You do too, and from the way your lovely lips move
I suspect you answer my words as well, though yours
Never reach my ears.49
For days on end, without thought of food or drink, Narcissus sat by the pool, waiting for the
beautiful man to appear in the flesh. And in that time, he grew weary and thin, eventually awaking to the
reality that the man with whom he was in love was nothing more than his own specular image, and that
the ache of longing he felt could know no relief. He therefore resolved himself to die. As he took his final
breaths, the tears streamed down his white cheeks and into the pool into which he had for so long gazed.
Water met water: that from his eyes, that of the pool, and in their contact, the pool’s surface was
disturbed, scattering and dispersing the object of Narcissus’s affections. “Good-bye,” said Narcissus to
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his love, who of course did not answer. But a reply was heard nevertheless: Echo, the bodiless voice, as
forlorn as Narcissus, echoed back her love’s final words, just as she did the wailing cries of those who
later gathered for his funeral, doubling and amplifying those grieving sounds, raising them to an aural
shroud. But his body could not be laid to rest, for when the time came it was nowhere to be found, and in
the place where it had once lay stood a flower, one that has come to be called a Narcissus, its buds
drooping over as if peering into the water as had its namesake.

Sound and the Liquid Metaphor
The Echo and Narcissus myth has provoked a substantial literature in the humanities: a simple
web search returns nearly 14,000 scholarly articles and books. Humanities scholars returned to the myth
with renewed interest during the rise of structuralism, and for good reason: at its core, the Echo/Narcissus
story concerns the role of language and representation in the encounter with the other and the formation
of the subject.50 On the one hand is Echo, who is capable of speech but apart from her own volition; and
on the other is Narcissus, who fails to recognize his own mirror image, which of course is the very
precondition of subjectivity in Lacan. Here, copies of all sorts—vocal repetitions, specular duplications—
prove treacherous, for they are subject to misunderstandings that lead ultimately to death or bodily
disintegration.
What’s so striking to me about the myth of Echo and Narcissus when considered alongside
Nietzsche’s investigation into the origins of Greek tragedy is how they both hover around the same cluster
of ideas: an interplay of sounds and images, of material bodies and illusionistic representations. Though
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predating the invention of the medium, both of these cases are to my mind highly cinematic in their
organization, themes, and consequences, and these same concerns can be found throughout the history of
film studies. Nietzsche’s emphasis on music’s relationship to the body as manifested in dance, for
example, dovetails in intriguing ways with film scholarship on spectacle in the musical, and Narcissus’
meconnaissance of his own specular representation might well serve as an emblem of 1970s apparatus
theory that sought to unveil the deceitfulness at the heart of the cinematic image via an understanding of
the imago’s role in the constitution of the subject.51
Indeed, for film scholar Amy Lawrence, the story of Echo and Narcissus is emblematic of
cinematic representation generally in that it reinforces the traditional hierarchy in which the image is
privileged over sound, and as Lawrence argues, this hierarchy is explicitly gendered. Echo’s plight (that
she is not an agent of her own voice) is a conceit ultimately in service of setting into motion Narcissus’s
ostensibly more consequential predicament (his fascination with his own image), and his death is
therefore treated as more tragic than hers. Channeling Metz, Lawrence argues that this tale “partakes” in
the same absence that is at the heart of cinematic representation: “in cinema,” she says, “everything we
hear and everything we see isn’t there any more. It is an echo and a reflection.”52
Echo’s heard but unseen presence, once could argue, might well be the prototype of what has
frequently been described in film studies as “acousmatic” or “disembodied” voices. Heard on the sound
track but not visualized onscreen, disembodied voices call forth the question of the location and
ontological status of their sources, for their highly ambiguous nature has often been said to induce a

51

See, for instance, Jean-Louis Baudry, “Ideological Effects of the Basic Cinematic Apparatus,” in Film Theory and
Criticism, eds. Leo Braudy and Marshall Cohen, 6th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004): 335–365;
Christian Metz, Imaginary Signifier: Psychoanalysis in Cinema, trans. Celia Britton and Annwyl Williams
(Bloomington, IN: University of Indiana Press, 1982).
52

Amy Lawrence, Echo and Narcissus: Women’s Voices in Classical Hollywood Cinema (Berkeley, CA: University
of California Press, 1991): 2. Recently, Britta Sjogren has revisited (and complicated) Lawrence’s (as well as Kaja
Silverman’s) arguments about classical cinema and the relationship of women’s voices to their subjectivity. See
Britta Sjogren, Into the Vortex: Female Voice and Paradox (Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2006).

58

certain anxiety in the viewer.53 Like Narcissus demanding the owner of the mocking voice reveal herself,
the film viewer, the thinking goes, desires the visualization of the offscreen speaker, for as long as it
remains out of sight it is unknown and possibly unknowable. For Chion, the “voice without a place” often
points us in one of two directions: towards God, speaking from some unseen celestial perch, or “even
farther back, for everyone of us, [towards] the mother.”54 Here, Chion invokes the familiar notion of the
“sonorous envelope” first advanced by Gus Rosolato and taken up in various incarnations by Mary Ann
Doane, Didier Anzieu, Claude Bailblé, Julia Kristeva, Walter Murch, and others.55 Common to all of their
accounts is the idea that the fetus first develops its sense of hearing (as well its sense of touch, though this
is less often emphasized) prior to those of sight, smell, and taste. As Murch, puts it, “We gestate in Sound,
and are born into Sight.”56 Floating in amniotic fluid, the fetus is gently jostled with the mother’s every
move, and it hears her voice (and feels that voice’s vibrations) transmitted through the mother’s bodily
tissue and fluids.57 For this reason, the fetus is often said to exist in an “undifferentiated state” with the
mother, the two operating, as it were, as a single organism.58 So if we follow this logic: the child in the
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This sensed oneness persists even after birth, with the vast majority of the infant’s time spent nursing or cradled
against the mother’s body. Indeed, the American Academy of Pediatrics now recommends that newborn infants be
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womb primarily experiences the world aurally; thus, sound, by extension (as extension), becomes linked
with sensations of unity, plenitude, and engulfment that are subsequently lost or at the very least
attenuated upon birth.
Freud, in Civilization and Its Discontents, reasons that the sense of eternity and oneness—what he
terms “the oceanic feeling”— that many religious people take as evidence of a cosmic unity with the
world, their fellow man, and/or the whole of nature, is in fact a faint recollection of the newborn state
prior to the development of the ego. In our normal, day-to-day lives, “there is nothing of which we are
more certain than the feeling of our self, of our own ego. […] [It] appears to us as something autonomous
and unitary, […] maintain[ing] clear and sharp lines of demarcation.”59 In the womb, however, the ego
has not yet been (fully) formed, and it only matures during infancy and early childhood when influences
from without work to individuate the child. Therefore, in the very earliest stages of its development, the
child does not distinguish itself from the external world around it. “[O]riginally,” Freud writes, “the ego
includes everything, [and] later it separates off an external world from itself. Our present ego-feeling is,
therefore, a shrunken residue of a much more inclusive—indeed, all embracing—feeling which
corresponded to a more intimate bond between the ego and the world about it.”60 Yet, according to Freud,
this engulfing bond is not lost to us; he posits that there are instances in adult life when the “boundary
between ego and object [threaten] to melt away,” as in certain spiritual practices, when in love, or when
suffering from particular pathological conditions. What we call “spirituality,” then, suggests for Freud not
so much a deep and abiding connection with a deity as a desire to return to a primordial state prior to ego
formation wherein the boundaries between the self and the world do not obtain, a desire, in other words,
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and a regressive one at that, to climb back into the womb and escape from the pain of existence—the pain
of selfhood—and its unfulfilled and unfulfillable desires.
It is apparent that the sonorous envelope and oceanic feeling, in traveling over much of the same
conceptual terrain, are grounded in a highly troublesome yearning for an irrecoverable past that is coded
entirely as feminine. This is why Kaja Silverman in her important book The Acoustic Mirror describes the
sonorous envelope as a theoretical trope based in “the cultural fantasy of the maternal voice.”61 More
broadly speaking, we might say that the concept is symptomatic of what Elizabeth Grosz identifies as a
larger tendency within critical theory generally, namely, the alignment of masculinity with the mind and
femininity with the body. She writes:
[M]isogynist thought confines women to the biological requirements of reproduction on
the assumption that because of particular biological, physiological, and
endocrinological transformations, women are somehow more biological, more
corporeal, and more natural than men. The coding of femininity with corporeality in
effect leaves men free to inhabit what they (falsely) believe is a purely conceptual order
while at the same time enabling them to satisfy their (sometimes disavowed) need for
corporeal contact through their access to women’s bodies and services.62
A great deal of feminist media studies scholarship has sought to uncover the various ways the
female body and its putative surfeit corporeality is coded in popular film and television texts and the
discourses about them. One particular strand of this approach has examined how emotion, sensation, the
body, and “excess” have come to be associated with genres most often “addressed” to female spectators
(the musical, the melodrama, the soap opera) or those in which the female body itself, with all its
supposed surplus of bodily affects, is the central, visual spectacle (pornography, the horror film).63
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We can begin to see that, across multiple theoretical conversations, the terms we’ve traced thus
far begin to cluster into binary oppositions that ultimately turn on the question of sexual difference: on the
one hand, vision, mind, separation, and culture are associated with masculinity; on the other, sound, body,
nature, and “the real” are linked with femininity.
Such tidy divisions are clearly untenable—gender, after all, is not a biological given—, and my
aim in turning to the sonorous envelope and the oceanic feeling are not at all meant to reinscribe these
reductive distinctions and claims. Rather, what interests me is the way in which these concepts call on
two metaphors to account for the loss of one’s self-anchoring: sound and water. Douglas Kahn explores
these ideas through an art historical lens in his magisterial Water, Noise, Meat: A History of Sound in the
Arts, charting the ways sound became integrated—technologically, conceptually, philosophically,
discursively—into late modernist and avant-garde art. In the process, Kahn isolates sound’s strong
association with fluids and fluidity, which manifests itself in art practices such as Jackson Pollock’s paint
dripping techniques, Fluxus artist George Brecht’s water-centric performances pieces, like Drip Music
(1962), and in the persistent tendency among surrealists to make a spectacle of women submerged in
water.64 In what follows, I seek to wrest these metaphors away from their associations with primordial
recoupment and maternal plenitude—their psychoanalytic foundations, one might say—and focus instead
on their connotations of flux and transformation. As I see them, both sound and water possess a
fundamental “in-between-ness” that from the outset troubles any attempt to lock them into rigid, binary
frameworks.65 This is not to discount, however, the critique that the sonorous envelope and the oceanic
feeling are symptomatic of a masculinist orientation that regards the maternal and/or the feminine as
outside of, or prior to, culture and subjectivity. Let me say by way of preview, then, that what I’m after
here is a conception of the liquid not as the antithesis of the solid but as that which is in the process of
either forming or deforming, making and unmaking.
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But first: why the association between sound and water in the first place? For one, both carry
connotations of engulfment or immersion. To be immersed in water or to be embedded in a sonic
environment is to be surrounded on all sides, to be enveloped. And insofar as that environment touches us
back, pressing against our bodies or palpating our skin and eardrums, the Cartesian image of the subject
as being at a remove from the world viewed recedes. This of course is why we tend to speak of becoming
“lost” or, to employ another liquid metaphor, “absorbed” in works of fiction: we inhabit two places: the
real world where we hold a novel or watch a movie, and the imaginary world of the story.66
Both of these notions—engulfing sound and immersive narrative—coalesce in the case of
cinema. As Adriano D’Aloia argues, “cinema embodies aquatic modalities of perception and expression,
pulling the viewer into a liquid environment that marks the confluence between the film-body and the
filmgoer-body.”67 Sound certainly plays an important role in this perceived collapsing of real and
represented space, as technologies such as surround sound offer a phenomenological correlate to one’s
mental absorption in the story.68
But cinema is but one privileged domain of the liquid metaphor. David Toop, much like Kahn,
finds the sound-water trope elsewhere in the arts, arguing that classical composers often sought to conjure
the sensations of being submerged in water: “the image of bathing in sound is a recurrent theme of the
past hundred years: Debussy’s Images and Ravel’s Jeux d’eau ripple around the listener; Arnold
Schoenberg’s The Changing Chord-Summer Morning By a Lake-Colours wraps us in flickering
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submarine light; Gyorgy Ligeti’s Atmospheres envelopes us in steam.”69 Along similar lines, Frances
Dyson has compellingly demonstrated that much of the discourse surrounding new media art and its
immersive attributes is couched in aural metaphors, for “the ephemeral, immaterial, and synesthetic
qualities of sound are central to the concept of virtuality.”70 The strong rhetorical alliance of sound and
water therefore suggests a certain elemental quality to both, an association that many in the field of sound
studies have aimed to complicate. Anthropologist Stefan Helmreich, for example, explores the
technological processes of transduction by which the sound-water conjunction has been naturalized, and
Dyson argues that much of this rhetoric of immersion is based in often inaccurate “cultural and
philosophical mechanisms […] of aurality.”71 The seemingly “natural” associations between water and
sound are thus misleading. Let me say, then, that I invoke these tropes here not to reify them, but to attest
to their staying power in the cultural imagination, to chart their centrality to various aesthetic philosophies
and theories of embodiment, and then to pull from them some theoretical consequences (and possibilities)
that have not yet been fully undertaken.
A second commonality between sound and water suggests itself: both are characterized by a
degree of formlessness. As the reader is no doubt aware, water does not possess form but rather takes it
on depending upon the contours of the vessel that contains it. Sound, too, is without (visible) form: the
only way to see it is through indexical evidence (nearby objects being disturbed by the sound’s movement
and vibrating in turn) or by representing its frequency through wave diagrams. One well-known example
of the former from popular culture can be found in Jurassic Park (Spielberg, 1993) when a trembling cup
of water on an automobile’s dashboard announces the approach of a Tyrannosaurus Rex in advance of it
is visualized onscreen. This scene operates via the same principle at work in a type sonic visualization
known as “cymatics." Developed by Hans Jenny (1904–1972) and based on the acoustic experiments of
69
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physicist Ernst Chladni (1756–1827), cymatics (from the Greek kyma [“wave”]) involves the use of a
mechanical oscillator attached to a plate coated in sand, salt, water, oil, or other materials. The plate is
then vibrated so that changes in aural frequency are registered through the visual displacement of the
coating material into symmetric patterns,72 as one can see in the below series of photographs.73 (SEE FIG.
5) Cymatic experiments thus bring into visual relief vibratory processes that would otherwise remain
invisible.

Figure 5 - Chladni patterns. Photographs by Chris Smith.
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I will have more to say about cymatics momentarily. In the meantime, recall the discussion in
Chapter 1 of Deleuze’s theory of sensation as elaborated in his book on Francis Bacon, which bears
repeating here. Throughout his oeuvre, Deleuze describes affect, sensation, force, intensity, and becoming
(the terms are frequently substituted for one another and thus may be taken as something of a theoretical
complex) as formless flows of energy. In Francis Bacon, sensation is posited as a “vibration” that forms a
“rhythm” that when paired with another vibration begins to “resonate” and reinforce itself. In this book,
affect is rendered almost entirely in sonic terms, whereas elsewhere in Deleuze’s oeuvre, the language is
more general (affects as “intensities”). Yet, what is retained across these concepts in their various guises
is an insistence on formlessness. Affect sets to work upon the body, and it arises out of encounters with
other bodies, with “body” here meaning, in the broader sense of Spinoza, an assemblage of parts: the
human body is one, but it is certainly not the only one.74 Whereas abstraction addresses itself to the mind,
affect is said to exist outside signification, outside consciousness. It is not found, for instance, in the
“narrative” content of a Bacon painting but in the relay of affects among the various bodies—that of the
dissipating subject of the painting and its surrounding milieu, that of the beholder and the gallery’s
surroundings.
Following Deleuze, affect is not something that is in bodies, but that which changes bodies. This
brings us to our final point: sound and water are both fluid; they resist states of fixity or stability. Per The
Oxford English Dictionary, in physics, the word wave, whether of the oceanic or sonic variety, names “a
rhythmic alteration of disturbance and recovery of configuration in successively contiguous portions of a
fluid or solid mass.” Etymologically, the word derives from the now obsolete old English and middle
Dutch waws, for “movement” or “agitation.” But something about this motion needs underlining: an
agitation does not result in a permanent physical change, but an oscillation, a movement between the
upper and lower limits, much like the peaks and troughs of a sinusoidal wave. (SEE FIG. 6) The wave
only comes to rest, only stabilizes, when its energy dissipates, when it dies.
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Figure 6 - Sine Wave. Image by C. J. Cowie

How do things change? What sort of transformations do they undergo? According to Deleuze and
Guattari, affective flows unleash “mad and transitory particles” which may thicken or congeal into new
bodies, new forms.75 These new forms, though, only emerge as a result of processes of undoing: form
itself must be de-formed in order to re-form. “Dismantling the self” is the name Deleuze and Guattari give
to the deformation of the human subject in their concept of the “Body without Organs,” a state achieved
through processes of undoing: de-signification, de-subjectification, and dis-organization. They caution us,
however, to “keep enough organism for it to reform at dawn; [for one must] keep small supplies of
significance and subjectification” so as to return to a state of composition when necessary.76
Disassembling is thus not an end but a means.
As I see it, the sonorous or the aqueous—both as physical processes and as cinematic tropes—
offer us an avenue by which we might think through questions of form in less rigid ways. This way of
thinking, however, is not at the expense of the solid. After all, water, as an example, may also take on
solid or gaseous form as a result of changes in its temperature or the degree of variance between its
temperature and that of the molecules that surround it (ice melts into water, water evaporates into steam).
The point is: forms transform—from without and from within.
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Recall the myth of Echo and Narcissus, which is nothing if not a story of transformation, of
changes of state. Narcissus does not perish by his own hand, nor does he die of starvation from his days
spend endlessly gazing at his reflection. No, according to Ovid, Narcissus liquefies:
He could bear no more, and as yellow wax melts
Over a gentle flame, or frost in the morning sun,
So too Narcissus, thin and meager with love,
Melts and is consumed by a slow, hidden fire.77
Narcissus soon solidifies once more, however, ultimately taking on the form of the flower that
today bears his name. And what of Echo? She, a water sprite born of a water god and water nymph,
“shrivels” and “dries up” before dissipating—evaporating—altogether. Poignantly, we are reminded of
the title of Ovid’s collection of poems: Metamorphoses.
I want to take sound and water, which are often said to be formless, and use them in a perhaps
counter-intuitive way to think through questions of form, both in the bodily, physical sense as well as that
of the cinematic and the aesthetic. What I’m after, then, is something along the lines of what Jean Epstein
argued was cinema’s fluid ability to vary temporal and spatial relations, which in turn reveals a protean
quality to matter itself. As he puts it, “all forms are affected and made pliable, remelted or rehardened or
reliquified, proving that they are nothing more than forms of movement.”78 Perhaps it is this very quality
that Deleuze seizes upon in Epstein’s films and those of fellow French Impressionists Marcel L’Herbier,
Jean Vigo, and Jean Grémillon. Taken as a whole, these filmmakers and their affinity for bodies of water
and their fluid framings mark the emergence of what Deleuze calls a “liquid cinematic perception” that is
“split between two states, one molecular and the other molar, one liquid and the other solid, one drawing
along and effacing the other.”79 If, as I’ve elaborated here, affect is not a property of form but rather that
which alters form, then we should be able to look (and to listen) to films for such changes, to see (and to
hear) them play out before us in multiple registers at the level of film form and bodily form, for both are
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fundamentally plastic. Indeed, these two levels coalesced in the love scene from Her taken up in Chapter
1 in which the characters’ invisible bodily changes (Samantha’s and Theodore’s respective molar- and
molecularizations) manifested as—or took the form of—a highly unorthodox extended blackout. A
deviation from conventional film form, therefore, is what signals and draws our attention to what is a
concomitant transformation of bodily form.
But why limit our analysis to one scene or even to one film? I want to take the mode of reading I
brought to the blackout in Her and mobilize it across a director’s entire corpus: that of Scottish filmmaker
Lynne Ramsay, whose We Need to Talk About Kevin I drew upon to open this chapter. Across her
cinema, certain aural and visual figures crop up again and again—but these figures, as I shall
demonstrate, are shapeshifters. Within the context of a single Ramsay film, the repetition of certain
images, sounds, or compositions adds to their significance, accumulating what Michael Walker, speaking
of Hitchcock’s motifs, calls a “density of meaning” through repetition.80 Yet when these same elements
turn up again in subsequent films, they rarely function in quite the same way, making them difficult to
reconcile within structural auteurism’s goal of “uncover[ing] behind the superficial contrasts of subject
and treatment a structural hard core of basic and often recondite motifs.”81 Criticism of this sort follows a
logic of resemblance; in Hitchcock, Grace Kelly is like Kim Novak is like Janet Leigh—all of whom, we
might say, are “versions” of Anny Ondra, as if a bell rung in Blackmail (1929)82 is still echoing in Rear
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Window (1954), Vertigo (1958), and Psycho (1960).83 Each reiteration not only adds to its legibility as a
sign (the “Hitchcock Blonde”) but also testifies to the auteur’s (perhaps unconscious) preoccupations.
With Ramsay, however, a different sort of repetition is at work. She consistently returns to particular
objects, narrative situations, visual compositions, and sound design flourishes, but in appreciably altered,
worked over, reversed or inverted form. This is not to say, however, that there aren’t discernible patterns
in Ramsay’s films: there unquestionably are. However, in Ramsay, repeating elements do not necessarily
resemble one another—though they do share a wavelength. Rather than “repeating,” perhaps it’s better to
say they resonate with one another, within the confines of a particular film and even across her
filmography. These resonant patterns, as we shall see, do not necessarily attain the cumulative
signification of cinematic motifs. Rather, they are more akin to the cymatic figures discussed above,
wherein sand or some other visible substance coating a vibrating membrane forms symmetrical patterns
that vary and become increasingly complex depending upon the frequency of that vibration. I demonstrate
how, precisely, in the following section, beginning with Ramsay’s debut feature Ratcatcher before
turning my attention to her two subsequent films, Morvern Callar (2002) and We Need to Talk About
Kevin (2011).

On Some “Motifs” in Lynne Ramsay
In light of the present discussion, I’ve selected Lynne Ramsay because her work puts into play
the same cluster of ideas this chapter has been exploring. First, her mise-en-scène is replete with aqueous
imagery. Second, she deploys an extraordinarily expressionistic and unconventional use of sound. Finally,
given that numerous commentators have taken a feminist lens to Ramsay, it is instructive to chart that
ways her work adheres to or departs from the essentialist associations between sound, water, and the
feminine.84
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Let’s start with Ramsay’s debut feature, 1999’s Ratcatcher, which in its very first shot begins to
chip away at the association between the sonorous envelope and “maternal plenitude.”85 Ratcatcher
concerns a young boy wrestling with the guilt of having contributed to the death of a playmate amidst the
blight of a 1973 garbage collectors’ strike in Glasgow. The shot fades in not from black but from white
and presents us with an abstract figure spinning against a white background—counter-clockwise, in slow
motion, in tight close-up. For more than a minute, this indeterminate figure twirls in this as-yet undefined
space. The sound track is likewise abstract and unforthcoming: a low, vaguely sinister rumble, the faint
screams of children (at play? in pain?), the squealing brakes of a train. Gradually, the situation comes into
relief. The white ground is in fact a daylit window, the dark gray mass a young boy (Thomas
McTaggert)—whose name, we later learn, is Ryan—twisting himself up in a sheer curtain. Ramsay
launches into this moment without context, leaving us ungrounded as to who the boy is, what he is doing,
and why. Though the gauzy curtain obscures his face, we can make out that his mouth is agape, and since
the drapes appear to tighten around his head with every rotation, his open maw carries with it the hint of
suffocation—a harbinger of things to come. (SEE FIG. 7) With its prolonged unfolding and droning
sound, the shot manages to lull and disquiet in near equal measure. Its languor is jarringly cut short when
Ryan’s mother (Jackie Quinn) steps into the frame and slaps him across the head. With this audible strike,
the movie awakens from its quasi-slumber, returning to a “normal” speed and “realistic” diegetic sound.
Gone are the children’s shrieks and the locomotive’s wails.
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Figure 7 - The curtain-wrapped boy in Ratcatcher

Few critics have taken up Ratcatcher at any length without mentioning this extraordinarily
haunting shot, and more often than not, they interpret it by way of two related ideas: birth and death.
Emma Wilson describes the boy, for instance, as being “submerged” in the curtain, an “echo [of]
sonogram photos of the foetus [sic] in the womb.” Yet she is also quick to point out that the enveloping
fabric resembles a death shroud.86 Christina Álvarez López further takes up the aural side of these
associations, suggesting that the muddled sounds we hear are akin to “how babies experience the exterior
world when they are in their mother’s womb—or how bodies experience the last moments before death’s
embrace.”87
That critics so frequently link this shot of physical engulfment and conspicuously reduced sound
first with connotions of the fetal experience of the womb and then with death suggests the degree to
which Ratcatcher complicates from the outset the familiar fantasy of maternal protection. This is made
manifestly plain at the shot’s conclusion with the mother’s smacking of her son: gentle, motherly touch is
refigured as a sudden, prohibitory force that shatters the sensation of envelopment. Mrs. Quinn’s
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disciplinary efforts, however, prove futile, for in the very next scene, Ryan slips away from her on the
street and absconds to the nearby verboten canal where he will subsequently drown while roughhousing
with his schoolmate, the film’s protagonist James Gillespie (William Eadie). This is the first of the film’s
three fatal or near-fatal drownings, all of which happen out of the eyeshot of mothers (who are most often
out working) and fathers (who are most often out drinking). Ratcatcher is marked by parental absence, an
absence which in turn grants the adolescent characters a high degree of mobility in and around their trashstrewn milieu, if ultimately at their own peril. Unlike the fetus in the womb or the infant at the breast, the
children here are very much detached from the shielding arms of their mothers, and, hence, they are
extraordinarily vulnerable to the ills of the world.
This opening scene, then, would seem, at least in part, to reject the water/womb/maternal refuge
relationship, a repudiation that is reinforced by the omnipresence of the sinister canal, which threatens to
devour the children who pass beside its banks. Williams argues that James’ frequent treks along the canal
evince his unconscious compulsion to return to the scene of Ryan’s death, which culminates in his own
apparent suicide.88 López also offers a psychoanalytic reading, suggesting that James’ repressed
memories of Ryan’s drowning come flooding back to him in various guises throughout the film.89 In
contrast, Annette Kuhn in her book on Ratcatcher, treats the canal as something far less symbolically
“rigid.” For her, the canal is not simply a site of trauma for James but also, by turns, a “meeting place,” a
“ritual route,” a “place of passage,” and, finally, a “space of reverie.”90 According to Kuhn, the
pronounced “motif of immersion” that runs throughout Ratcatcher shouldn’t be seen in such black-andwhite, birth-or-death terms. In her analysis, Ratcatcher is not the story of an adolescent’s inexorable
march towards death but one more aptly characterized as enacting a cycle of re-birth, which she argues is
manifested formally in the film’s highly ambiguous, bifurcated ending. There, posits Kuhn, the film ends
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not once but twice: first, with James seemingly plunging to his death in the canal, and second, with him
walking towards the countryside home for which he has spent the film yearning. These endings, of
course, are open to interpretation as to which is the “real” outcome: one stands as the culmination of an
overarching fatalism while the other offers a faint glimmer of hope in what is otherwise a remarkably
bleak movie.
I find Kuhn’s analysis particularly compelling, especially her attentiveness to how the canal’s
ostensible meaning shifts throughout the film. Indeed, in some respects, it calls to mind French film
theorist Nicole Brenez’s “figural” method of criticism, particularly her notion of “anamorphosis.”91
Unlike the motif of literary criticism or structural, auteur-oriented film theory that accumulates meaning
through its patterned repetition, Brenez’s anamorphosis names a process by which “a key image is
translated and metamorphosed in the course of a film.” Not a matter of mere subtle variation,
anamorphosis occurs when “a figure that is initially simple in its symbolic operation”—like the canal in
the case of Ratcatcher—“is “progressive[ly] … push[ed] to its limits.”92 Now, Brenez tends to use
“anamorphosis” and “metamorphosis” interchangeably. It bears noting, though, that the former term
captures something crucial about Brenez’s concept that the latter does not, namely, a connotation of
distortion. Anamorphosis is no doubt familiar to readers of Lacan, who in his 11th seminar famously
discusses Hans Holbein’s 1553 painting The Ambassadors and the distorted image of a skull that is only
recognizable as such when viewed obliquely. Others might be familiar with anamorphosis in the context
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of film, where widescreen formats such as CinemaScope rely on special lenses during principal
photography to compress a wider than otherwise possible image onto a standard 35mm and then, during
projection, to stretch this distorted image back out.93 (SEE FIG. 8) Brenez, though, has a different
understanding in mind. She describes anamorphosis as a type of a figurative “fold,” with her usage here
clearly bearing the influence of Deleuze’s exegesis of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. For both Deleuze and
Brenez, folding is not merely a trompe-l’oeil; it takes on a material dimension. Deleuze offers the
metaphor of origami, the Japanese art of paper folding, that conveys for him the way in which the outside
is always folded into the inside: the two always remain in contact with one another.94 Similarly, Brenez
embraces the tactile, manipulative (in the sense of utilizing one’s hands) aspects of this argument, for key
to her philosophy and her critical mode is an insistence on the fundamental plasticity of both matter and
cinema. According to Adrian Martin, whose valuable translations have helped introduce Brenez to
Anglophone film studies, her work begins from the premise that “everything is plastic: […] it can be
formed, it has shape, it has no definite form. It can be moved. It can be transformed. Everything in a film
is plastic, [just as] people are plastic.”95 The “stretching” of the image involved in anamorphic widescreen
(an operation that is recognizably, if not exclusively, cinematic in nature) is hence extended to matter
itself.
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Figure 8 - The Ambassadors (Hans Holbein the Younger, 1533)

In Brenez’s figural film analysis, the fold is a “formal logic” whereby that which appears in the
“beginning finally meets or ‘touches’ the ending to offer a striking comparison,” in essence “passing from
the recto to the verso of a given situation or image.” A large-scale fold may constitute a film’s overall
“narrative structure”—but it also can play out on a smaller, more gradual level wherein “the major fold is
progressively translated throughout a series of small folds (akin to a pleated skirt) over the entire structure
of a film.”96 As Martin summarizes, an anamorphic fold “does not merely reiterate (in terms of motif) or
answer [an earlier scene or image] in a neat rhyme but, in a deeper sense unfolds its meaning in an
ultimate, dramatic way.”97
Let’s examine such a formal logic at work. For Brenez, Abel Ferrara is the exemplary director of
the figurative, and in a book-length study she details how images become “translated” and narrative
situations “inverted” in his oeuvre. For instance, in Bad Lieutenant (1992), Brenez identifies a series of
“visual transfers”: the Harvey Keitel character driving his two sons to school early in the film is in a
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certain sense replicated by his chauffeuring of the two male rapists at the end. This particular figure
(people paired in vehicles) morphs twice more, and in each the genders have been flipped: the titular
character’s sexual arousal at the sight of two dead women in a car at a crime scene is later acted upon
when he persuades, via the threat of arrest, two teenaged girls to simulate sex acts in their car while he
masturbates from outside the window.
But anamorphic folding is not a process that is necessarily confined to a single film; in fact, it
may stretch across a director’s entire body of work. Brenez argues that certain films function as
counterparts to one another, such as when, in Ferrara, a rape that goes unpunished in one film (the
pornographic 9 Lives of a Wet Pussy [1976], which the director has since disavowed) is “expiated” in
another (the rape-revenge piece Ms. 45 [1981], the search for the nun’s sexual assaulters in Bad
Lieutenant), or how his movies often act as “reverse shots” of each other, whether in terms of narrative
situation or in formal design.98 It should comes as little surprise by now that, in describing these cinematic
folds, Brenez reckons with what is principally a visual phenomenon in sonic terms: these pleats, these
processes of reversal, inversion, and repetition are “singular echoes” within a vast cinematic “matrix” of
“vibration.”99 The mode of repetition found in echo and/or reverberation thus captures a dynamism that,
unlike the more static, one-to-one correspondence of a mirror image, conveys a hint of accretion,
expansion, difference, and temporal delay.
Back to the matter at hand: Lynne Ramsay. In the remainder of this section, I want to take the
pronounced “motif of immersion” Kuhn identifies in Ratcatcher and account for how it plays out across
the rest of Ramsay’s output in multiple metamorphosed forms. In doing so, I show how Brenez’s
approach helps us to move away from a concern with the cumulative signification of motif in Ramsay and
towards an appreciation of the larger economy of aesthetic and narrative elasticity at work in her
filmography.
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Since we are by now well familiar with the significances of the canal in Ratcatacher, I want to
turn my attention to other instances in which water comes into play elsewhere in this film and those
subsequent to it. In one scene in Ratcatcher, James’ mother scrubs the lice-ridden hair of the youngest
Gillespie child Anne Marie (Lynne Ramsay, Jr.), who sits in an aluminum tub in the middle of the family
living room. The scenario later plays itself out, this time in a standard bathtub, as James performs the
same deed for Margaret Anne (Leanna Mullen), an older girl who finds in the non-threatening James a
respite from the boys her age who sexually torment her. (Even the first consonants of the two girls’
double name structure are reversed: Anne Marie ! Margaret Anne) The scene unfolds with the characters
in profile with James positioned frame-right. (SEE FIG. 9)
A very similar situation with nearly identical framing occurs in Morvern Callar (2002), Ramsay’s
second film about a woman who idiosyncratically mourns the suicide of her boyfriend by disposing of his
body, vacationing in Spain, and selling his unpublished novel under her own name. In it, the titular
character (Samantha Morton) shares a bath with her best friend Lanna (Kathleen McDermott), the
protagonist this time situated on the left, reversing the orientation seen in Ratcatcher. (This is to say
nothing of the repetition of the tub, which comes into play elsewhere in Morvern Callar when the heroine
dismembers the corpse of her boyfriend, who, as with the main character of Ratcatcher, is also named
James Gillespie.) (SEE FIG. 10)
Such echoes abound throughout Ramsay’s cinema. Ryan’s death by drowning in Ratcatcher is
suggested by the gradual stilling of the water’s surface after the bubbles from below subside. We see this
once again when Margaret Anne holds her breath in the tub and, finally, when James sinks himself in the
canal. But what are we to make of the fact that a remarkably similar shot reappears in Ramsay’s abstract
short film Swimmer, which was commissioned by the British government in advance of the 2012 Summer
Olympics? In the short, a swimmer emerges from the waters of the British Isles to take in a hallucinatory
carnival scene before returning to the sea. There, he floats on his back in one shot, then descends into the
depths in the next, the camera lingering on the beads of air that break through the surface and then cease.
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Figure 9 - Margaret Anne (L) and James in Ratcatcher

Figure 10 - Morvern (L) and Lanna in Morvern Callar

Water and drowning arise again in We Need to Talk About Kevin, Ramsay’s disturbing third
feature about an ambivalent mother struggling to cope with her son’s perpetration of the murder of her
husband and her daughter and the massacre of dozens of his classmates in a Columbine-style high school
slaying. One scene in particular presents us with a series of anamorphoses. After yet another sleepless
night, Eva, the Swinton character, attempts to rouse herself by dunking her face into a sink of water. The
camera begins below the surface, peering up at her as she bends at the waist. As Eva makes contact with
the liquid, the sound track shifts gears: diegetic noises become muffled and reduced—reminiscent of how
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one hears when underwater (and how the viewer heard the opening shot of Ratcatcher)—and a dissonant,
droning squeal emerges, gradually rising in pitch and volume. Eva gently swings her head to and fro,
causing her dark locks to obscure her face. Yet when her hair does lift away from her brow momentarily,
we find that her eyes are no longer clenched shut but wide-open, conveying alarm, as if she were
struggling for air, as if some invisible force were holding her head down. Her veiling hair also serves to
hide two jump cuts. With the first, Eva’s frightened face is replaced by another dark-haired figure, the
teenaged Kevin (Ezra Miller), whose countenance registers a similar sort of shock, as if now he were the
one being pinned beneath the surface. (SEE FIGS. 11–12) With the second cut, the face is again cloaked
and unidentifiable as the figure withdraws itself from the water. In the next shot, a bathroom mirror: Eva
rises into the frame, breathless and wiping the water from her eyes.
Here under the water, a striking substitution of the tormentor and the tormented takes place, all in
only 11 seconds of screen time: child drowning mother, then mother drowning child—a chilling rebuttal
to the water/womb metaphor. In the first half of the sequence, even though Kevin is now incarcerated for
his crimes, Eva seems to feel his predatory nature, which is rendered both sonically and visually as an
attack; in the second half, the situation is reversed, with Eva, it would seem, fantasizing her retaliation
against Kevin for his years of mental abuse.
There’s something mathematical about Ramsay’s cinema. A particular sound, image, or idea
accretes or multiplies, only later to be added together, combined or collapsed into a single figure. One
sees this most obviously in the aforementioned scene of Eva’s oscillating face in the wash basin, where
she doubles or divides into two, returning to one upon her withdrawal. (Shades of Deleuze on Bacon: “the
forces of deformation […] become visible whenever the head shakes off its face.”100) But this is hardly
the most peculiar instance of doubling or merging in Ramsay’s filmography. Sometimes these operations
occur within single shots, with no hidden cuts, as is the case with two moments in Ratcatcher and
Morvern Callar, respectively
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Figure 11 - Under water, Eva morphs...

Figure 12 - ... into Kevin

Kuhn points us to one of these remarkable shots from Ratcatcher, which takes place when James
briefly escapes the blight of the city for the idyllic countryside outskirts where new government housing
is under construction—and where he finds an unsecured unit to explore. The shot in question opens with
our protagonist standing in profile, facing screen left, his head resting against the back of the wall. The
camera slowly tracks left only to find James, paradoxically, now on that side of room and that half of the
frame. His posture is very much the same, but his eyes directed screen right.101 At no point, though, did he
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cross in front of the camera on his way to the other side of the room. It is as though the boy had been
doubled, occupying two positions in space at once.

Figure 13 - James appears on both sides of a lateral track (R to L); this structure is reversed with Morvern

As if this shot weren’t enigmatic enough, it appears in only slightly modified form in Morvern
Callar. In his essay on the film, John Caughie notes that in the Spanish mausoleum scene, Morvern stands
alongside a wall, in profile, facing screen right—which is, one will recognize, the exact reverse of James’
starting position in Ratcatcher. The camera then tracks right before coming to rest on—you guessed it—
Morvern, who now faces screen left, as she places a carnation in front of one of the tombs, a de facto
funeral for James and perhaps the film’s only moment in the film in which Morvern grieves in any
“normal” way.
At some point during these eerily similar lateral camera movements, cinematic space quite
literally folds in on itself. What appears in the first half of each shot is impossibly mirrored in the second;
indeed, the two shots even mirror one another: James relocates from the right side of the frame to the left,
Movern from left to right, and in both their orientation reverses 180 degrees. (SEE FIG. 13) It’s a

82

testament to the sharp eyes of both Kuhn and Caughie that they each spot this aberrant shot structure.
Neither of them, however, makes the connection that it appears in both films. Now, my intention is not to
condemn either scholar for failing to point out the similarity. After all, Kuhn’s book was published as part
of the BFI Classics series, which is explicitly tailored to the examination of a single film, and Caughie’s
stated goal in his piece is to consider Morvern Callar in the context of Scottish cinema and national
identity. On these fronts, both succeed splendidly. But insofar as these highly unusual shot structures, like
the watery imagery already discussed, repeat across Ramsay’s body of work, they constitute a complex
network of reiterative relays that calls out for a different sort of analysis, one that neither isolates itself to
an individual text nor that seeks to unify these differential repetitions into a coherent, consistent system of
meaning. To this task, Brenez’s figural method is particularly well suited.
Let us consider another Ramsayian figure, the curtain, which undergoes an anomorphic mutation
between Ratcatcher and We Need to Talk About Kevin. The latter film opens much like the earlier one
did: with a shot of drapes. In Kevin, though, rather than acting as an encapsulating cloak, the curtain
serves as a barrier between Eva (the camera gives us her point-of-view) and the corpses of her husband
and daughter that await her in the back yard. Yet we only learn the significance of this shot far later in the
proceedings, when the film’s non-chronological unfolding contextualizes it. It should be noted, though,
that anamorphosis is not an exclusively visual mutation. The image of the curtain repeats only once, but
the horror it conceals blankets the film in the form of a sound effect. During the title sequence and prior to
the opening shot of the curtain, we hear the swift, staccato rhythm of a garden sprinkler without any clear
narrative motivation. It is a noise that crops up in the sound mix frequently, most often in moments when
Eva appears most mentally frayed. For the bulk of the film, we hear but never see this sprinkler. It is
therefore an acousmatic noise—that is, at least until that moment when Eva finally peels back the curtain
late in the film to reveal her slain loved ones, their bodies soaked by the sprinkler that monotonously goes
about its duty, indifferent to the carnage upon which it rains. Like the image of the curtain, the
significance of the sound that lies just beyond this threshold only registers to the viewer after the fact. In
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retrospect, whenever the sprinkler’s choppy pulse was heard, it cryptically served to prefigure the image
that was to come.
In We Need to Talk About Kevin and Ratcatcher, sound provides us fleeting access to the
interiority of protagonists who are otherwise opaque, who never verbalize to other characters via
dialogue, to themselves via internal monologue, or to the viewer via voiceover, their beleaguered inner
states. In the case of Kevin, the sound of the sprinkler marks the momentary intrusion of the memory of
the devastating discovery that Eva futilely tries to hold at bay.
This logic is reversed in Morvern Callar. If sound intrudes on Eva, it fortifies Morvern. She, too,
is bowled over by grief, and in the moments when she appears most overwhelmed, she dons her portable
headphones and listens to the mixtape James made for her before he took his life. Once again we find
what I call a soundful moment, for when sound so conspicuously shifts gears, it betokens a momentary
deviation from the film’s principal formal strategies or a rupture in the configuration of the body. Here,
the songs’ relative prevalence in the sound mix is indicative of the degree to which we are experiencing
the world in the manner in which Morvern does, the extent, in other words, to which we are in her
headspace. In “objective” shots, the songs are tinny and slight, heard as on onlooker (onlistener?) might
hear them, as only slightly audible “leaks” from the headset. In other instances, the music on Morvern’s
tape, loud and full, overtake the entire sound track, even if we don’t occupy her “aural” point-of-view (to
pointedly mix a metaphor).102 This is most apparent in three scenes: once, when Morvern steels herself
with the tape James left her as she dismembers his corpse; and twice when she walks through a Spanish
disco (while tripping on Ecstasy in one), the club’s deafening music seemingly unable to penetrate the
grieving woman’s sonic bubble. Morvern, it would seem, is not merely retreating into herself when she
puts on her music but communing with the dead, letting the world impress itself upon her as opposed to
102
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expressing her self upon it.103 Thought of in this light, Morvern’s mixtape operates a bit like the curtain
that James coils himself up in in Ratcatcher: both insulate the characters from the outside world.
But whereas these are gestures of screening or blocking, We Need to Talk About Kevin recasts
them by reversing their functions. Unlike Ryan, the curtain for Eva is not some protective womb; it is
instead utterly porous, a veil that must be pushed back, a dam about to break. And unlike Morvern, Eva
cannot retreat into an aural shell, for there is no sanctuary from the sprinkler’s piercing rhythm. Here,
sound does not shield; it penetrates.
This is the nature of the repetitions in Lynne Ramsay’s cinema. They do not function in the
manner of traditional motifs that tend to accrete in meaning through reinscription. Her method is one of
reversal: we see one side of a figure before it is elsewhere spun around to reveal different and sometimes
contradictory facets. Ramsay molds and remolds her figures in such a way that they never take on fixed
form. Like clay never kilned, her cinematic material remains pliable. Rather than motif, then, we might
say her approach is more on the order of Hans Jenny’s experiments in sonic visualization, a series of
which are pictured below. (SEE FIG. 14) Note how the sand particles are redistributed into increasingly
baroque patterns with every increase in the rate of vibration. With cymatics, there is no net change in the
amount of material that lines the plate—but that material scatters into new, ever more complex
arrangements. Indeed, one could easily import Brenez’s characterization of anamorphosis as a caption to
Jenny’s illustration: “a figure that is initially simple […] is progressive[ly] … push[ed] to its limits.”104
Like a cymatic figure, those of the Brenezian sort are subject to transmogrification: their form is
emphatically not pre-given. And as this chapter has shown, Lynne Ramsay traffics in such figures. Thus,
rather than seek out the uniformity of certain sounds, images, or themes in her work, one might be wiser
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to consider these elements as always, already in the midst of transformation. After all, Ramsay apparently
conceives of them in just such a way. In her published screenplay for Ratcatcher, Ramsay characterizes
the figure that I’ve taken up here at great length, that of Ryan coiled in the drapes, neither as an image of
womb-like plenitude nor as a harbinger of looming death. She instead likens it to a creature that is
fundamentally in between forms. Her descriptor for the curtain-wrapped boy? A cocoon.105

Figure 14 - Cymatic figures grow more complex as pitch rises. (Hans Jenny, Cymatics, 85)

Lynne Ramsay’s cinema is fluid—not simply because of the prevalence of watery imagery found
within it but because of the semiotic instability or reversibility of that imagery. A certain figure might
repeat in Ramsay’s work, but rarely does it ever “mean” the same thing as it did in previous instances.
What I want to suggest is that, in addition to her tendency towards “unruly women” who reject or at the
very least bristle at patriarchal roles they are supposed to perform (Eva’s ambivalence about motherhood,
Morvern’s outright refusal to don the black veil), Ramsay’s figural suppleness is the key aspect of her
feminist project. Ramsay in one instance will invoke the familiar tropes of femininity and maternalism
only to stand them on their heads later in her films. While Ramsay does not fully escape the constraints of
either/or dualist structures (birth/death, mother/child, mother/father), she nevertheless has invented a
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cinematic language that fluidly moves between the poles, giving us the process characters who cannot be
pinned down to one pole or the other.

Formal Echoes
This chapter has pursued three types of figures, or, better, three processes of figuration:
Nietzsche’s transfiguration of invisible music into human form and bodily gesture; Brenez’s anamorphic
folding and re-folding of cinematic figures, and the visualization of vibrations through the displacement
of visible matter in the experimental practice of cymatics. This is service of developing something of a
“reading strategy” for the cinema of Lynne Ramsay that takes into account not only sound as a formal
element of her films but also as a conceptual “figure” unto itself.
In the next chapter, I turn my attention to another nexus of art and science to ask how
neuroscience, specifically accounts of autoscopic phenomena (better known, perhaps, by one of its quasimystical subsets, “out-of-body experience”), might complicate our understanding of not only point of
view in the cinema, but also of subjectivity more broadly. By way of preview, at stake is a radically
different conception of the self, one that is rooted in a disruption of the sensation of one’s anchoring in
space.
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3 / STRUCTURES OF REFERRAL
My objective throughout this dissertation has been to reckon with the visual in terms of the aural
in the realm of film form and bodily form. In Chapter 1 I examined the affective molar- and molecularization of bodies suggested by Her’s evacuation of the image track during a pivotal love scene, while in
Chapter 2, I considered two different, yet to my mind related, understandings of “figurality”: the
“transfiguration” of music into visible, bodily form in Nietzsche’s theorization of Greek tragedy, and
Nicole Brenez’s notion of “the figural,” which aligns the plasticity of the cinematic medium with that of
matter generally and the human body specifically.
This chapter brings together Jean-Luc Nancy’s “sonorous subjectivity,” Deleuze’s “perceptionimage” from the Cinema books, and, perhaps unexpectedly, accounts from neuroscience of “autoscopic
phenomena,” the most common of which is popularly known as “out-of-body experience,” in order to
complicate how the customary image of the subject as discrete and bounded by the body. The chapter thus
lies at the intersection of philosophy, science, and art, the three intertwined realms of creativity for
Deleuze and Guattari.1 From each of these disparate domains, I draw what I describe as a set of related
“modes of self-relation.” In two of these three modes, the self encounters itself primarily by way of sight.
I argue, though, that these instances are in fact visual manifestations of what is an underlying aural logic,
which I demonstrate through an analysis of Terrence Malick’s The Tree of Life (2011), a film that I
contend reveals a remarkably complex portrait of subjectivity that is defined not so much by the self’s
encounter with the other but by its relationship to itself. As I shall demonstrate, soundful relations suffuse
The Tree of Life, but in order to locate them, we must learn to listen to the image.

Vis-à-vis
Too much has been written on the double, haphazardly, metaphysically, finding it everywhere, in any old
mirror, without noticing ... [that] it inscribes itself on a line of flight.—Deleuze and Guattari2
One’s reflection before a mirror is perhaps the most widely recognized icon of self-relation, for it
1

Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, passim.

2

Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 132.

88

allows the subject to see herself as an object and in much the same way that others might see her. This is
of course why Lacan posited the metaphorical mirror as the locus of ego formation and why, later, film
theory adopted Lacan to argue that the allure of the cinema derives at least in part from the spectator’s
identification with the camera itself. According to this line of thinking, vision structures subjectivity: the
eye equates with the I.
Beyond philosophy and critical theory, we find the mirror trope permeating the arts as well. Take
painting, for instance, where in everything from Eckersberg’s neoclassical Morgentoilette (1841) to more
self-conscious meditations on illusion and perspective such as Velázquez’s Las Menias (1656) and
Manet’s A Bar at the Folies-Bergére (1882) the mirror reflection, the copy, becomes as important to the
overall composition as the human subjects. The cinema is similarly littered with mirror imagery. In any
number of films, characters are depicted standing before a mirror, their visual reflection meant to convey
the act of mental reflection (in the sense of contemplation). Alternatively, the double image offered by the
mirror is often used to suggest a character’s duplicity (think: Phyllis Dietrichson [Barbara Stanwyck] in
Double Indemnity [Wilder, 1944] or innumerable other femmes fatale), or it operates as a meta-cinematic
gesture about the medium itself (Peeping Tom [Powell, 1960]). In still other cases, a character-at-mirror is
meant to convey ego and id at odds, which manifests itself in horror films as doppelgangers or evil twins
(Black Swan [Aronofsky, 2010]). (SEE FIG. 15)

Figure 15 - Black Swan (Aronofsky, 2010)
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Yet self-relation can be thought in ways that are less explicitly visual and for that matter less
explicitly psychoanalytic in their thrust. In his unfinished The Visible and the Invisible, Maurice MerleauPonty complements his previously vision-centered phenomenology with a more far-reaching ontology of
the flesh, a change he comes to via the tactile analogy of touching one’s left hand with her right. For
Merleau-Ponty, this analogy doesn’t merely illustrate that the subject is also an object in the world; more
radically, it fundamentally calls into question the divisibility of the subject from the world as a whole:
“where are we to put the limit between the body and the world, since the world is flesh?” he asks.3 We
hear echoes of this line of thinking in Luce Irigaray, who likewise sought to disrupt the Cartesian, visioncentered model of subjectivity. Initially, she critiqued this tradition (even while holding on to some of its
Lacanian foundations) with her adoption of the manifold metaphor of the speculum, which at once
suggests a gynecological instrument, Plato’s discussion of the distorting convex mirror, and the
etymological link between vision and thought (“speculation”).4 However, she later departs from the visual
model altogether, turning instead to touch and the specific corporeality of the female body. According to
Irigaray, unlike the phallus, which signifies “The one of form, of the individual, of the (male) sexual
organ, of the proper name, or the proper meaning,” the vaginal lips are in “continuous contact” with one
another, so much so that there is no “possibility of distinguishing what is touching from what is
touched.”5
Jean-Luc Nancy takes this same premise—that one is simultaneously sensing and sensible—and
pitches it in the sensual domain of hearing rather than that of touch. It bears repeating once again,
however, that hearing is itself achieved only through the transmission of vibration to the eardrum. Thus,
though Nancy’s explicit focus is aurality, he very clearly understands the mutual imbrication of hearing
3
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and touch and, indeed, of the entire sensual apparatus. The philosophical import of the aural for Nancy
lies in how hearing oneself speak necessarily involves an exteriorization of the self and a fundamentally
different temporal logic than the other senses. I shall at this point take up the first half of Nancy’s claim
before returning later in the proceedings to the subject of time.
The crux of Listening lies with a distinction between two words in French that on the surface
would seem to mean the same or very similar things: entendre and écouter, which render in English as
“hearing” and “listening,” respectively.6 For Nancy, “hearing” suggests an intensified or “anxious” form
of aural attention geared towards the meaning of an utterance more so than the direct “musicality” of it as
sound. Hence, entendre (“hearing”) is inextricably linked with comprehension and communication,
whereas écouter is tied to the immediacy of perception, free from the concerns about a sound’s
significance or origin.
Now, key to Nancy’s project is a third and even more complex term, renvoi, which carries a
number of associations in English: refer, return, repeat, allude, and so on.7 All of these connotations are in
play for Nancy, but the foremost sense is that of “referral.” The nature of this referral, however, varies
depending upon whether one is listening or hearing. In the context of semiotics, a sign—a spoken word,
say—refers back to its referent, and as the linguistic turn bore out, the chain of referrals is endless, with
one word conjuring another and then another and then another and so on.8 This is hearing for meaning, for
significance, which Nancy says is “the very model of a structure or system that is closed upon itself.”9
Listening, in contrast, is based in an altogether different sort of renvoi or referral: that of acoustic
resonance. Whereas the renvoi of hearing and of signification is a symbolic referral, that of listening is
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material. In a difficult passage that we shall pore over carefully, Nancy writes that “Sound
is also made of referrals: it spreads in space, where it resounds while still
resounding “in me”…. In the external or internal space, it resounds, that is, it reemits itself while still actually “sounding,” which is already “re-sounding” since
that’s nothing else but a referring back to itself. To sound is to vibrate in itself or
by itself: it is not only, for the sonorous body, to emit a sound, but it is also to
stretch out, to carry itself and be resolved into vibrations that both return to itself
and place it outside itself.10
In simpler terms, for Nancy, both meaning and resonance (viz., hearing and listening) are
comprised of the “form, structure, and movement of an infinite referral”—the former, symbolically,
semantically; the latter, physically, acoustically. Listening is thus but one form of renvoi, but for Nancy it
is the more basic and fundamental one.
Now, Nancy likens this “sonorous” listening body to a drum, an instrument that was initially
created by stretching animal hides over a shell, a practice that persists in spite of the development of
artificial drumheads with certain types of hand drums like bongos and dijembes. Drums, of course, only
sound when struck from without, but they owe their sound to the perpetuation of the initial vibration of
the stick’s or the hand’s force via their own resonant constitution. For Nancy, sensation works by similar
means. “Isn’t the space of a listening body,” Nancy asks, “just such a hollow column over which skin is
stretched,” a “body beaten by its own sense of body, what we used to call its soul.”11
Nancy clearly grants pride of place to listening and its resonant physicality over hearing and its
semiotic meaning. This does not mean, however, that his is entirely a move towards affective intensities
and away from language, for the two, he reasons, are inseparably fused. This is evident, in fact, in
Nancy’s linguistic playfulness in the labyrinthine passage above. In a span of some 70 words over four
sentences, Nancy utilizes the pronoun “it” or “itself” 15 times. Read it closely, for a subtle but important
substitution is at work. The antecedent for the its in the first half of the passage (“sound”) is replaced by
another (“the sonorous body”) in the second, a shift, in other words, away from the vibration to the
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vibrated.
It is thus not sound that “stretch[es] out”; it is instead the body of the listening subject itself,
which is “resolved into vibrations that both return to itself and place it outside itself.”12 To speak then is
not merely to sound a vibration that exits the body, for that very same vibration sets to work upon the
body from which it departed: the sound departs and returns, extending the body beyond itself, to be, as it
were, both inside and outside itself at one and the same time. The listening subject that Nancy theorizes is
“nothing other than a form or function of referral [in the resonant sense]: a self is made of a relationship to
self, or of a presence to self.”13 This self-relation, Brian Kane explains, “offer[s] a way of considering the
subject that contrasts with the identification of the subject as the punctual I or imago”—that is, a nonvisual, non-imaginary (in the sense of Lacan) mode of self-identification.14 The opposition that Nancy
sets up, therefore, between hearing and listening is implicitly one between the visual and the aural, on the
one hand, and between representational and nonrepresentational paradigms on the other. For Nancy, to
listen to oneself speaking is in essence to encounter oneself as from without, as if an other, as if standing
beside one’s self were another self. In this arrangement, one encounters oneself as a non-illusory, external
presence through a structure of auditory referrals, which is wholly unlike the encounter offered by the
reflecting surface of a mirror. But thinking of the self as constituted by resonant referral, by renvoi, seems
utterly abstract, less literal, and not as intuitively grasped as the mirror metaphor. If it could somehow be
visualized, what would an aural structure of self-relation look like? What form would it take? Where
might we see the sort of circulation of self-referral Nancy theorizes?

Dismantling the Self
Roughly a third of the way through Deleuze’s book on Francis Bacon, one will find a brief
excursus in which its author veers away from the primary topic of painting to proclaim the “superiority of
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music.” As vibration, “music traverses our bodies,” Deleuze posits, but, more pivotally, it “involves
bodies […] in another element. It strips them of their inertia, of the materiality of their presence: it
disembodies bodies. […] In short, music begins where painting ends.” Using precisely the same phrasing
as Nancy but in a somewhat different vein, Deleuze theorizes a “sonorous body,” qualitatively different
than the material body as it is normally understood, yet still a body keenly receptive to sensation.15
In both Nancy and Deleuze, sonorousness is linked to a type of attention or experience in which
the self breaks free from its corporeal moorings. Rather than as metaphors, I want to take these claims of
disembodiment or self-expulsion literally—though not in any empirical, observable way. Rather, I argue
that the intense arousal of the body precipitates a sensation of being cast out, which in turn establishes
something of a relay of referral between one’s self (that is, what we might call one’s subjective anchor)
and one’s body. This is why Deleuze and Guattari describe the subject as a “figure” that “designates an
‘event’ much more than an essence.”16 The self is not something fixed; rather, it unfolds.
Where and under what circumstances does the “event” that is subjectivity play out in the way
I’ve put forth here as the self’s decoupling from the body, especially when, in our day-to-day lives, few
things would seem as indisputable as one’s self (or mind or soul) “residing” within one’s body? Certainly
no one actually experiences the world in this way, one would think.
Yet there is one place we might turn to find a host of accounts of just this sort of body-self
dismantling: neuroscience. Specifcially, I look to three types of hallucination known collectively as
“autoscopic phenomena,” which are “rare illusory experiences during which the subject has the
impression of seeing a second own body in extrapersonal space,”17 the perhaps most widely-known of
which is “out-of-body experience.” Despite the vision-based suffix (–scope), there is a variety of these
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peculiar experiences, “heautoscopy,” that evinces a lived experience that is surprisingly analogous to the
sonorous body conceptualized by Deleuze and that manifests the mode of self-relation posited by Nancy.
To understand the distinctions between the subcategories of autoscopic phenomena and why I
isolate heautoscopy in my analysis will require no small amount of unpacking, but that work is ahead of
us. In the meantime, let me clarify my approach, which, to borrow a phrase from Deleuze, is at once
“critical and clinical,” drawing on both abstract theory and research from the hard sciences.18 For
Deleuze, this method hardly makes for strange bedfellows, for “philosophy, art, and science” are to him
complementary endeavors, “separate melodic lines in constant interplay with one another” and
characterized by “relations of mutual resonance and exchange.”19 (Again, his language is suffused with
the sonic.) Whether alone or with Guattari, Deleuze moves fluidly between these realms: out of Proust, he
redefines semiotics,20 out of Sacher-Masoch, he boldly reinterprets sexual deviancy and desire;21 likewise,
evolutionary biology runs throughout Difference and Repetition and A Thousand Plateaus, as does the
brain and its operations in Cinema 2.
Following such a model, though, poses methodological challenges. For instance, in affirming
schizophrenia, Deluze and Guattari have drawn fire.22 Patricia Pisters walks this delicate line in her recent
book The Neuro-Image when she writes of “building a bridge […] between the hard sciences and the
humanities” by turning to neuroscience to understand better the relationship between the brain, cinema,
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and politics. Pisters carefully qualifies her use of Deleuzo-Guattarian schizoanalysis, noting that, in
drawing from the lived experience of schizophrenics, she “do[es] not want to romanticize […] disease; it
is quite frightening and tremendously difficult to live in a state of engulfment, hallucination, paranoia,
and fear. But these pathological conditions do shed light on the processes of our own brains.”23 Though
the neuroscience literature I take from below is not engaged with schizophrenia per se, I want to remain
mindful of Pisters’ important proviso.
What precisely is the role of neuroscience in the present discussion then? The autoscopic
phenomena I take up in this chapter are atypical and not directly observable; thus, researchers must rely
on their subjects’ accounts of their symptoms in order to link them to neural causes. My interest in these
accounts is not, however, to arrive at the root cause of the phenomena; I rather derive from them what I
call a “phenomenology of disembodiment.” What’s most striking to me about these patients’ descriptions
is how often they square with Nancy’s notion of a sonorous body stretching out beyond itself or the body
of which Deleuze speaks that escapes itself in the throes of affection. In inquiring into out-of-body
experiences of various stripes, neuroscience works to develop a language based in actual, lived experience
to account for any number of strange exchanges that accord with the abstract or metaphorical concepts we
find in some of the philosophy examined here. To be clear, I do not mean to draw cavalierly from the real
and often harrowing experiences of those suffering from afflications of the brain. I do want to suggest,
however, that many of the sensations described by clinical subjects are in fact more common than we
might think. Perception is quirky, and in those infrequent but not unfamiliar moments in which we do not
trust what we see (or hear, smell, taste, or feel) lies the vaguest suggestion that that which would seem to
be impossible is brought briefly into reality.
Many of the sensations about which I write below are not necessarily disabling or even
disturbing; indeed, they are oftentimes sought after experiences. Take, for instance, the familiar word
“ecstasy,” which is rooted in the Greek ekstasis (“out of place”). According to The Oxford English
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Dictionary, in its earliest usage, ekstasis meant “insanity,” but it later evolved to convey a sense of the
soul or consciousness displaced from the body, which frequently arises out of trance-like states.
“Rapture,” “frenzy,” “transport,” “the sublime”: all name some joyous sensation of displacement, some
rare and overwhelming sensual arousal, a prized domain of human experience. Kant contrasted the
sublime, for instance, with that which was merely beautiful. In a differentiation that we can hear echoing
in Nietzsche’s distinction between the Apollonian and Dionysian from Chapter 2, Kant states that the
beautiful “concerns the form of the object,” whereas the sublime is formless or unbounded.24 The
sensation of being outside one’s body, of course, is not in itself a necessarily pleasurable experience. A
common figure of speech suggests its dual nature: being “beside oneself” describes a surplus of agitation
in both positive (elation, anticipation) and negative (worry, grief) circumstances. For some, bodily
detachment carries with it a quasi-mystical significance, especially when it arises during close brushes
with death (“near-death experiences”).25
These seemingly more common occurrences aside, the sensation of being detached from the body
or of seeing oneself doubled is most often regarded in the neurological literature as a pathological form of
hallucination. However, noted neurologist and public intellectual Oliver Sacks offers that hallucinations
are “a unique and special category of consciousness and mental life” that are not confined to the clinic or
to the chronically ill. In fact, he claims that people vastly under-report their experiences of hallucinations
out of fear of being saddled with the stigma of mental instability.26 According to Sacks, hallucinations of
all varieties are more common than we might think. Of course, “hallucination” itself is a slippery word.
Says Sacks:
Precise definitions of the word “hallucination” still vary considerably, chiefly because it is not
always easy to discern where the boundary lies between hallucination, misperception, and
illusion. But generally, hallucinations are defined as percepts arising in the absence of any
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external reality—seeing or hearing things that are not there.27
According to this general definition, hallucination hinges on the question of externality: is what
one perceives “out there” in the real world or is it entirely a figment of one’s mind? But this is not to say
that hallucinations are exclusively aural and/or visual in nature. Elsewhere in this same book, Sacks
details a range of tactile, olfactory, and gustatory hallucinations as well. Hallucinations run the full
sensual gamut, and as with “normal” perception, these sensations trigger more than one sense modality at
a time.
This is precisely the case, indeed, with heautoscopy, the form of autoscopic hallucination with
which I am primarily concerned throughout the rest of the chapter. Heautoscopy involves not simply
seeing a body that is not actually there, but feeling it as well, and in such a way that the criterion of
externality that serves to delineate true perception from hallucination becomes especially thorny. All of
this is to say: do not let the –scope suffix fool you: heautoscopy has as much to do with one’s visceral
sensation of physical (dis-)location as it does with visual perception.

The Body, Doubled
Autoscopic phenomena can be divided into three variants: first, “autoscopic hallucination” (AH),
wherein one visually perceives a mirror image of herself in “extrapersonal” or “extracorporeal” space
that mimics her movements in real time.28 A second type is “out-of-body experience” proper (OBE).
With OBE, the subject feels as though his self, defined as his “center of awareness,” “is located outside
of the physical body and somewhat elevated,” looking down upon his physical body.29 The third
subcategory is heautoscopy, which is the most complex of all autoscopic phenomena. There, the “subject
has the experience of a double of himself in extrapersonal space,” but “it is difficult for the subject to
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decide whether […] [his] self is localized within the physical body or in the autoscopic body.”30
In the first two types of autoscopic phenomena, the self’s perceived location is completely
unambiguous: with AH, one’s center of awareness is “housed” in the physical body, whereas with OBE,
one senses herself as “disembodied,” as being definitively separate from her corporeality. The situation
is more equivocal with heautoscopy, for the subject finds himself “[i]n-between egocentric and alterego-centered perspectives.” Unlike OBE and AH, wherein one has no doubt as to which body she
“belongs,” heautoscopy “indicates the existence of two selves.”31 Heautoscopic subjects tend to describe
themselves as situated neither with the physical body nor that of the double but as alternating between
these two positions in space, and in some cases, even occupying both at the same time.
What elicits the strange intermediateness in heautoscopy that is not present in OBE and AH—as
if the apprehension of one’s double was not itself strange enough? Unlike AH and OBE, heautoscopy is
not solely or even predominantly a visual phenomena; it also involves the proprioceptive (the awareness
of one’s body in space, and of its parts in relation to one another) and kinesthetic (the sense of one’s own
bodily movements) systems. Now, these systems are to a lesser extent activated during OBE, but there
one’s position in space remains constant, and thus one’s sense of self remains “intact.” The heautoscopic
subject, however, quite literally feels herself oscillating between the two bodies (the real, physical one
and specular, hallucinatory one), and to such an extent that she no longer is certain to which body her
self belongs.
Blanke and Mohr helpfully differentiate the phenomenology of the three types of autoscopic
phenomena with a diagram (SEE FIG. 16). First, note the direction of the arrows, which are
unidirectional with AH and OBE but bi-directional with heautoscopy. Second, notice that figures in the
diagram are sometimes outlined solidly, sometimes with dashes. The solid lines indicate the position of
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the physical, material body, while the dashed lines signify the autoscopic body. With AH, the arrow
proceeds from physical body to the illusory one, whereas with OBE, it stems from the autoscopic body
to the physical one. The origin of the arrow therefore represents the spatial position of the self, i.e., to
which body it is unequivocally linked. What this diagram makes abundantly clear is just how
indeterminate the experience of heautoscopy is relative to the other forms of autoscopic phenomena. The
arrows point in both directions to the two bodies, both of which are outlined in dashes: as far the
heautoscopic subject is concerned, there can be no assurance that either body is the “real” one, just as
there can be no definitive anchor or fixed point-of-view. The entire situation is in a state of constant
variation.

Figure 16 – The Phenomenology of Autosocopia. From Blanke and Mohr, 187.

While AH and OBE are certainly anomalous subjective events, the individual experiencing them
recognizes them for what they are: hallucinations. Though they certainly register as bizarre, they do not
disrupt one’s notion of self. The heautoscopic self, however, is only tenuously and temporarily anchored,
and given this, one cannot so readily dismiss its double as merely a hallucinatory figure.
The peculiar, disconcerting aspects of heautoscopy do not end there. In addition to spatial
oscillation, patients sometimes describe “an apparent sharing of bodily feelings” with their doubles, a
kind of telepathy that further disturbs the sense of self maintained with AH and OBE.32 Stranger still is
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the double’s “behavior” in relation to the subject. In AH, the double parrots the subject’s movements but
with left-right reversal, which corresponds to a well-known schema of self-representation: standing
before a mirror. This familiarity thus contributes to the subject’s recognition of the autoscopic double as
illusory. Relatedly, during OBEs, the physical bodily is most often seen sleeping or still and from an
elevated angle; there is thus no consonance of action or gesture between the pair. Hence, it quickly
registers as hallucinatory. Heautoscopy, however, is much more variable in this regard. In some
instances, the double will mimic the subject’s gestures in what neuroscientists call “heautoscopic
echopraxia.” Yet when it does, it is in a laterally asymmetric way: if the subject raises his left arm, up
goes the double’s left, too, violating in the process any expectation of mirror reversal. This is perhaps
why the term “echopraxia” calls on an acoustic phenomenon of repetition (“echo“) rather than visual
analogy of mirroring. The double’s lack of mirror reversal, Brugger notes, is for some patients so
unsettling that they question who is mimicking whom and, indeed, they often begin to wonder if it is not
their doubles that “contain the real mind.”33
Yet the heautscopic double does not always mimic the actions of the subject; in some cases, it
will move about extracorporeal space autonomously;34 in fact, the double’s appearance may differ
appreciably from that of the subject—in age, size, dress, even sex.35 Whether alone or combined in one
or more ways, these factors (the sensation of alternating positions in space with the double, exchange of
thoughts and feelings between the two, echopraxic mimicry, and the double’s differential physical
appearance) prompt the subject to question the ontological “status” of the reduplicated self before him in
ways the less “disruptive” phenomena of out-of-body experience and autoscopic hallucination do not.
Perhaps by now the symptoms of heautoscopy are beginning to sound a bit familiar: a double
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that both is and is not like the subject and whose apparent autonomy from him not only induces
uneasiness but also causes him to question the certainty of his own self-sovereignty, if not the very
nature of his own existence. It recalls any number of terrifying tales of doppelgangers and evil twins, a
genre that rose to prominence in the 18th and 19th century gothic horror tradition and that still persists in
popular culture today.36 Brugger explicitly incorporates this tradition in some of his work. For instance,
in a departure from a number of his colleagues who study body awareness and consciousness, Brugger
utilizes two different terms for the reduplicated self: when discussing AH or OBE, he tends to use the
more or less standard designation “double,” whereas with heautoscopy, he turns to “doppelganger,”
explicitly acknowledging the way the double often takes on the qualities of an “alter ego.”37 Indeed, in
one article, Brugger interweaves clinical case histories with he calls “literary accounts” of self-seeing
that strongly resemble heautoscopy.38 Before Brugger, Freud, too, mined doppelganger fiction for
insights into the human psyche in his famous essay “The Uncanny.”39 Cast in such a light, the
heautoscopic double takes on a menacing quality, as if it were some “ghastly harbinger of death.”40 Yet
in the clinical setting, one’s relationship to the heautoscopic double is not necessarily antagonistic. In
some studies, patients describe their doubles as “neutral or even benevolent,” performing something of a
“consoling” role. For example, some neuropsychologists have proposed that the doubles found in
heautoscopy and OBE involve some degree of “transitivism,” wherein one’s psychological and/or
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somatic symptoms are projected onto the double, often to the point that the patient’s symptoms are either
significantly mitigated or cease altogether.41
What I mean to convey here, then, is that in spite of the horrifying depiction of doubles in
popular culture, heautoscopy is not necessarily threatening to the subject. For that matter, in that most of
our knowledge about it and other forms of autoscopic hallucination have been culled from clinical
accounts, they tend to focus on pathological conditions and mental illness. There are far more mundane
situations, however, in which these peculiar events arise, such as during migraine headaches, epileptic
seizures, bouts of depression or anxiety, or even when grieving.42 This squares with some of the accounts
of hallucination Sacks relays that describe patients who regard some of their symptoms not as burdens
but as “companions” or “mild hallucinatory pleasures” in which to indulge.43
More pertinent to my larger point, though, is this: heautoscopy, as the experience of seeing one’s
double and feeling one’s self in a state of relay between two different bodies, serves as a visual
manifestation of the type of sonorous subjectivity Nancy theorizes in Listening. That is to say, Nancy
finds in the acts of sounding and listening a structure of referral that is intimately tied to the constitution
of the self. He writes: “A self is nothing other than a form or function of referral: a self is made of a
relationship to self, or of a presence to self.” This presence to self, Nancy reasons, is better sensed
through the ear than through other sense modalities, specifically because “to be listening is to be at the
same time outside and inside, to be open from without and from within.”44 Heautoscopy, I argue, presents
in visual (and kinesthetic and vestibular and proprioceptive) form something of this sort, of the self’s
presence to self that arises out of a referral, a referral that is not simply a representation of the self (as
with a mirror) but as a material relay between selves—plural.
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In both Nancy and heautoscopy, the notion of the subject as corporeally anchored is
fundamentally called into question: in the former, making a sound stretches the self outward beyond
one’s material body, yet the resulting sound returns to the body in audible form. The subject posited by
Nancy therefore exists not within the confines of a body but in the space of this dynamic referral.
Something similar, the neuroscience research tells us, transpires in heautoscopy. As Brugger explains,
the hallucinatory self-doubting to which heautoscopy gives rise is in essence the birthing of a
(temporary) second body that the self flittingly inhabits. Crucial to both heautoscopy and Nancy’s
concept, then, is a dynamic movement between bodies.
Our discussion of Nancy and neuroscience has taken us somewhat far afield from the aesthetic
questions this study has to this point pursued, but it has equipped us with a radical model of subjectivity
based not in the subject’s relationship to another subject or to objects in the world but in a conception of
the self as always, already doubled. This model of self-relation, I contend, offers potentially rich avenues
for rethinking subjectivity and interiority not only philosophically but also cinematically.
In film, subjectivity is primarily conveyed in one of two ways: on the one hand, via interior
monologue or voiceover, wherein the character verbalizes her inner thoughts; or, on the other, through
the point-of-view shot—if not some combination of the two. With the remainder of this chapter, I want
think sonically the question of cinematic subjectivity, particularly as it relates to the way point of view
has traditionally been understood. One might here assume I mean something along the lines of Rick
Altman’s notion of “point of audition” (POA), the aural counterpart to the POV shot, which he develops
in his essay on shot scale and cinematic space.45 This is not the case. What I seek to complicate is neither
the “view” nor the “audition” but, rather, the “point.” In film studies, the is most often understood as a
singular, fixed, locatable position in diegetic space that a character is implied to occupy via shot
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composition and cutting.46 Cinematic space as rendered in the Hollywood continuity system is thus what
Deleuze and Guattari would classify as “striated.” Note how, even when speaking entirely outside the
context of cinema, their language could be imported into a textbook description of classical film
continuity. The striated, they write, “lay[s] out a divisible, homogenous space” and is “defined by the
requirements of long-distance vision: constancy of orientation, invariance of distance through an
interchange of inertial points of reference, interlinkage by immersion in an ambient milieu, constitution
of a central perspective.”47 Within striated space, movement occurs between two points. In contrast to it
is “the smooth,” wherein “orientations, landmarks, and linkages are in constant variation.” In smooth
space, movement does not occur between points; rather, points are situated between movements. One
thus does not navigate smooth space so much as “distribute” oneself in it.48
This chapter shall work to weave together these disparate strands (listening, autoscopic
phenomena, smooth space, and still others to come) into a new understanding of cinematic POV, and
given this scope and ambition, I ask the reader’s patience as I work through these ideas. In what follows,
I turn to two recent films, Gaspar Noé’s Enter The Void and Terrence Malick’s The Tree of Life, cases
that at first blush would seem to have very little in common. Stylistically, Enter the Void is garish in
comparison to Malick’s stately The Tree of Life, with Noé’s brash provocations standing in stark contrast
to Malick’s more poetic, lyrical approach. Both, however, are organized by what I shall demonstrate are
related “autoscopic logics”—quite explicitly in the case of Enter the Void, the roving camera of which is
meant to convey the first-person perspective of the wandering soul of a man recently killed, and
implicitly in—and in such a way that has been almost entirely missed in the reception of—The Tree of
Life. Neither film, I must stress, depicts characters literally experiencing autoscopic phenomena, at least
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not in a way that fully correlates to the phenomenology recounted in the neuroscience literature. Rather,
both movies enact what I argue are differing “modes of self-relation” consonant with two particular
types of autoscopia. Furthermore, these films feature contrasting spatial organizations: one smooth, one
striated. Though both examples call into question the bodily boundedness of the subject, only one of
them undermines the firmly entrenched geometry of “the point.” By reading these films against the grain
and against one another, my analysis reveals two vastly different metaphysical worldviews: one
conservative and orthodox; the other radical and open-ended—and the question of which is which can
ultimately only be answered by taking a sonic approach to visual style.

“Magic Mirror”: Enter the Void
Along with The Diving Bell and the Butterfly (Schnabel, 2007), Enter the Void is perhaps the
most rigorous attempt at a “pure” point-of-view film since The Lady in the Lake (Montgomery, 1947).49
It opens with a digitally-stitched, 27-minute long-take from the optical point-of-view of Oscar (Nathaniel
Brown), complete with the effect of blinking eyelids. The take is interrupted only after he is shot and
killed by police in the bathroom of a Tokyo dive bar following an attempted drug bust. From an
overhead shot above a dirty stall, we see his corpse curled around a urinal as the camera withdraws from
it, which suggests that we have detached from his point of view and are now entering into a third-person
perspective. This seeming objectivity soon gives way, though, as the camera reverses itself and
approaches the body, slowly inching closer as if studying it for signs of life. Moments later, this
viewpoint we occupy drifts towards and then through the washroom wall. Now outside, it soars above
the city streets and over several blocks before making a beeline for one building in particular. There the
camera descends and penetrates the façade of a strip club wherein dances Oscar’s sister Linda (Paz de la
Huerta).
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We come to find, of course, that this free-floating camera and its impossible movements are
meant to convey Oscar’s consciousness liberated from his flesh—all of which was foreshadowed earlier
when Oscar’s friend Alex (Cyril Roy) summarized a book he lent Oscar that he failed to read, The
Tibetan Book of the Dead. Exposits Alex, “When you die, your spirit leaves your body…. You can see
all of your life reflected like in a magic mirror, and then you are floating like a ghost.” This spirit, he
explains, attains a “higher plane of existence” that is at first euphoric but gradually turns nightmarish,
and “the only way out is to be reincarnated.”
For the remainder of Enter the Void, Oscar’s spirit self hovers over the other principal
characters, darting across the city at will—cross-cutting, in essence. Cinematographer Benoît Debie’s
bravura camerawork serves as a stand-in for Oscar, but only as it relates to his vision. After his death, we
no longer have access to Oscar’s subjective thoughts, which we previously heard in the form of interior
monologue or that he verbalized to other characters. Instead, we must surmise his feelings based on the
film’s changes in camera angle and location as corresponding to Oscar’s shifts in attention. And how his
attention flits! The camera weaves, corkscrews, and spins, absorbing the colorful neon glow of Tokyo—
selected, apparently, as the film’s setting for no other reason than precisely this glow—in a wave on
incessant movement as he investigates situations into which he is incapable of intervening.
What’s significant about the camera movement of Enter the Void in light of aims of this chapter
is how it accords with the phenomenology of out-of-body experience—even if, insofar as Oscar is
unambiguously indicated to be dead, it is qualitatively different from the living, conscious experience of
OBE. Nonetheless, OBE, especially in its more metaphysical or “paranormal” interpretations, has
penetrated the popular imagination in a way unmatched by other autoscopic phenomena such as AH and
heautoscopy. This stems from the fact, perhaps, that OBE is compatible with the body/spirit dualisms
found in any number of world religions or “new age” spiritual practices as well as the purported
hallucinogenic effects of certain psychotropic drugs. On this score, the film hedges its bets, supplying
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not one but two motivations for its “disembodied” aesthetic: one psychedelic (drug use) and one
metaphysical (the afterlife). Thus, despite not depicting OBE as characterized in the clinical literature,
Enter the Void nevertheless assumes a certain cultural familiarity with the mechanics (if not the etiology
or symptomatology) of OBE.
Viewers familiar with Noé’s previous feature Irréversible (2002), which deploys a similarly
dizzying, long-take-laden camera style (also by Debie), will recognize not only the visual aesthetic of
Enter the Void but also much of its lurid subject matter. The film teems with sensationalistic imagery,
such as a graphic depiction of an abortion (complete with a close-up of the bloody, intact fetus) and a
CGI shot from inside Linda’s vagina as an erect penis penetrates and ejaculates into it, obscuring the
“view” of the “lens” that is, of course, not actually there. Furthermore, and unsurprisingly for a Noé film,
incest is among the provocations on offer. One of Oscar’s first stops in his dematerialized form is his
sister’s strip club dressing room. There, as she and boyfriend, the club owner Mario (Masato Tanno),
copulate on the sofa, Oscar moves in for a closer look, leering for a long moment before penetrating the
man’s skull so as to occupy Mario’s optical point of view as he thrusts atop Linda. With his newly
attained immateriality, Oscar seems to aspire to act, if only vicariously, upon his sexual longings for his
sister, which are suggested later, in flashback, when we see him stare at her as she sleeps nude in their
shared bedroom. By the same token, his yearning is perhaps reciprocal, as another flashback reveals
Linda aggressively nibbling and tonguing Oscar’s ear.
The incestuous desires that run throughout the film thus play out according to a rather unsubtle
and self-conscious deployment of the Oedipal scenario. This is most apparent in another of the film’s
many flashbacks, which are always coded as such, as if out of René Magritte, by the presence of Oscar’s
head in the frame indicating that his spectral self peers over his own shoulder. (SEE FIGS. 17–18) In this
sequence, a string of shots depicts what amounts to a succession of psychic displacements of Alex’s
libidinal investments from his mother and towards Linda. The associative chain is activated when Oscar
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watches one of his prior sexual encounters with the mother (Sarah Stockbridge) of his friend Victor
(Olly Alexander), the fink: as Oscar leans in to lick Victor’s mother’s breasts, we cut to Oscar as an
infant nursing from his own mother. Subsequently, another substitution occurs when newborn Linda
displaces a toddler-aged Oscar at their mother’s bosom. Next comes a very brief scene of Oscar and Alex
sharing a cigarette. “Smoking,” Alex says, “reminds me of sucking on my mother’s nipples. Best feeling
of my life.” A few shots later, an adolescent Oscar happens upon his parents making love, and the faces
of the mother and the father monstrously morph before his eyes into those of Linda and Alex,
respectively.
This libidinal economy comes full circle in the film’s final moments. Recall Alex’s early
exegesis of The Tibetan Book of the Dead where he spelled out that the only escape from the one’s
disembodied state is through a self-chosen reincarnation. Purgatory in this film is imagined as the neondrenched, orgiastic “Hotel Love” wherein Oscar’s spirit surveils an assortment of couples having sex, all
with colorful lights emitting from their loins, promising rebirth. Per Alex, one’s spirit is to “choose the
[couple] that suits [him] best,” selecting, in other words, the womb into which he shall gestate and from
which he will later be born (again). Oscar predictably selects the Linda/Alex couple and as a result he
escapes his ghostly form and re-corporealizes as an infant, now able, at long last, to suckle from his
sister’s breast in much the same way he did from his mother’s.

Figure 17 - The Schoolmaster (René Magritte, 1954)
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Figure 18 - Behind-the-back shot from Enter the Void

Such is the modus operandi of Noé, who has developed a reputation as a provacteur and
sensationalist. (He garners frequent mention in a recent anthology as one of several “transgressive”
filmmakers of the so-called “New European Extremism.)50 Yet despite all its technical virtuosity, lewd
visuals, and shocking subject matter, Enter the Void is ultimately, metaphysically, a conservative film,
one couched in a staunchly transcendent worldview. The spirit or the mind is regarded as the higher state
of being, a state of unencumbered, Cartesian vision, while the fleshy world below is treated as the realm
of the other, lesser senses. What’s more, the central narrative dilemma of the film has little to do with
drug deals, Oscar’s death, or his sister’s grief and is instead a psychosexual conflict that is resolved only
through heteronormative, procreative coupling. It sets up this happy ending in contrast to Victor’s
outcome, who winds up homeless and performing fellatio for money in the hotel elevator. In that that
sexual encounter is homosexual and therefore, non-procreative, his “luminescence” offers no possibility
of reincarnation for Oscar. Victor’s fate amounts to a form of karmic punishment for having given up
Oscar to the police, a betrayal that precipitated Oscar’s death. Hence, the film plays out the same dualism
in effect in Irréversible, which begins at “the end” (the S&M gay bar “Club Rectum”) and concludes
with “the beginning” (a mother with child-in-womb, aglow in white light). Indeed, the entirety of Enter
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the Void is organized around not just this familiar dualism but several others (spirit/body, straight/queer,
birth/death), while the incest plot, flaunted for shock value, ultimately reinforces the taboo by making
Oscar and Linda suffer for their illicit longings, only to offer redemption through reincarnation, an
outcome that gives Oscar another go at “proper” sexualization.
Despite not belonging to the “puzzle film” genre, Enter The Void, like Irréversible before it, is
vulnerable to the critique Hunter Vaughan directs at films such as Fight Club (Fincher, 1999) and
Memento (Nolan, 2000), which he says seek to enact at the aesthetic level the fractured subjectivities of
their characters. Yet for all their impressive sounds and images and inventive tinkering with narrative
norms, they ultimately “subscribe to a conventional order of meaning that reverts in the end to classical
philosophical notions of subjectivity” and hence fail to imagine viable “philosophical alternative[s].”
These movies, Vaughan says, rely on “deranged subjects” to motivate their aesthetic experimentation
rather than depicting “average characters caught in experimental modes of thinking.”51
Vaughn’s words, I think, help us to see Enter The Void for what it really is. For all its seeming
transgressiveness, it is in the end quite orthodox in the ideas it explores. My qualm with Enter The Void
is not that its Oedipal per se, but that it operates according to a fixed logic in which every outcome seems
fated or pre-ordained. Oscar’s “liberation” from his bodily mooring comes only as a result of his death,
and, once so freed, his only thought is to pursue the same “goal” (his mother, displaced in the form of his
sister) of his corporeal life. Moreover, even though Oscar’s disembodied soul both hears and sees, the
film takes his bodily transcendence as primarily an intensification of his visual faculties and treats
hearing as merely a holdover, thus reifying sight as the privileged sense modality of selfhood, intimately
linked to mind and/or soul, and as the cornerstone perceptual faculty of patriarchal privilege and
domination.
Noé tends to wrap his sensationalistic titillations in bombast, as we see with the portentous
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maxim that bookends Irréversible first as a spoken line and then as a closing title card: “Le temps detruit
tout” (“Time destroys everything”). Enter the Void, like its predecessor, has no clothes, for as with
Irréversible, it fails to imagine any philosophical alternatives. Even though he is liberated from the flesh,
Oscar is utterly unable to escape the structures of desire and spatiotemporal orientations that prevailed in
his living, embodied days. Though it may flirt with taboo, Enter the Void is inextricably bound to the
point, that is, to the fixed location of the discrete, viewing subject.
Terrence Malick’s The Tree of Life, in contrast, profoundly undermines this geometry and the
logics that underpin it—and in ways that have almost entirely escaped the notice of critics. Unlike the
predominantly vision-based (and mostly vapid) mode of self-relation enacted in Enter the Void, The Tree
of Life manifests what I argue is a soundful and much more philosophically rich notion of selfhood. I say
this not just because Malick has long been regarded as an overtly philosophical filmmaker, though that is
certainly true.52 Malick’s bona fides in this regard are well established: a protégé of Stanley Cavell at
Harvard, a Rhodes Scholar in philosophy at Oxford, a translator of Martin Heidegger.53 Moreover,
Malick, as both his devotees and detractors are quick to point out, relies on a lyrical visual style and a
singular use of “poetic” voiceover narration that, combined, make his films at once aesthetically ethereal
yet intellectually rigorous, if self-consciously so. Pick up any study of Malick, and some if not all of the
following list thinkers, themes, or schools of thought will appear: Heidegger, Walt Whitman, Ralph
Waldo Emerson, Romanticism, Naturalism, American Transcendentalism. And for good reason:
Malick’s oeuvre abounds with sustained references—sometimes overt, sometimes very thinly veiled—
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to them all. Example: characters speak aloud the phrass “all things shining” and “all the world is
shining” in The Thin Red Line (1998) and The Tree of Life, respectively, which Warwick Mules, in an
essay entitled “Mise-en-scène and the Figural,” takes to be a play on the concepts of schein and
eurscheinung from the German Idealist tradition.54 Malick therefore offers several hermeneutic entry
points into his films, though one cannot readily say he sanctions any one of the multiple possible
readings of his work.
My analysis, however, approaches Malick from a slightly different angle. Though I am
concerned with some of the philosophical implications of The Tree of Life, I am not at all interested in
sussing out Malick’s overarching worldview, a task that would demand, and that has seen, several booklength studies in its own right. What primarily interests me about this film is its highly mobile
camerawork, a characteristic it shares with Enter the Void. But whereas the camera of Noé’s film is
resolutely subjective, Malick’s, I argue, is tactility so, and like Enter the Void, it too can be aligned with
a specific mode of autoscopia. But in spite of the –scope in autoscopia, The Tree of Life exhibits a mode
of self-relation that is not rendered exclusively as a function of vision. Rather, the camera is what points
us to a more radical understanding of subjectivity.

Ecstatic Perception: The Tree of Life
“Wherever we used the word ‘memories’ in the preceding pages, we were wrong to do so; we meant to
say ‘becoming,’ we were saying becoming.”55
—Deleuze and Guattari
The cinematography of The Tree of Life marks something of a departure from the style exhibited
in Malick’s films to that point. In his book on the filmmaker’s work through 2005’s The New World,
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Lloyd Michaels describes Malick’s two predominant compositional styles: “panoramic vistas …
employing a telephoto lens and a smoothly moving camera, or carefully arranged static close-ups of
exotic objects held long enough to become cinematic still lifes.”56 Though still evincing a fascination
with the natural world, The Tree of Life moves away from the sweeping vistas of the Malick’s four
earlier features in favor of intimate proximity and a camera that rarely comes to rest. One crewmember,
in fact, estimates that over 90 percent of principal photography was captured “off the sticks,” without the
aid of a tripod.57 The Tree of Life therefore synthesizes and inverts the director’s two primary tendencies:
rather than mobile panoramas and tight, stationary shots, a restless steadicam creates constantly reframed close-ups.
This is nowhere more evident than in the 1950s section that constitutes the bulk of the film.
Particularly in the scenes involving young children at play, the camera moves alongside the boys as if
trying to keep pace. On the surface, this style bears a resemblance to what David Bordwell calls the
“prowling camera,” his term for Hollywood’s growing attachment to highly mobile cinematography over
the last forty years.58 Yet rather than the tightly choreographed dolly or steadicam shots that he describes
as anticipating the movement of characters, the camera in The Tree of Life darts and swings around the
children, always appearing a step or two off, and often positioned at or just below shoulder level of the
boys.
One way to account for the camera’s mobility and propinquity is to ascribe to the film a
retrospective frame. Most assessments of The Tree of Life, for instance, subscribe to the notion that it is
memory that drives the narrative. A reasonable conclusion is this, for early in the film, we see a middle-
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aged man, Jack (Sean Penn), arise from bed to solemnly light a candle in memory, we surmise, of his
younger brother, who died young, most likely in the Vietnam War. When Jack later arrives at work, he
appears shaken, distracted, and he even phones his father (Brad Pitt) to tell him that he “thinks about [his
brother] everyday.” Combined, all of this suggests that this day we see is the anniversary of his brother’s
death and that the sounds and images of midcentury Texas that follow stem from Jack’s grief-tinged
nostalgia. And if this is the case, then the child-level tracking shots imply a subjective vision, for they
would seem to connote, rather than a detached third-person perspective, the close-up, low-angle (relative
to the more default adult height) viewpoint of a participant. It implies, in other words, that what we, the
viewers, see is what Jack saw as a boy as channeled through his memories.
However, whereas the narrative’s structure of contemporary sections bookending a longer
middle portion set in the past would seem to suggest a retrospective frame, the cinematography does
little to bear this thesis out. A couple of problems emerge. First, if the low-angle camera is meant to
convey Jack’s memory of his own subjective POV, then what are we to make of the fact that the object
of this viewpoint is most often, paradoxically, himself? Second, the camera tends to veer off course,
gravitating to seemingly irrelevant objects, stopping to scrutinize the tiniest of details. In one scene, the
camera pauses to examine the curtains shifting in the breeze, and in another, it halts its pursuit of the
brothers running through the family home in order to ponder the texture of a wall painted a lush forest
green. Surely a child in the midst of play would not suddenly gravitate to such mundane, familiar aspects
of his environs, nor would those same details leap to the mind of an adult reminiscing about his youth. I
offer, therefore, that Jack is not remembering these objects from the perspective in which he saw them as
a boy, but rather that he is presently seeing them anew, occupying and roaming again his childhood
milieu with adult eyes, and while caught up in the motion of human figures, he finds himself seized by
affectively resonant yet narratively inconsequential objects from his past. Anyone who has ever returned
decades later to places once frequented during childhood can likely attest to the intense lure of quotidian
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objects that have become defamiliarized with the passage of time, such as elementary school desks that
resemble dollhouse furniture when measured against one’s fully-grown, adult body. Recognition
therefore does more to explain the “behavior” of the camera than does remembrance; in other words,
Jack is not recalling that green wall or the textured pattern of that curtain; it is instead as if he were
catching glimpses of the sort of sensory details that are not consciously retained in the vaults of memory.
Unlike the involuntary flood of memory we might associate with Proust’s happenstance encounter with
the madeleine, Jack’s consciousness as rendered by the mobile camera is actively probing this space.59
We might therefore think of The Tree of Life in terms of yet another connotation of Jean-Luc Nancy’s
renvoi—that is, as the central character’s return to the place of his youth. What The Tree of Life gives us,
then, is Jack’s ecstatic perception.
By “ecstatic,” I mean less in the sense of blissful happiness or euphoria and more in keeping
with its origins from the Greek ekstasis, which according to The Oxford English Dictionary meant “to
stand beside oneself.” The implications of this are that Jack, the adult, is quite literally moving alongside
his boyhood self. Moreover, the two selves, young and old, do not move in concert nor do they directly
mirror one another’s actions. Jack’s self is in essence doubled, and these two selves move about space
more or less autonomously. As we’ve rehearsed, the doubled body is no rarity in cinema, but when the
trope does appear, it tends to evoke not so much a duplicated body so much as a split self, that is, as a
manifestation of a warring ego and id, and it generally is deployed to arouse an uncanny dread. In
contrast, what we have in The Tree of Life is a type of self-reduplication that is not at all threatening and
therefore not linked to death or psychical turmoil as is commonly associated with the encounter with
one’s doppelganger. In this way, the doubling I locate in the film would suggest, rather than a
hallucinatory or horrific confrontation with an uncanny other, the looser and far more ambiguous
experience of heautoscopy.
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It is important that I stress here that my intent is not to “diagnose” Jack with some pathological
condition or neurological disorder that prompts the movie’s visual style. What I do want to put forth,
though, is that the fluid “dance” that transpires between the camera and young Jack in The Tree of Life
suggests a type of paradoxical self-seeing consistent with heautoscopy insofar as it involves an
alternation between the two positions in space and with such abandon so as to render it nearly impossible
to determine the body to which the self belongs. And in this way, heautoscopy as described by actual
people in settings clinical and non- overlaps in quite remarkable ways with Deleuze’s understanding of
the suppleness of cinematic perspective, which is first explored in Cinema 1 and then in its more radical
form in that project’s second volume.
Early in the first volume of Cinema, Deleuze notes that cinematic perception is “double,” that it
can be subjective or objective. Typically, one would assume that a subjective image is one that grants the
viewer access to that which a character sees, whereas an objective one would be entirely “external.”
Things are trickier than this, says Deleuze. He points to an example from Albert Lewin’s Pandora and
the Flying Dutchmen (1951) wherein the opening wide shot that would appear at first glance to be
objective is eventually revealed to hail from a the viewpoint of a character watching with a telescope
from afar. Thus, according to Deleuze, within this single shot we have shifted from an objective to a
subjective view. This is not simply a unique case for him, either, for he argues that it is “the cinema’s
perpetual destiny to make us move from one of its poles [subjective or objective] to the other.”60
He next offers an even more complex example from El Dorado (L’Herbier, 1921) wherein “the
distraught woman who sees in soft focus is herself seen in soft focus.”61 This shot, Deleuze tells us, is, in
the words of Jean Mitry, “semi-subjective,” an example of what Pier Paolo Pasolini would later call
“free indirect cinematic discourse.” The free indirect mode was first theorized in literary theory to
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describe the effect when an author embeds the subjective thoughts of a character into an otherwise
objective, third-person presentation, i.e., without quotation marks or any other syntactical marker to
designate it as subjective as such.62 Something analogous is at work in El Dorado: the shot is not
presented from the optical point of view of the character, but it would appear to see through her eyes
nevertheless. One may find this device used frequently, to the point that we might call it a cliché, in
films in which a blurred or unsteady camera is meant to optically convey the subjective states of the
intoxicated or punch-drunk characters occupying the frame. A more striking example of this can be
found in Alejandro González Iñárritu’s otherwise forgettable Babel (2006) in the scene in which a deaf
teenager tripping on Ecstasy moves through a crowded nightclub. In certain shots the film would seem to
emulate her inebriated perception even when she herself is centered within the shot. This is most often
conveyed through the withdrawal of diegetic sound. In so doing, the film would seem to hear from
Chieko’s (Rinko Kikuchi’s) point of audition while seeing her from the point of view of another.
Pasolini singles out Antonioni as most proficient at this technique, for rather than rely on such clearly
coded or “motivated” visual distortions, his “obsessive” compositions reflect more subtly the “neuroses”
of his characters. 63
Deleuze is largely step for step with Pasolini’s argument except for one crucial aspect. Pasolini
describes the camera’s relationship to the subjectivity of the character it frames as one of “mimesis,” of
imitation. Deleuze, however, sees something even more radical in the cinematic free indirect, which does
not simply render perception as on oscillation between subjective and objective viewpoints, but also
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suggests a subject that has been in essence doubled. Deleuze, quoting Henri Bergson, describes it thus:
[T]here is no subject which acts without another which watches it act, and which
grasps it as acted, itself assuming the freedom of which it deprives the former.
“Thus two different Selves, on of which, conscious of its freedom, sets itself up
as independent spectator of a scene. … [T]his dividing-in-two is an oscillation of
the person between points of view of himself, a hither-and-thither of the spirit…”
a being-with.64
I am struck by how this “oscillation of the person between points of view of himself” Deleuze
describes in the perception-image, in addition to being a novel and even radical way of thinking about
film, is as much a theory of subjectivity and self-relation as it is a taxonometric category of cinematic
images.
Indeed, I want to take a page from Deleuze and Guattari’s What Is Philosophy?, where they
insist that science, philosophy, and art are all related endeavors of creativity, and unite the various
strands of this chapter, which hail from each of these domains. Each of these strands hinges in one way
or another on a self that is doubled. For instance, the “oscillation of the person between points of view of
himself” Deleuze finds in the art cinema is also an apt characterization of the self as described in the
phenomenology of heautoscopy, which in many ways corresponds with the spatial distribution of the
subject that Nancy ponders through an aural framework in Listening, where he writes, “To be listening is
to be at the same time outside and inside, to be open from without and from within.”65 These ideas may
be productively brought to bear on The Tree of Life, just as it might in turn illuminate them.
With that said, my exploration of the film in question, heautoscopy, and the perception-image
heretofore has largely been expressed in visual terms. The question that remains, therefore, is: how does
sound open up the question of bodily doubling beyond a function of self-seeing?
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Sound at the Limits
An intriguing anachronism can be found in Deleuze’s discussion of the perception-image, which
he elaborates first in relation to French Impressionist filmmakers such as Epstein, Gance, and L’Herbier
before abruptly turning to the likes of “modern” directors Pasolini, Antonioni, Rohmer, and Godard.
Why do they come up here so early on in Cinema 1, especially since Deleuze’s trajectory throughout the
two volumes proceeds, despite his insistence to the contrary, almost entirely as a linear historical
account?66 In the regime of the movement-image, the division between subjective and objective is
undermined through free indirect discourse, but that happens only with respect to the image. With the
modern time-image, the free indirect mode extends to sound as well. Thus, sound, no longer serving as
mere accompaniment to the image, attains its own autonomy, and once liberated, it may enter into free
indirect relation with the image. Thus, the French Impressionist cinema’s loosening of subjective and
objective perspective with respect to the image is something of a precursor of the fully audiovisual, more
radical free indirect mode that is to come.
In addition to the aforementioned Rohmer and Godard, Deleuze points to Marguerite Duras and
Jean-Marie Straub and Danièle Huillet as filmmakers whose experimental, disjunctive use of sound
introduces an “irrational interval” into the cinema, an “incommensurable complementarity” between
sound and image.”67 The image is now capable of showing that which sound cannot convey, and sound
utters that which remains invisible within the image.68 Each comes to perform the function of the other,
in essence “transfiguring,” to borrow a term of Nietzsche’s from the previous chapter, each into the
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realm of the other.69
The appeal of the time-image for Deleuze is that it gives rise to “pure optical and sound
situations” with which the viewer must reckon, confronting her with “limit situations,” a term he
borrows from Karl Jaspers (perhaps by way of Heidegger) to designate extraordinary moments where
one encounters the limits of one’s own consciousness.70 The cinema possesses the capability to unleash
such a situation—but so, too, does heautoscopy, which fundamentally calls into question the nature of
one’s own selfhood in ways other modes of hallucination do not. These are thus two privileged but
extraordinary circumstances in which the self is revealed to be doubled but that transpire outside
everyday life and “normal” perceptual experience. In contrast, the bodily “stretching” Nancy theorizes in
relation to sound is always, already operating in the realm of the aural, though it most often escapes our
attention precisely because we tend to hear rather than to listen, which for Nancy is always an act of
“straining toward” that which is “not immediately accessible.” He continues: “To be listening is always
to be on the edge of meaning, … a meaning whose sense is supposed to be found in resonance, and only
in resonance.”71 Listening thus brings about its own sort of limit situation, one that forces the self into
confrontation with itself—not as two distinct entities but as a space of relay and interrelation. Nancy,
again:
To be listening is thus to enter into tension and to be on the lookout for a relation to self: not, it
should be emphasized, a relationship to “me” (the supposedly given subject), or to the “self” of
the other, … but to the relationship in self.72
Nancy means this quite literally. He argues that listening “can and must appear to us not as a metaphor
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for access to self, but as the reality of this access.”73
The philosophical value of a film like The Tree of Life (above and beyond its overtly
metaphysical “content”) is that it carries the potential to cue the viewer to precisely this reality, a reality
to which we are typically blind—blind precisely because it is a reality that is on a fundamental level
soundful. Heautoscopy likewise may also grant access to a similar realization, though its occurrence is
exceedingly more rare. It is better, therefore, to seek it out in the more attainable domains of listening
and of cinema, domains that I consider alongside one another in this next and final section.

The Voiceover as Renvoi
This chapter has gone to some lengths to explicate the ways in which, to my mind, the camera
movement in The Tree of Life evinces or is motivated by a type of self-seeing. Yet this reduplication of
the self is not perceptible solely as a visual phenomenon. Indeed, the peculiar mode of self-relation I’ve
detailed to this point is more subtly and more poignantly at work in the film’s sound track, most notably
in its complex interplay of voiceovers.
It should come as no surprise that I would seek to mine a Malick film for its philosophical
insight, especially with regard to his ruminative, poetic voiceovers, which are perhaps the most
distinctive and recognizable aspects of his style.74 Leo Bersani and Ulysses Dutoit, however, caution
against reading too much into them, for the unsophisticated philosophizing of Malick’s characters often
masks the more thoughtful philosophical work being performed at the level of the films’ style.75
Especially in the case of The Tree of Life, to hew too closely to a character’s words as if they held the
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key to unlock the film as a whole runs the risk of missing the more pressing matter of how the
voiceovers function vis-à-vis one another, for it is there in the intricate arrangement of voices more so
than the words they utter that the film’s most profound understanding of subjectivity makes itself felt.
Put simply, the following is an attempt to listen to these voiceovers rather than to hear them.
Most readings of The Tree of Life—facile ones, I think—take the voiceover of Jack’s mother
Mrs. O’Brien (Jessica Chastain) as a lens through which to interpret the film. Why, given that it is but
one of several voiceovers present, do critics ascribe to it such significance? In contrasting “the way of
nature” with “the way of grace,” Mrs. O’Brien would seem to articulate something of a dualist
philosophical system, and given its placement as the first voiceover we hear, and over the film’s opening
image, no less, it would seem to “tune” the viewer to the film’s idiosyncratic frequency. This is a
reasonable enough assumption, for sure. But Mrs. O’Brien’s words are perhaps the most orthodox
metaphysical expression on offer in The Tree of Life. If one focuses instead on Jack’s voiceover—or
should I say, voiceovers, plural, since he narrates as both a child and as an adult—one will find a number
of linguistic ambiguities that complicate the grace/nature reading and that align more readily with my
earlier argument that the film as a whole is organized around a doubling of the self. Indeed, by listening
to these voices that hover over and around the film, we find something of a sonic subjectivity that flies in
the face of most interpretations of the film. For example, at one point young Jack, “disembodied” (i.e.,
not visualized, in the problematic way film studies deploys the term), asks, “Where do you live? Are you
watching me? I want to see what you see.”76 Who is this you? In one sense, the line suggests a prayer and
thus easily reconciles with Judeo-Christian theology. But what do we make of these lines of Jack’s that
emerge later over images of tragedy (of a drowned playmate, of a house engulfed in flames): “Where
were you? You let a boy die. You let all sorts of things happen.” To whom is Jack directing his question
76
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and his anger? Is he asking God the Father why he allows evil into the world? Or is he laying blame with
his biological father, the Brad Pitt character, for failing to act and for not living up to the masculine ideal
he purports to embody?
Obviously, these third-person pronouns make the sentences equivocal (and, in fact, aside from
Jack, no major character in the film is ever referred to by a proper name, making concrete identification
in nearly all cases difficult). But the pronouns also prevent the sentences “from falling under the tyranny
of the subjective or signifying constellations,”77 rendering them vague and indeterminate.
The result of this indeterminacy is that “‘fundamentally heterogeneous elements end up turning
into each other in some way.’”78 Listen closely to the voiceovers and one will find that the two Jacks,
young and old, do just this: they transform into one another. Malick’s voiceovers are typified by their
heightened language, but what are we to make of a line like this from young Jack: “Mother, Father:
always you wrestle inside me. Always you will.” Certainly the boy is given to introspection, but the
sophistication of the wording is curious, for his other interior monologues are far less precocious. It’s as
if the child were speaking the thoughts of his older self, verbalizing his later existential crisis. The voice
clearly belongs to the adolescent, but the utterances are more congruous with Jack’s middle-aged
ponderings.
Attribution becomes difficult in these instances, for the voiceovers cannot be said to
“transparently” represent the interior thoughts of the character at two stages of his life. It would seem,
therefore, that Jack the boy is articulating the spiritual disquiet of Jack the man, engaging, in other
words, in an act of free indirect discourse with himself. These two selves that seem to paradoxically
occupy the same space and time in the 1950s portion of the film here undergo an even more profound
sonic intertwining.
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This co-presence of selves that is implicit in both the voiceovers and the cinematography is in
fact made explicit in the film’s final sequence, where for the first time we see both Jacks, young and old,
within the same shot, as if the elder were literally responding to the whispered call of the younger—
”follow me”—heard earlier in the film via voiceover. (SEE FIG. 19) Jack the boy appears to be leading
his older self across first a desert and then a mesa before arriving finally at the ocean. There, the film’s
two principal time frames, the 1950s and the present day, collapse into one. At the beach, the “archetype
of smooth space” for Deleuze and Guattari, all the principal characters congregate, appearing as they did
in the coming-of-age section of the movie.79 As middle-aged Jack greets his family with embraces, the
scene suggests a celestial heaven, yet nothing in the narrative indicates that he is dead and has now
ascended to some otherworldly plane.

Figure 19 - Two Jacks, one shot

Among the people on the beach is Jack’s younger brother, the one whose death sets the film into
motion. Curiously, the boy can be seen in two distinct shirts and with two different haircuts. Likewise,
Jack’s mother appears wearing two separate dresses. (SEE FIG. 20) The peculiarities mount: we next see
Jack’s mother praying serenely on the beach as she is reassured by the tender touch of a young girl
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(Jessica Fuselier) glimpsed earlier in two brief scenes: in the first, she appears as one of several children
cavorting on the school playground; in the second, she is clearly the object of Jack’s adolescent
affections, as he is seen tailing her as she walks home one afternoon. This unnamed girl is joined on the
beach a few shots later by an even younger one, fair-skinned and freckly, who also strokes Mrs.
O’Brien’s hair. Especially attentive viewers might recognize this redheaded girl, despite her onscreen
time tallying mere seconds, as Mrs. O’Brien’s girlhood self, seen at the opening of the film during her
“way of nature/way of grace” monologue. (SEE FIG. 21) As with Jack, her young and old selves are
made to occupy the same space and time, brought together within a single shot. In fact, by the film’s end,
every major character (and even a few minor ones) appears in at least two incarnations.

Figure 20 - TOP: Jack's brother in blue (L), brown (R); Mrs. O'Brien in green (L), blue (R)
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Figure 21 - Mrs. O'Brien is flanked on her right by her girlhood self

The shots I’ve isolated here are easy to miss, fleeting and fugitive as they are. But once we take
notice of them, once we hold them in our grasp, they become impossible to ignore. On their own, they
are simply curious, but when taken together and considered against the film’s probing cinematography
and its “blended” voiceovers, we begin to see that they mark the culmination of a mode of renvoi—of
return, referral, repetition—that was in play from the outset. “All sonorous presence,” says Nancy, “is …
made of a complex of returns”: “It returns (refers) to itself, it encounters itself or, better, occurs against
itself, both in opposition to and next to itself. It is co-presence.”80 As an adult, Jack returns to the place
of his youth, a place of self-encounter. He stands beside himself and moves with himself, he speaks for
himself and to himself, listens to himself through himself, across space and time. The final images of
The Tree of Life, of double selves encountering one another on a beach, manifest and make visible the
complex web of referrals that was happening throughout the film at the level of the voiceover and
implicitly, up to this point, in the camerawork.
All of this, frankly, has for the most part been missed in the critical reception of the film. So
powerful is the content of the voiceovers (nature and grace and so on and so forth) that it clouds the far
more interesting matter of how these voiceovers function—not only against one another but also in
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relation to the film’s visuals and its structure as a whole. In spite of its grand metaphysical ambitions, its
cosmogony and dinosaurs and prayers and ponderings, I assert by way of closing that the most profound
thing The Tree of Life has to offer is an extraordinarily rich conception of subjectivity in which one’s self
is not something one encounters before a mirror but rather is something one comes to know through his
entwinement with it within a web of resonant referrals.
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4 / DISTANT PASSIONS
In Chapter 1, I analyzed a love scene in Her in which the two principal characters, an unlucky-inlove greeting card writer and his computer’s operating system, manage to consummate their burgeoning
romance in spite of the latter’s lack of a body. The impossibility of any physical union between these
ontologically different beings is temporarily overcome in this scene as suggested by its rendering of
moaning voices over a black screen. Sound, as I argued, is figured in this film as a molecular realm in
which bodies, broadly construed, de- and re-materialize. I’d like to open this chapter by looking to a
similar scene of bodily incorporation from Leos Carax’s dazzling Holy Motors (2012), and as with the
sequence from Jonze’s film, the melding of bodies happens only when the lights go down.
In one of the movie’s dozen or so vignettes, the shape-shifting protagonist Monsieur Oscar (Denis
Lavant) emerges from his limousine, a veritable dressing room and prop closet for the donning of
identities, clad in a black, skin-tight suit dotted with tiny white orbs. With a large case in hand and a
tubular container strapped to his back, he approaches what looks to be a factory of some sorts. Once
inside, he enters a darkened room. So dark is this room, in fact, that the spheres on his body are revealed
to be glowing, and they are all that cuts his figure from the ground. Scarcely visible, he opens his case and
removes martial arts weapons similarly adorned with luminescent dots. From elsewhere, via an intercom,
a voice gives instructions. Oscar obeys. In time, we gather that this mysterious room is a motion-capture
studio and that the tiny balls affixed to Oscar are the digital receptors that translate his physical
movements into digital representations. (SEE FIG. 22)
The remainder of the scene, some eight-and-a-half minutes, is a mesmerizing study of the body in
motion rendered as the dance of white dots against a black background. Absent the cues provided by
shadow, relative size, back- or foreground, any suggestion of a z-axis falls away: depth is in effect erased.
Generally utilized to make cinematic space cohere, the conventions of continuity editing prove wholly
disorienting in this environment, and even more so than under “normal” conditions, jump cuts are
especially jarring. All of this Carax playfully exploits, using sudden camera angle switches and almost
imperceptible ramps in and out of slow-motion in such a way that the immediate narrative thrust of
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Oscar’s actions become less important than the immediacy of his motion and the sheer pliability of his
body. Indeed, for me, the spatial relations of the scene only come into relief when I slowly review them
shot-by-shot, over and over, altering, to paraphrase Laura Mulvey, the very flow of the film with my
remote control.1 At times, Oscar seems to hang in space, as if momentarily free from gravity, like some
Riefenstahlian diver. Moreover, the audible thuds of his landings the only thing reminding us of the floor
that we, if only for a second, forget is there. Without spatial orientation and without the more
recognizable features of the human body that illumination provides, we are left with just the fluidity of
the movement itself, the “beauté de la geste” (“beauty of the gesture”), as Oscar puts it later in the film.2
At the unseen director’s behest, Oscar begins to wield his weapons in what we surmise is a battle
simulation. From the point of view of the audience, there is no clear delineation between hand and object:
his arms fuse with his arms like prosthetic appendages or bodily outgrowths. Yet this is fusion is hardly
the most remarkable one on offer in the scene. Moments later, when the lights come up again, a woman
(Russian acrobat Zlata) in a similarly orb-studded, red leather body suit joins Oscar in the space. The two
figures face one another as if a Spaghetti Western duel before slithering together to perform an assortment
of simulated sex acts.
Down go the lights once again: as with earlier, figure and ground blur, but here, so to do the
boundaries between the two bodies, their contortionistic poses rendering the pair as an constantly
morphing, inextricably entangled bodily amalgam. Even more so than in Her, this scene renders
lovemaking (or the performance thereof) as two bodies becoming one, as an in-corp-oration. The glowing
orbs thus do not mark out a corporeal boundary or border; instead, they reveal the body in all its atomistic
porousness: as the two bodies begin to snake and twist around one another, the unit of analysis ceases to
1
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be the singular body but rather the shifting constellation of dots. The relationship of one to the other is
thus refigured as a relationship of even more elemental physical parts—parts that in this depiction can no
longer be said to belong definitively to one body or the other. In this regard, the scene serves as a visual
figuration of a provocative line from Gaytari Chakravorty Spivak: “[I]f one really thinks of the body as
such, there is no possible outline of the body as such.”3

Figure 22 - Oscar dotted with motion capture sensors in Holy Motors

It must be underscored, though, that in both of these examples (Her, Holy Motors), sex, in
however “performative” a fashion, is the primary means by which bodies incorporate, as if following
from Aristophanes’ logic of sexual (re-)union. But if as I’ve argued heretofore that bodies are inherently
porous and protean, that they scatter and coalesce and enter into peculiar intersubjective assemblages,
then it stands to reason that they might do so under circumstances that are less explicitly “carnal” and that
do not rely upon physical proximity.
Indeed, this is what I find at work in Shane Carruth’s mind-bending science fiction love story
Upstream Color, the primary object of analysis in this chapter. In it, we find an ever more thoroughgoing
type of integration, one that widens out in space and time to include not just two bodies but multiple
others—human and non-—, the consequences of which demand nothing short of a fundamental re-
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thinking of (inter)subjectivity. This fact alone would make Carruth’s film a candidate for inclusion in this
study. But it’s not simply what Upstream Color does with regards to subjectivity that warrants our
attention but also how it goes about it, the physical, material interactions that set the film into motion.
Two related, albeit independent “channels” make possible the expansive, interconnected field of
subjectivity found in Upstream Color: water and sound. It therefore serves as a fitting film with which to
end the dissertation, for a number of this project’s earlier concerns here converge. But before we may
venture down that path, we must first unravel what is an extraordinarily oblique text.

An Anti-expository Film
Upstream Color is a “difficult” film by most any measure, both aesthetically and narratively.
Let’s start with its style. As many critics have noted, the movie bears in some respects a resemblance to
the work of Terrence Malick, whose The Tree of Life we took up in Chapter 3, and whom Carruth cites as
an influence.4 Like Malick, Carruth is drawn to the natural world, his camera sumptuously taking in
leaves and stones and sunshine peeking through tree limbs. Another similarity: throughout Upstream
Color, Carruth frequently employs close-ups of outstretched fingers feeling their way through grass,
water, or the air—imagery straight out of the Malick playbook (I’ll have more to say on this point
momentarily). Be that as it may, unlike Malick, Carruth’s serene shots of nature are punctuated by
restless, precise editing.5 What’s more, Carruth often foregoes the wide establishing shots favored by
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Malick, relying instead on shallow depth of field and fragmentary, meticulously composed close-ups to
only gradually reveal the environs.
Sonically, Carruth’s approach also departs from Malick. Rather than dense orchestral scores,
Carruth’s music, which he composes himself, is minimalist, electronic, and quiet to the point of almost
lulling. Often this music covers over most if not all of the noises of the diegetic world. And unlike
Malick, Carruth largely eschews voiceover. Upstream Color, therefore, is a film of few words, standing
in stark contrast to the “vococentrism” of most mainstream cinema.6 What dialogue we do hear is often
slightly muted and meant to convey the tone or cadence of a conversation more so than its actual content.
Important lines, however, are slightly more prominent in the sound mix, though they are frequently doled
out in tiny, elliptical fragments that are intermittently repeated for emphasis. Taken on the whole,
Upstream Color is perhaps the quietest film in recent American cinema, a cinema somewhat notorious for
its noisiness.
Carruth’s aesthetic is thus one of audiovisual juxtaposition, though not strictly in the contrapuntal
manner of, say, Godard. Rather, the mismatch has more to do with rhythms: swift, elliptical cutting
occurs against a calm, languid soundscape. Much of the movie’s hypnotic quality is owed to the net effect
of these contrasting aural and visual tempos, their “relations of movement and rest, speed and slowness.”7
Carruth’s aesthetic and narrative inclinations dovetail to form a highly fragmentary, “antiexpository” style.8 The director seems to have taken to heart the filmmaking adage of “show, don’t tell,”
as evinced by his forthright mistrust of dialogue:
I absolutely do not like exposition. It feels to me like every time I need it, it seems like
there must be some other way to get around this. We cannot have a scene where Jeff
Goldblum explains Chaos Theory [as he does in Jurassic Park]. We cannot do that. [….]
The script probably had a line or two in it that would technically have been exposition,
and those were excised out once the visual language started to really develop.9
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What is most odd about this position is that Carruth makes films—his earlier, debut film Primer
(2004) is an impenetrable time travel movie with a sizeable cult following—that are almost inscrutable:
they withhold exposition from elaborate plots that would seem most in need of it.
So elaborate is the narrative of Upstream Color, in fact, that nearly every reviewer admits a
certain degree of bafflement with it.10 Many in fact praise the film even as they struggle to describe its
plot. One critic, for example, notes that the film “edges close to absurdity,” a sentiment echoed by another
who concedes that his inadequate synopsis makes the film “sound impossibly silly and arch.”11 Critic
Scott Tobias gives it a valiant (and humorous) go:
To describe the plot of Upstream Color is an exercise in comical futility, but here goes:
Amy Seimetz stars as an effects artist who is abducted and implanted with a
bioengineered grub that holds her in a hypnotic trance. By the time she recovers—via
some sort of pig-related resuscitation process engineered by Andrew Sensenig (see:
comical futility)—Seimetz has no memory of what happened, but she’s mysteriously
drawn to a young, disgraced trader (Carruth) who seems to have gone through a similar
experience. The two share an intimate relationship, spiked by mutual fear and paranoia,
and their memories and identities start to muddy and converge inexplicably. (Also:
Something something orchids; something something [Thoreau’s] Walden; something
something triggering sound effects.)12
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Do not be misled by Tobias’ tone, though, for his review is unquestionably a positive one.
Upstream Color, he concludes, is “the type of art that inspires curiosity and obsession, like some beautiful
object whose meaning remains tantalizingly out of reach,”13 which testifies, I think, to the conviction with
which this ludicrous-on-paper film is mounted. And it’s not only Tobias who thinks so: one online review
aggregator estimates that 84% of critics regarded the movie favorably.14
All of this is to say: writing about Upstream Color is no easy task. It will require a longer than
normal recounting of plot events in order to take stock of the implications of, to paraphrase Scott Tobias,
its strange network of humans, pigs, worms, and flowers. I therefore ask the reader’s patience as we move
through this complex film. In the first half of what follows, I suggest a material basis for the subjective
interconnectedness the film’s central characters, while in the second, I consider the circumstances of how
these connections were forged. As one might guess from the above excerpts from the critical reception of
Upstream Color and the general thrust of the dissertation to this point, sound plays a significant role here.
How, however, is a question that we will have to set to the side for time being.

Entangled States
Let’s begin in the middle, at a point of connection, and then work our way backward: Kris (Amy
Seimetz) and Jeff (Carruth) meet on a train and are instantly drawn to one another for reasons they cannot
explain, seemingly for something beyond mere physical attraction. Despite this being their first encounter,
they both seem to sense that they know each other, which makes for a somewhat testy meet-cute: Kris
appears perturbed by her vague familiarity with Jeff, whereas he romantically pursues her immediately
and aggressively—to the point of stalking her—, as if their match were preordained and their coupling a
fait accompli. What is the nature of their magnetism, their simultaneous push and pull from and to one
another? We come to find that they were both victims of an unnamed character (Thiago Martins), listed in
the credits only as “The Thief,” who brainwashes his targets by introducing, by hook or by crook, strange
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worms into their bodies, worms he harvests from rare blue orchids he purchases at an exotic flower shop.
His primary means of getting his victims to ingest the worms is to slide them into medicine capsules, pose
as a drug dealer, and pass them off on unsuspecting buyers. Unfortunately for Kris, she happens to be in
the same bar as The Thief on a night when he fails to land a sale. In a sequence of events that disturbingly
resembles a sexual assault, The Thief incapacitates Kris with a taser while she waits in line for the
bathroom, drags her to the building’s backalley, straddles her body, and using a bag valve mask filled
with water, forces a worm down her throat. This parasite, we learn, renders their hosts especially open to
suggestion, and The Thief exploits this vulnerability by directing Kris and his other victims in a series of
monotonous tasks (gluing strips of paper into long daisy chains, stacking poker chips, transcribing
Thoreau’s Walden [1845] in its entirety) in order to make them docile and robotic, at which time they, at
his behest, obligingly drain their bank accounts.
Once robbed, the Thief’s victims awake from their trances with no memory of the crimes
perpetrated against themselves, by themselves, and since they signed over their own assets, they have no
legal recourse for recovery, no plausible scenario to give to the police as to why they liquefied their
assets. Indeed, Jeff, formerly a stockbroker, handed over not only his own money but also that of his
clients, leading to his being fired for embezzlement; and Kris, unable to account for her absence from her
job as visual effects supervisor in the film industry, is likewise terminated. Unemployed, broke, and
doubting their own mental stability, Jeff and Kris are effectively reset to zero.
Now working as a clerk at a copy/print store, Kris moves through her post-theft life as if in a
foggy haze. Yet in Jeff, she seems to detect something kindred, like a faint signal only she can hear
breaking through what is otherwise a world of noise, and ditto for him. The characters thus gravitate
toward one another not (only) because of physical attraction but (also) on account of shared but not
consciously recalled experiences of their conditioning at the hands of the Thief. Indeed, much of the
couple’s bonding, such that it is, revolves initially around their gradual discovery that they both have
similar, sizeable gaps in their personal histories for which they cannot account.
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As their courtship continues, other oddities start to crop up. Memory, for instance, becomes a site
of contestation. They bicker, at first teasingly then later more heatedly, about the “ownership” of certain
recollections. For example, Kris and Jeff both tell stories of family vacations in Vermont and of being
almost drowned by an overweight neighbor name Renny, similarities which seem to them beyond
coincidence. They each begin to suspect that the other is purposefully intermixing their personal narrative,
a charge they both deny.
Stranger still, Kris becomes convinced she is pregnant even though tests reveal that not only is
she without child but also that she is unable to conceive, a conclusion doctors reach when they discover
scars on her uterus consistent with a surgical intervention for cancer, a diagnosis and a procedure for
which she has no recollection. But while she is probed at her doctor’s office, Jeff doubles over at work,
clutching his abdomen as if he, too, had suddenly become aware of something amiss internally, as if he
were experiencing something akin to the symptoms of Couvade syndrome (“sympathetic pregnancy”)—
this despite Kris not actually being pregnant.15
It is evident that the bond that unites Kris and Jeff is not simply metaphorical; indeed, there seems
to be some sort of material bond between them, with the thoughts and sensations of one half of the couple
intruding upon the other. Unlike the brief coital unification of Samantha and Theodore in Her or the
boundary-blurring contortions of Oscar and his fellow performer in Holy Motors, the “affiliation”
between Jeff and Kris is far more prolonged and perhaps even indissoluble. To refer back to some of the
conceptual language from elsewhere in this study, we might say that the two lovers in Upstream Color
“resonate” with one another in profound ways, or that they are deeply “intertwined,” or perhaps that they
have incorporated at a molecular level into a single body or “assemblage.” This latter term is closer to the
mark, for it acknowledges the material circumstances—more on that shortly—of Kris and Jeff’s
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connection, but it doesn’t quite go far enough. A better description, I think, for this strange state of
exchange in which these two lovers find themselves? Entangled.
In quantum physics, entanglement names a type of particle-level phenomenon that “def[ies] the
physics governing life at human scale.”16 A popular podcast recently explored entangled states by
describing for a lay audience an experiment conducted at the University of Maryland. As the hosts
reported, two atoms were isolated beneath metal boxes on opposite ends of a table. Then, with a complex
assortment of lasers and mirrors, scientists were able to accelerate the motion of these atoms so that they
each emit a photon. The researchers forced these photons to collide with one another, which in turn
caused the two atoms from whence they came to become linked or “entangled”.17 Now, every atom
possesses an intrinsic angular momentum that physicists call “spin,” the direction of which can be altered
under laboratory conditions by scientists. Here’s where it gets interesting: “bizarrely, if the direction of
one atom’s spin is altered, its entangled fellows will change their spins accordingly, and
instantaneously.”18 What happens to one, in other words, affects the other instantly, no matter the distance
between them. They no longer operate as discrete entities but as a single object—even though they are
separate from one another in space. The entanglement experiment at the University of Maryland spanned
a mere four feet, but to date, similar results have been obtained across a distance of just over 186 miles
(300km).19 “Theoretically,” though, “you could fly one atom to the moon, and still if you affected it in
some way, the other atom back on earth would be affected instantaneously in the same way.”20
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As evinced by his famous public debates with Niels Bohr in the late 1920s and early 1930s, the
notion of quantum entanglement greatly troubled Albert Einstein, for he contended that the theory was
either flawed or incomplete because it failed to account for how entangled atoms could “transfer”
information with one another without physical contact and faster than the speed of light. The implication
was that “particles do not take on physical properties until they are measured or observed in some way.
Until then, they can exist simultaneously in two or more places. Once measured, however, they snap into
a more classical reality, existing in only one place.”21 Einstein’s derisive term for this strange
phenomenon: “spooky action at a distance.” But since the time of the Bohr–Einstein debates, quantum
entanglement has been proven, first with some qualifying assumptions by John Stewart Bell in 1964 and
definitively by Dutch physicist Robert Hanson and others in 2015.22
“To be entangled,” writes philosopher of science Karen Barad, “is not simply to be intertwined
with another, as in joining separate entities, but to lack an independent, self-contained existence.”23 How
fitting this line is for the situation Kris and Jeff finds themselves in in Upstream Color, for they not only
feel one another’s pains and emotional highs and lows but also share an almost telepathic link and what
amounts to a shared pool of experiences and memories from which they indiscriminately draw. Jeff and
Kris do not consciously or willfully seek to affect one another, but they are affected by one another
nonetheless. For this reason, I prefer Abner Shimony’s term “passion at a distance” over Einstein’s
“spooky” action at a distance. Shimony’s phrasing harks back to Aristotle’s distinction between “action”
and “passion” found in his Categories and Physics. In its contemporary usage, “passion” connotes strong
emotion, suffering (specifically in the context of Jesus Chris), or great enthusiasm. In Aristotle’s usage,
however, “passion” is meant to convey a sense of passivity: one is either the “mover” (action) or the
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“moved” (passion).24 Far down the list in its entry in The Oxford English Dictionary one will find these
meanings for “passion”: “the fact or condition of being acted upon” and the “way in which a thing is or
may be affected by external agency.” In his election of this term, Shimony shifts the emphasis away from
causality in quantum entanglement to effect, the receiving end. In other words, he is underscoring the role
of affect in entangled states. Shimony, in 1983, argued that altering one atom of an entangled pair does
not cause an alteration in the other;25 rather, as physicist M. P. Seevinck explains, one atom “passively
comes to know more about a faraway situation, [i.e., its entangled partner] but [it] cannot actively change
it. […] Instead of ‘transmission of a message’ think of ‘extra information being available’.”26 This
conception of entanglement aligns better with Upstream Color than the active thrust of Einstein’s. What
happens to Kris is not duplicated in Jeff in a one-to-one correspondence, or vice-versa. Rather, the
experiences of one are felt as a vague percept or even a premonition, and even then only sometimes.
Moreover, it is not as though Jeff or Kris seeks to intentionally affect the other through their own selfaffectations. Jeff does not, to contrive an example, place his hand in the fire so that Kris might feel the
burn as if he were some corporeal voodoo doll. Finally, and conveniently for me, outside the context of
quantum physics, “passion” tends to conjure the image of romantic love or erotic desire, which syncs up
nicely with the love story aspects of Upstream Color. In fact, in one scene Jeff entangles these two
meanings in his highly unconventional marriage proposal to Kris: “I want to marry you. I’m already
married to you.”
What I hope to achieve with this discussion of quantum entanglement is to frame Upstream Color
as a film that uses the science-fiction form to ponder the philosophical implications of a science fact—that
at the particle level, discrete bodies interact with one another and that this impacts how we might think
24
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about the supposed circumscription of the self. In the controlled environment of the laboratory, physicists
can force quantum entanglement to occur—but the implication is that entanglement can and does happen
“in nature.” We can make entanglement happen, but it can happen without our intervention—invisibly
and outside our conscious awareness. As one of the hosts of the podcast mentioned above put it, “[Y]ou
don’t even need lasers to get [entanglement] to work. It … probably happens all the time in the natural
world. Like, there could be one particle of you right now entangled with the person you just passed on the
street.”27
Even though Upstream Color contrives an extraordinary set of circumstances to entangle its
characters, it nevertheless goes to great lengths to attribute them to “natural” (albeit fictional) processes.
For the sake of comparison, though not exactly the same thing as entanglement, forms of telepathic
communication as depicted in cinema tend to be tied to supernatural (The Shining [Kubrick, 1980]),
extraterrestrial (Independence Day [Emmerich, 1996]), or otherwise “cosmic” occurrences (The Double
Life of Véronique [Kiéslowski, 1991]). In contrast, Carruth depicts the film’s mysterious organism as
something that occurs in nature and is only subsequently utilized by humans who happen upon the
organism’s affective powers by chance. Furthermore, the characters wind up entangled with one another
not because of some vast conspiracy or some malevolent mastermind but as a result of a trio of unrelated
parties operating not in concert but in pursuit of their own economic self-interests. So what, in the final
analysis, is the driving force behind the strange entangled states in which these characters find
themselves? Capitalism.

Trans-species Intersubjective Loops
Our discussion of quantum entanglement has largely confined itself to paired entities, but what’s
remarkable about Upstream Color is the entangled states it presents extend far beyond the two principal
characters we’ve considered thus far. Indeed, the film lays the groundwork early on for an intricate
affective chain that only becomes clear in its second half. The turning point: while at work, Jeff suddenly
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and without provocation attacks two co-workers, while Kris, also at work and absent any manifest threat,
is just as suddenly and just as inexplicably roused into a state of panic. She abandons the shop and bolts
towards a building that draws her for no apparent reason. When she phones Jeff, now driving feverishly,
she cannot provide an address or even describe her location. Nevertheless, Jeff knows that she is at the
office from which he just left, most likely because he, himself, was on the way to her workplace.
Something compelled them to seek each other out, like an intuition of the impending possibility of grave
harm to one or both of them. Upon finding one another, they rush home and barricade themselves in the
bathroom, cowering in the tub. Flanking them are the items they hurriedly gathered: a flashlight, food and
water, a first-aid kit, a handgun. Oddly enough, intercut with shots of their self-sequestration are images
of piglets being corralled and placed into a large sack.
What is the relationship between these two characters and these farm animals? Kris and Jeff’s
intense connection was established, we learn, not merely through their brainwashing at the hands of The
Thief or their exposure to the worm but rather, more significantly, through an even stranger bond between
the grubs and their subsequent hosts, for the worms do not permanently reside in The Thief’s victims.
In a harrowing scene from very early in the film, Kris tries in vain to remove the subcutaneous
creature with a carving knife. Without knowing why, she hops in her car and drives to a remote location
to which she has never before been, and there she encounters an unnamed farmer, listed in the credits only
as “The Sampler,” who sits in a field at night with large loudspeakers pointed at the ground playing a low,
loud, repetitive rumble. Kris, one surmises, is lured to his location by this monotonous sound for reasons
she cannot articulate. By all appearances, the Sampler is not in the least bit surprised when she arrives
seeking his help. In fact, he nonchalantly leads her to a tent where he anesthetizes her and surgically
extracts the worm from her body and transposes it into that of a pig, also unconscious. Afterwards, The
Sampler tags the pig’s ear with a number and records it in a logbook alongside Kris’ name, which is
preceded by dozens of others. When next we see her, she is asleep at the wheel of a car stopped on the
side of the highway. She has no idea how she got there nor does she have any recollection of her
encounter with The Sampler.
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Through this process, Kris and the pig now hosting the worm that once resided in her become
affectively linked in an trans-species, intersubjective loop: what happens to one is somehow sensed and
felt by the other. What’s more, though Carruth never explicitly depicts it, we gather that Jeff has
undergone the same procedure, too. Complicating matters further, the two pigs entangled with Kris and
Jeff are themselves drawn to one another on the farm, where they mate, which is what precipitates Kris’
false “motherly intuition,” a literal and figurative gut feeling that stems not from her own body but from
the sow’s. Or might it be the other way around? Could it be that Jeff and Kris’ chance encounter on the
train is what set into motion the pigs’ mating on the farm? These are questions the film leaves unresolved,
for, again, causality is less important in Upstream Color than is effect (or affect).
This much is clear: the sudden onset of paranoia that leads our human protagonists to hole up in
the bathroom is in some way tied to The Sampler’s removal from the farm and subsequent drowning of
their swine counterparts’ piglets after they begin to behave erratically. Now, before continuing with the
effect of this act on the film’s protagonists, let’s pause to touch upon the role The Sampler’s disposal of
the pigs in a nearby tributary plays in the grander scheme. Once the pigs’ bodies begin to decompose
underwater, the worms within them release an unusual blue-hued fluid that is carried with the stream’s
current, eventually seeping into the root system of orchid plants downstream, which turns their blooms
from white to blue, drawing the attention of the exotic flower dealers who uproot them and sell them in
their shop—to customers such as The Theif, who extracts from them the worms he uses to drug his
victims. The tributary is thus, in addition to sound, the second linking branch in the film’s complex
network of entanglements. Hence, Upstream Color presents us with the classic “chicken or the egg”
paradox, except in this case the dilemma is in three parts: The Sampler, as far as we can discern, only
tosses the parasite-hosting pig carcasses in the stream if they had first been implanted with the worms he
had extracted from The Thief’s victims; yet The Thief would have no access to said worms had he not
first purchased the worm-carrying orchids for the flower retailers, who are unwittingly reliant on The
Sampler’s unorthodox method of pig disposal for the rare plants they sell at a premium. Let me reiterate,
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however, that this is not a paradox I shall endeavor to solve: effects—and affects—are what I’m after,
passions rather than actions.
So, to return to the film’s central characters, Jeff and Kris both feel their swine counterparts’ fear
when The Sampler carts off their young, which suggests why Jeff attacks his coworkers out of the blue
and why Kris enters into what Carruth problematically describes as an episode of fugue-like “hysteria”
triggered by the mother pig’s loss of her offspring. I say “problematically” because of the gendered nature
of their differing responses: Jeff is to “fight” as Kris is to “flight”—though her retreat is not to some
elsewhere physical location but deep into the recesses of her self. Following the piglets’ death, Kris
borders on catatonia, which Carruth in interviews links directly to her felt if not “real” role as a mother.
Kris, he says, “is dealing with the mania and hysteria of having her children taken from her, without her
ever being able to consciously know she has children. So she is experiencing a level of, in my mind,
maybe the greatest, the most powerful emotion you might be able to feel, … what I imagine it might feel
like to lose her children.”28 Though Jeff clearly feels the same familial loss that Kris does, the only
“natural” response Carruth can imagine (or project) for her is that most troublesome and highly gendered
of diagnoses: hysteria.
With that said, it bears noting that Kris’ behavior in response to this “most powerful of emotions”
is to immerse herself in water, the formless and fluid realm that, as we’ve seen in the previous chapters, is
so often associated with the feminine. Kris takes to an indoor swimming pool, where she repeatedly dives
for rocks she tosses to its depths, as if in search for the offspring she senses linger at the bottom of a body
of water. Interestingly, even though Carruth falls back on gendered assumptions of emotional excess, he
nevertheless turns the pool not into a metaphor for the womb or some other protective enclosure or space
of undifferentiatedness but an almost ritualistic site of mourning. Like the films of Lynne Ramsay we
took up in Chapter 2, water is for Carruth a feminine realm of birth, flow, regeneration, and continutation
that is also simultaneously imbued with melancholy and death. Furthermore, in keeping with the trope of
28
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the retaliative, wronged mother, it is Kris rather than Jeff who in the end who avenges the death of the
piglets. To this retribution we shall return. In the meantime, I want to home back in on the question of
sound, that other constant of the present study, for Upstream Color hinges on it like no other film since
perhaps Coppola’s The Conversation (1974).

Affective Antennae
A consequential question we’ve yet to explore: why would The Sampler go to such lengths to
remove these odd worms from strangers and then place them into his pigs, and why does the rumbly noise
he plays into the ground seem to attract The Thief’s victims to him? Relatedly, is The Sampler in any way
affiliated with The Thief? Here’s where sound becomes especially important. When not tending to his
animals, The Sampler engages in what at first appears to be a hobby and later a preoccupation: composing
electroacoustic music. The Sampler does not play a traditional instrument like, say, a guitar or a clarinet
as would be the case with conventional musics; instead, he makes electronic recordings of noises from the
natural world (rushing water, the rustle of tree branches in the wind) and subsequently manipulates—
bends, stretches, distorts—them with a synthesizer to construct ambient compositions, to build ambience
out of ambience, in other words.
Not just any sound will do, though, as The Sampler pursues extremely particular noises. Early in
the film, he abruptly departs his pickup truck when he hears a faint hum, which he traces to a nearby
utility pole. In the next shot, he stands before it with boom microphone in hand and headphones donned,
capturing the sound to a digital recorder. The Sampler is not content, however, to wait for certain noises
to present themselves via chance encounters. At one point, he samples the sounds produced when he
topples a tower of bricks, rolls stones down the grooves of a corrugated culvert pipe, and drags an iron
file across the edges of that pipe’s opening, like a cellist bowing her instrument. Why? The answer has to
do with The Sampler’s impossibly keen sense of hearing and his idiosyncratic compositional mode. But,
rather than begin with his ear, I want to focus instead on his hands. Earlier, I noted the evident influence
of Malick in Upstream Color’s cinematography, and this is nowhere more apparent than in the scenes
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involving The Sampler as he walks with his fingers outstretched before him (SEE FIGS. 23–24). In
Malick, close-ups such as these, of hands as they stroke tall grass, wheat, or the bark of a tree, are, in Ann
Rutherford’s words, like cinematic “exclamation points,” “gestural moments of intensity” that conjure in
the viewer the tactile sensation of touching these same objects.29 In Upstream Color, images such as these
are not “merely” haptic: The Sampler’s hand in this case is neither primarily prehensile in its function nor
is it foremost meant to conjure the act of touching through an appeal to the “knowledge” of the viewer’s
own fingers.30 Instead, it becomes something more like an antenna, which I mean in both the thrust of an
insect’s multi-function sensory appendage and a device for the reception of radio waves.31 The relatively
recent “phenomenological turn” in film studies has compellingly demonstrated the tactility of vision in
the cinematic experience.32 What’s unique about Upstream Color is that it recasts the hand not as an
extension or complement of vision but as an augmentation of the ear. Jean-Luc Nancy evokes the French
phrase tender l’oreille—“literally, to stretch the ear”—to convey what he describes as an “intensified”
form of listening in which one becomes “all ears.”33 The Sampler’s hand functions in this manner, turning
the hand into what Deleuze might call a “polyvalent and transitory organ.”34
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Figure 23 - CU of hand in The Tree of Life

Figure 24 - The Sampler's hand in Upstream Color

Let’s examine a complex sequence some 40 minutes into the film to see how this use of the hand
as antenna plays out. It opens with The Sampler overlooking the pigpen from his deck, and the camera
catches glimpse of his fingers as he taps the wood banister as if he were playing an invisible piano. Next,
we see him in the pen, walking slowly with his hand outstretched as he stops in front of each individual
animal, as if seeking out one to anoint with the mud on his fingertips. Shortly thereafter appears a series
of eight shots that is of the utmost importance for discerning the role sound plays in this film, for its reworking of the standard shot-reverse-shot structure tells us a great deal not only about the Sampler’s
motives but also about the manner in which he hears:
1) The Sampler squats in front of a pig (A) and dangles his hand over its head;
2) A man, in his first appearance in the film, driving a car;
3) The Sampler in CU, peering downward towards pig A, as if in deep concentration;
4) Back to the man in the car, now joined by The Sampler, who sits in the passenger seat staring
at the driver, who seems entirely unaware of his presence;
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5) CU, The Sampler in the pigpen, glancing away from pig A below him to something offscreen
left;
6) The Sampler, now in medium shot, crouching before a new pig (B);
7) A woman, new to the film, dining alone in an otherwise crowded restaurant. Another patron
crosses in the foreground, masking a cut that reveals
8) The Sampler now sitting across from the woman, though she, like the driver in (4), does not
seem to note his presence.
A pattern emerges: in one shot, The Sampler places his hand near a pig (SEE FIG. 25); in the next
one, he inexplicably appears in an entirely different setting, often positioned close enough to others that
one might expect them to take notice of him, but yet they do not (SEE FIG. 26). This pattern repeats six
more times in a span of 38 seconds, with The Sampler relocating from the farm to several different urban
locations: first we see him standing behind a window shopper, then following a man to a bank of
elevators, then alongside a person feeding a parking meter, then next to a woman at a coffee shop, then
staring at a passerby, then inches away from a construction worker.

Figure 25 - The Sampler communes with a pig

Figure 26 - The Sampler “eavesdrops” on a window shopper
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This rapid-fire alternation between locations soon slows itself down. Following the shot of the
construction worker, we cut back to The Sampler on the farm with ambulance sirens audible offscreen.
He turns toward the implied direction of the sound, and as he does, pulsing lights from the rescue vehicle
dance across his face. Yet the first responders are not actually there at the pen; they hail from another
location (a residential neighborhood) entirely, as subsequent shots indicate. Spaces collapse: those that
The Sampler physically inhabits, those to which he gains audiovisual access when in “commune” with the
pigs. We see The Sampler looking on as paramedics cart off an unconscious woman (Carolyn King). A
cut takes us back to the farm: in tight CU, The Sampler’s mud-covered fingers outstretched. In the next
shot, he stands in the back of ambulance while the husband (Frank Mosley) clings to his wife’s hand.
Seconds later, The Sampler leans against the wall outside her hospital room. There, like a ghost, he sits
directly in front of the husband but remains undetected as he leans in towards the anxious man, as if
straining to hear some miniscule sound, like a whisper or even his heartbeat. A fragmentary, iterative
scene of loveless kisses and domestic quarrels over trivial matters between the married couple follows.35
From these sketches, one draws the conclusion that the woman, suffering through an unhappy marriage,
has attempted to take her own life.
The Sampler’s hand acts as a conduit of sorts, a portal into the lives of those people affectively
tethered with his pigs—though Carruth’s refusal of exposition leaves it unclear as to the exact mechanics
of this. It is clear to me, though, that touch operates for The Sampler as a crucial supplement to his
already keen sense of hearing. Rather than playing merely a complementary role to his sight, hearing is
his “dominant” sense modality and the precondition for his preternatual vision. Or in slightly different
terms, for this character, the sense of touch is an extension of his sense of hearing, and his vision is a
function thereof. The Sampler’s voyeurism follows from his singular proficiency at what we might call
“affective eavesdropping.”
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This brings us back to the question of what compels him to listen in on one particular moment of
one particular life over another? Why does he elect, for instance, to linger on the plight of a desperate
women and a guilt-laden man yet so swiftly turn away from the lonely diners and construction workers
and window shoppers earlier? The ostensible answer is that unlike these other mundane affairs, the
suicide plot is, to an outside observer, more interesting, more dramatic. One might say, too, that such a
conclusion is corroborated by the image of The Sampler sitting in a beach chair in the middle of the
pigpen with a pile of grain directly beside him, hastily placed there, it would seem, to entice the pig to
remain in close proximity to him to facilitate his viewing pleasure.
I grant that one could make the argument that The Sampler’s movement from pig to pig in the
sequence above is a form of voyeuristic channel surfing, hopping from one situation to the next until he
comes across something titillating. That said, the beginning and ending of this sequence mirror one
another in ways that suggest something more complex—and more morally ambiguous—is at work. In the
final image of the suicide plotline sequence, we see The Sampler stand watch in the background as the
husband waits by the telephone in foreground and gently raps his fingers across the kitchen table in
precisely the same manner The Sampler did on the deck railing at the beginning of the sequence. This
suggests that The Sampler enters the pig pen not (solely) to entertain himself by watching the tribulations
of others but to feed a more fundamental compulsion within him—to seek out the source of the sounds he
hears in his head, sounds that he then attempts to replicate for later incorporation into his musical
compositions.36
Indeed, this is what drives him throughout much of the film and not simply in this one example.
For instance, in the scene mentioned above in which The Sampler captures audio of bricks tumbling and
rocks sliding across metal, Carruth intercuts shots of our protagonists performing monotonous—and
noisy—tasks: Jeff running a mail sorter and a photocopier, Kris operating a large-scale printer and sewing
a vinyl sign. Upon first viewing, these would seem to be simple auditory “rhymes” (i.e., analogous to the
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perhaps more familiar “graphic match” or “match cut”), but the similarity between these sounds is
important. Note how when Kris cuts the thread on the sewing machine with a razor, its prominent, audible
snap carries over into the shot of The Sampler just as he abruptly cuts short his sussing out of the musical
idea he’d been chasing. We have a causal link: when Kris stops the sewing machine’s racket, the sound
that The Sampler hears from “elsewhere” and that he models his composition on goes silent. Thus, the
aural correspondence we find between the sounds in The Sampler’s environment and those in Kris and
Jeff’s is not meant to suggest a simple synchronicity but rather that The Sampler is quite literally hearing
the sounds that Jeff and Kris hear. Another instance of this can be found even earlier in the film when a
shot of Jeff folding disposable drinking straw wrappers into daisy chains (presumably a holdover
compulsion from The Thief’s brainwashing) is immediately followed by a shot of The Sampler recording
crispy autumn leaves in the breeze. Here, The Sampler mistakes the sound of the paper wrappers for the
crackling leaves, or at the very least he tries to approximate the wrapper noises with whatever materials
he has available to him. Either way, this suggests why The Sampler is so willing to drop whatever task is
at hand in order to pursue a certain noise: he must recreate the sound before the original he hears from
elsewhere fades from audibility. He has only a short window of time within which to work.

“A Weird Flowing Sound”
In Upstream Color, sound performs a bridging function, not only between The Sampler and the
people linked to his menagerie of pigs, but also, more generally, between all of those in the film’s vast,
interconnected network. This is to say, in true cyclical fashion, The Sampler uses his compositions to lure
The Thief’s victims so that he may in turn make more compositions. His recordings are thus at once a
means to and end as well as an end in and of themselves. They are both bait and meal.
Take Kris’s first encounter with The Sampler, for instance. To a human like her, the repetitive,
droning noise he transmits into the ground has no significance, but to the parasite she hosts, it most
certainly does. Worms do not have ears, of course, but they do feel vibrations, and as Darwin tells us, “if
the ground is beaten or otherwise made to tremble, worms believe that they are pursued by a mole and
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leave their burrows.”37 Hence, The Sampler is practicing, perhaps unbeknownst to himself, a
technologically reproduced mode of “worm grunting,” a pre-modern technique for harvesting earthworms
for bait once common in the worm-rich Apalachicola National Forest in Florida.38 One writer describes
the worm grunters sound and its effect thus:
The sound [a worm grunter] makes is otherworldly. Somewhere between a rusted door
creaking open and a bullfrog with a sore throat. The simple materials he uses to create the
sound—a strip of metal rubbing against a wooden rod pounded into the earth—make it all
the weirder, but that’s nothing compared to its effects on the environment around it. Like
magic, the noise drives hundreds of earthworms out of the ground as if reporting for duty.39
Strictly speaking, the sound does not attract Kris and her fellow victims, per se; rather, its mechanical
vibration animates the worms within their bodies, rousing the parasites to flee by activating their fight-orflight mechanisms.
Yet, the noisy music The Sampler makes is not only the means by which Kris and Jeff (and
others) wind up entangled with the pigs but also a crucially important clue that leads to them (partially)
unraveling the central mystery of the film. Not long after the episode in the bathtub, we see the couple in
bed at night as Kris complains that she hears a faint, high-pitched sound emanating from underneath their
home, a claim Jeff quickly dismisses. We cut to the next day to find that he, in an effort appease her, has
sought out the noise’s source by digging a sizeable hole in the backyard that stretches below the house.
She tries to replicate the pitch of the sound with her voice so that Jeff might listen for it, too. But he
corrects her: it’s lower in tone, he says. He, too, has been hearing this “weird flowing sound,” but he was
afraid to admit it.
So much of Upstream Color involves the location of a noise’s source. Much like with The
Sampler, these sounds from nowhere beckon Kris and Jeff, and they set out on a feverish search for them.
37
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Failing to uncover the whistling noise at home, Jeff and Kris take to their car, giving chase to the sounds
that they hear intermittently and faintly. Indeed, their efforts lead them to the same culvert and the
identical utility pole that had attracted The Sampler, both of which are located adjacent to his farm. Mere
feet from there, they see a mailbox labeled QUINOA VALLEY RECORDING COMPANY, a clue that sends
them to their local record store, where they find a handful of CDs—with titles such as Extractions and
Reverberations—produced by The Sampler and distributed under the very same moniker found on the
mailbox. Back at home, they take turns listening to these recordings via headphones, and both Kris and
Jeff immediately recognize the sounds found therein as those they’ve been hearing during their
sleepwalking days and, farther back perhaps, as those that lured them to The Sampler long ago. (SEE
FIG. 27) His sounds lead them to him twice: first, when he initially extracted their worms, and again later,
when they discovered the sources of the sounds that constitute his electroacoustic albums.

Figure 27 - Kris recognizes The Sampler's compositions

This discovery of an overlap between the sounds heard on The Sampler’s CDs, those they
vaguely recall from their brainwashing, and those Kris and Jeff hear pulsing throughout their day-to-day
lives is sufficient evidence for them to conclude that The Sampler is the culprit behind the crimes
committed against them, crimes they cannot consciously recall but that they feel the residues of
nonetheless. They plot their revenge, which will involve a luring of their own—and it is to transpire amid
a complete withdrawal of diegetic sound: no dialogue, no environmental noise; only score—and a
powerful exchange of glances.

153

At his otherwise empty office building, Jeff sits down to eat lunch, during which time Carruth
begins to crosscut to various shots of The Sampler walking through the pigpen, his hand outstretched and
hovering alternately from animal to animal, each pause “placing” him into diverse spaces (a tennis court,
a streetcar) occupied by his former “patients.” But then he comes across Jeff’s pig and, instantaneously,
The Sampler appears in Jeff’s office space. He takes a seat across from Jeff, who stares blankly ahead. In
walks Kris, who joins Jeff at the table (SEE FIG. 28), a coalescence of two of The Sampler’s pigs’
counterparts that he appears to regard with equal parts curiosity and amusement. Like the beholder before
a painting, he stares at Kris, cocking his head at different angles so as to study her more fully from his
position of invisibility and, thus, power. (SEE FIG. 29)

Figure 28 - The Sampler (foreground) watches Kris (L) and Jeff

Figure 29 - The Sampler studies Kris' face
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Figure 30 - Kris returns his gaze

But then she looks up and meets his gaze, a returned glance that visibly stuns The Sampler: she
can see him. (SEE FIG. 30) It’s a beautiful performance by Sensenig, whose facial expressions subtly
shift among an array of emotions in only a few seconds: first shock followed by shame, doubt, and fear,
culminating in resignation. No words are exchanged. He stands up from the table and slowly walks away,
aware that he is about to die.
Once again, Carruth collapses two distinct spaces. There in the office, The Sampler, literally and
figuratively, backs up against a wall. He slides to the floor while reaching for his chest as if he had been
shot. And indeed he has been, despite the fact that no wound or no blood are visible on his shirt. This is
because he has not been shot at the office, but rather on the farm, which Carruth conveys via a striking
graphical match. In the office, Kris slowly approaches from screen right the slouched over man on the left
side of the frame (SE FIG. 31). In mid-step, we cut from this space to that of the farm, where in the same
spatial arrangement, sits a despondent Sampler and a determined Kris continuing her movement across
the frame. (SEE FIG. 32) Given that it is almost entirely cloaked by her body, one might not notice the
gun in her hand until she, in the next shot, faces the Sampler, raises the weapon, and fire three rounds into
him—a “mother” avenging the death of her “children.” (SEE FIG. 33)
How is it, though, that Kris was finally able to recognize the man who up until this point had been
the subject of vision but not the object of vision? Kris’ pivotal moment of seeing is predicated upon her
being able to listen—first to the seemingly hallucinatory sounds that keep her up at night, then to
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electricity coursing through a utility pole, and then finally to The Sampler’s CD. It is this sequence of
events that ultimately unveils the man who brought about the entangled relationship between her, her
husband, and the two distant farm animals. Over the course of the film, Kris and Jeff construct something
of a “sound map,” sleuthing out the sources (the actual physical locations) from which the sounds they
hear emit—sounds that they had until late in the proceedings thought to entirely hallucinatory. And from
this map, the couple derives a lesson. We might productively apply Deleuze’s remark about the Ingrid
Bergman character in Rossellini’s Europa ’51 (“she sees, she has learnt to see”), but with one small but
significant modification: Kris learns to see precisely because she has learnt to hear.40 Or to frame it in
terms consistent with those I put forth in an earlier chapter of this dissertation, an aural revelation about
the nature of the sounds she hears—where they come from, why they exercise this uncanny power over
her—is transfigured into the realm of the visible.

Figure 31 - Kris walks across the office towards The Sampler, partially visible on the right

Figure 32 - In a graphical match, Kris continues her movement, only now on the farm
40
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We might say, therefore, that Upstream Color’s project is pedagogical. It is only when Jeff and
Kris learn to listen, when they cease to believe that the unsourced sounds they hear are false perceptions,
that they are able to unravel their entangled pasts. Furthermore, once The Sampler is dead, they assume
the role of teachers, sharing with others the lessons they have learned. Kris removes from the farm The
Sampler’s files, which reveal not only the circumstances of her’s and Jeff’s first encounters with The
Sampler but also of those who came before and after them. Armed with their names, they ship copies of
Walden to all who had undergone the same transplant procedure at the hands of The Sampler in the hopes
that Thoreau’s words will stir in them some recollection of their same or similar ordeal. In the film’s final
scene, Kris, Jeff, and some half dozen others gather en masse at the farm, all awakened to the fact of their
shared victimhood, to “meet” face-to-face the pigs that had unbeknownst to them been affecting them at a
distance. Little do Kris and Jeff realize, though, that their conclusion, their lesson, is an incomplete one.

Figure 33 - Kris takes aim The Sampler

Life Cycles and Porous Boundaries
The irony of Kris’s retributory execution of The Sampler, of course, is that he is not the origin of
her plight so much as an exploiter of it after the fact—and The Thief is still at large, to boot. However, her
killing of The Sampler does, in fact, put an end to The Thief’s ability to victimize others. It was when
Jeff’s and Kris’s swine counterparts began to act violently towards the farmer, the reader will recall, that
he disposed of their piglets by gathering them in a sack and tossing it into a stream, killing them. But with
The Sampler dead, no more pig carcasses will find their way to the stream, and thus no more blue orchids
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shall sprout, and The Thief will no longer have access to the worms, which, like their swine upon which
they depend for their existence, shall perish in that shallow water, thus ending the “worm-pig-orchid life
cycle,” as Carruth calls it.41
If we reckon with Upstream Color solely from the standpoint of the mysterious organism at its
center that forges these strange connections, then “cycle” is an apposite term. Yet to think of the film in
this way requires that we isolate and bracket off each stage of the organism’s journey, which fails to
account, I think, for precisely that which is so intriguing about the film, namely, that those who come into
contact with the organism continue to be indirectly affected by it long after their direct contact with it has
ended. We see something similar to this is in Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the “rhizome,” which in
contrast to the linear verticality that is a tree, forms a horizontal network of connections between disparate
elements. Coincidentally enough, one of the examples they give of rhizomatic relations is that shared
between the wasp and the orchid. The orchid, they say, “de-territorializes” itself by making itself
resemble a wasp, which in turn lures the insect, who upon departure from the plant carries with it the
flower’s pollen, which it later deposits on yet another orchid. The wasp, in effect, has become part of “the
orchid’s reproductive apparatus.” Yet the wasp does so unwittingly. The orchid’s visual deterritorialization is thus the start of an “`aparallel evolution of two beings that have absolutely nothing to
do with one another” directly.’”42
Leaning too heavily on the “worm-pig-orchid” cycle, I think, overly simplifies this complex film,
for it overlooks that which rhizomatically unites all of the vastly different agents in Upstream Color; it
misses those crucial linkages that mediate in aparallel fashion each of those discrete “embodiments” in
the parasite’s life cycle: materially, sound and water; and volitionally, as those who precipitate its taking
up a new host, The Thief, The Sampler, and the orchid harvesters. Furthermore, a three-term model also
excises the two types of exchange that subtend the entire network of beings entangled in Upstream Color:
41
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on the one hand, affect, and on the other, money. Therefore, in lieu of Carruth’s proposed triangular
“worm-pig-orchid lifecycle” model, which, while elegant, oversimplifies his own film, I offer the
following diagram which better captures, I think, the full scope of the rhizomatic relations found in the
movie. (SEE FIG. 34)

Figure 34 - Diagram of Cycles and Connections in Upstream Color

A few things should be noted about the diagram in Figure 4.13. First, I’ve categorized the various
entities into two primary groups: one for the human agents whose roles in the film’s network of exchange
are motivated to greater or lesser extents (and with greater or lesser degrees of malevolence) by the drive
for monetary gain, and one for the various bodily “homes” of the parasitical organism. Second, my model
differs from the triangular model Carruth proposes, which is necessarily hierarchical insofar as one of the
parasite’s bodily hosts must occupy the topmost position at any given instant. My diagram renders these
cycles not as a rotation but as a pair of parallel, horizontal flows that are linked along the vertical axis so
as to unite human and nonhuman beings. This arrangement is preferable, I think, in that it avoids a
triangular relation that would frame the film in terms of a linear, forward progression rather than as a
multifarious and coextensive network or simultaneous affects. Furthermore, my model places all the
related entities on a more or less even horizontal plane, capturing what Jane Bennett describes in her book
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Vibrant Matter as “encounters between ontologically diverse actants.”43 Bennett defines “actants,” a
concept she takes from Bruno Latour, as “a source of action that can be either human or nonhuman; it is
that which has efficacy, can do things, has sufficient coherence to make a difference, produces effects,
alter the course of events.” Thus, considering Upstream Color not solely in relation to the human
characters allows us to better grasp the extent to which agency is “distributed” in the film.44 My model
thus flattens categories of being in much the same way the film does. Case in point: throughout Upstream
Color, Kris literally and metaphorically clings to Jeff. Yet in the film’s final images, we see Kris on the
farm, a piglet in her arms, bouncing it like a baby, cooing at it, cuddling it warmly, embracing it—literally
and figuratively—like she would her lover or her own child.45 (SEE FIG. 35)

Figure 35 - Kris warmly embraces a pig on the farm

Let’s return to the diagram. One will note the presence of two types of line (solid and dashed).
Solid lines are meant to indicate discrete, bounded bodies and linkages that are seemingly more
“concrete” or otherwise directly attributable to someone else (i.e., The Thief utilizes the worms, The
Sampler utilizes the swine), whereas dashed ones connote what we might more broadly call processes,
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activities or operations that occur among the various actants.46 Unlike the hard-lined arrows, which are
clearly unidirectional, dashed processes are looser, more open-ended, harder to pin down, not “fixed.”
This is why SOUND and WATER (which share a conceptual association with formlessness and movement,
as we saw in Chapter 2) are situated between two paired sets of actants (the organism’s hosts [worm-pigorchid] and those that exploit that organism [Thief-Sampler-Harvesters]), both of which are entirely
dependent upon another and bound up in both natural processes (vibration, gravity) and capitalist
impulses (the pursuit of profit or pleasure) that nevertheless happen entirely independently of one
another.47 For instance, The Thief does not know how or why these particular orchids carry this particular
worm, nor do the harvesters have any inkling that these plants, which they first come across by chance,
could be and have been weaponized. Each is operating according to her or his own self-interests, which is
why CAPITAL is situated above all of the underlying “transcations” and “exchanges,” and why,
furthermore, it touches all phases of the more exploitative cycle. Similarly, at the bottom of the diagram
lies AFFECT, which like capital subtends the entire system.48 Every encounter between the parasitic
organism and another actant either increases or diminishes that actant’s capacity to change or be changed
(Spinoza’s definition)—and, indeed, in the case of Kris, Jeff, and their pig counterparts, the organism’s
influence persists long after the initial encounter, like “a microscopic event [that] upsets the local balance
of power.”49
Perhaps “influence” is not the correct word here. Recall the distinction Abner Shimony drew
between his understanding of quantum entanglement and Einstein’s. For the latter, the implications of
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entanglement were “spooky” insofar as it implied an instantaneous (i.e., superluminal, or faster than the
speed of light, and thus, for Einstein, impossible) and causal relationship between atoms separated in
space. For Shimony, however, entanglement was not a question of causality so much as one of
affection—of being done to rather than of doing. My use of the dashed lines is intended to convey this
very idea: in contrast to the solid lines of my model, the dashed lines carry no directional arrows or have
one at each end, thereby indicating no active subject and no passive object as well as no beginning nor
end. Dashed lines are not vectors—they are two-way streets.
Now, the attentive reader has no doubt noticed that two crucial actants are missing from the
diagram above: Kris and Jeff. Their situation, indeed, demands a diagram all its own. (SEE FIG. 36)

Figure 36 - An inter-affective Map

The most notable aspect of this illustration is that, unlike the first one in which discrete actants
are demarcated by solid lines, Jeff, Kris, and their respective entangled pigs are rendered with dashed
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lines. Why? Like Spivak in the line that opened this chapter, I want to suggest that there is no hard and
fast outline of the body as such. As Karan Barad writes,
At first glance, the outside boundary of the body may seem evident, indeed incontrovertible. A
coffee mug ends at its outside surface just as surely as people end at their skins. On the face of it,
reliance on visual cues seems to constitute a solid empirical approach, but are faces and solids
really what they seem? … [I]t has become increasingly clear that the seemingly self-evidentiary
nature of bodily boundaries, including their seeming visual self-evidence, is a repetition of
(culturally and historically) specific bodily performance.”50
She goes on to write:
Physics tells us that edges or boundaries are not determinate either ontologically or
visually. […] It is a well-documented fact of physical optics that if one looks closely at
an “edge,” what one sees is not a sharp boundary between light and dark but rather a
series of light and dark bands—that is, a diffraction pattern.51
My aim in using a dashed line is to suggest to the naked eye what is an invisible reality about the
nature of bodies: that they are not discrete, bounded, or as integral as they seem, that at a microscopic,
particle level, all bodies are coalescing and sharing in one another. The dashed line also represents the
body in precisely the same manner as I’ve represented affect, as that which is said to be indeterminate,
indefinable, free-flowing, that which penetrates boundaries.
This last diagram, however, does have some solid lines for which we must account. Located on
the left side of the diagram are Kris (bottom) and Jeff (top), and extending from each of them is a solid,
unidirectional line running to the right to their respective pigs. This line is meant to convey the direct,
physical transposition of the worm from the human bodies to those of the swine. The dashed lines
thoughout, however, represent the affective relationship among the actants. For instance, what affects
Kris affects her pig counterpart, just as that which affects the pig affects her: thus the arrows on both ends
of the line. Situated in the center is The Sampler, solidly lined. This is meant to show that he, as a voyeur
and not a participant per se, is not subject to the same intersubjective anomalies as are the other characters
in the film. That is, of course, until the moment he is seen by Kris, whereupon he becomes a visible (and
vulnerable) object embedded in the film’s network of actants. Up until this point, though, The Sampler
50
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did exert some level of direct control (action, agency) over the pigs as their caretaker (and as their
murderer). I’ve therefore used solid, diagonal lines to mark this relationship. Diagonal lines also extend
from The Sampler to Kris and Jeff on the left side of the diagram, but here they are dashed. This is
because The Sampler has a “window” onto these characters but he does not possess any sovereignty over
them. And in that until the very end of the film they cannot see him, these lines’ arrows point in only one
direction. Kris, Jeff, and the pigs to which they are bound are not movers: they are the moved.

To Learn Better to Listen
How does one convey in cinematic fashion that which acts upon us, that which is felt, but that
cannot be seen? Forces such as these are, to borrow Einstein’s phrasing, “spooky” precisely because they
resist our epistemological grasp, because they disobey the observable laws of physics that dictate how
discrete entities are supposed to interact. Sound, as I’ve argued throughout this dissertation, has a special
kinship with that which escapes our ability to reckon with it.
In perhaps more literal a fashion than any other film heretofore considered in this dissertation,
Upstream Color renders seemingly impossible yet physically factual “superluminal” connections across
space, time, and bodies, as a function of sound and hearing only to then transfigure these interactions into
visible form. Indeed, this is the very culmination of the film’s narrative conflict. The movie’s central
mystery, which is handled so obliquely and in such a fragmented manner, is ultimately resolved only
when invisible forces and the most vaguely felt of affects are made concrete and rendered in the form of
that most cinematic of tropes: the Western duel, the face-to-face confrontation, the wordless meeting of
gazes. (SEE, AGAIN, FIGS. 29–30) And like any great cinematic duel, one shall live and one shall die.
The latter, in this case, is the one who took a microphone to a gunfight.
In closing, let me say that Upstream Color, despite being preposterous to the point that it would
border on comical if not for the sincerity with which it is presented, offers us something quite profound,
even if one finds herself unmoved by its story. What if those aspects of life that would most seem to
indicate the existence of the soul, the spirit, or powers higher—love, déjà vu, a feeling of connectedness
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to one’s fellow man and/or to nature as a whole—in fact had a material basis? Perhaps, then, the value of
a film like Upstream Color is that it so stubbornly insists that ours is a profoundly interconnected world
and that we tend not to register it precisely because these connections exceed or outstrip our ability to see
them. Maybe, then, the best way to attend to them is not to augment our vision but to learn better to listen.
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CONCLUSION
“Sound must itself become an image.”1—Gilles Deleuze
Throughout this dissertation, I’ve turned to films in which either sound or what I’ve termed
soundful relations are, in Nietzsche’s terms, “transfigured” into visual form, or, in Deleuze’s, “rendered
visible.” I’d like to close by considering the opposite and far rarer procedure: rendering audible that
which is not itself audible. One of the objects I analyzed in Chapter 1, Alvin Lucier’s I Am Sitting in a
Room, did something along these lines. As the reader will recall, Lucier, in both the album version of the
piece and in his numerous liver performances of it, recorded himself speaking and then played the tape
back into the room while recording that playback. Dozens of times he repeated the process so as to make
the space’s natural resonant frequencies gradually “reinforce themselves,” thereby replacing his
intelligible utterances with the normally inaudible vibrations of the room itself. This experiment with
mechanical reproduction, repetition, and acoustics was rendered, however, at least in the LP release,
entirely in and through the domain of sound—which is why I turn now to a more recent example of sound
“extraction” that achieves the same end, making the inaudible audible, via audiovisual means: the “visual
microphone” developed at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Researchers in the field sometimes called “visual acoustics” conducted studies utilizing ultra-high
frame rate cameras to record video—and not audio—of objects such as a potato chip bag as a nearby
loudspeaker plays audio of recorded speech or music. The frame rates typically used in most consumer
and professional-grade video formats range between 24–30 frames per second (fps), as these rates are
adequate to achieve the desired “motion effect” in which one sees not a succession of discrete images
during playback but rather a continuously moving image thanks to the slight blur produced between
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Figure 37 - The Visual Microphone Methodology (Davis, et al., n.p.)

Figure 38 - The Visual Microphone Apparatus (Davis, et al., n.p.)

frames.2 The MIT researchers, however, utilized frame rates ranging between 2200 and 20,000 for their
experiments. While these rates are hardly suitable for commercial filmmaking, they are quite helpful in
laboratory settings for detecting minute movements that would normally be invisible to the human eye. In
this case, researchers were able to see the tiny vibrations caused by the sound from the loudspeaker on the
surface of the objects they placed before the camera. They then “decomposed” and processed the images
in such a way that they were able to detect visual patterns of vibration within the images and then
“partially recover” the sound that caused them, “extracting” sound, in essence, from a soundless image:
2

These frame rates have been industry standard for some time, but filmmakers have begun to experiment with
higher frame rates. Notoriously, Peter Jackson shot The Hobbit (2012) at 48fps, which produces what some have
labeled the “soap opera effect,” a sort of hyper-real artificiality that crosses the threshold from sufficiently life-like
to the “uncanny valley.” Vincent Laforet, “The Hobbit: An Unexpected Masterclass in Why 48 FPS Fails,”
Gizmodo, December 19, 2012, http://gizmodo.com/5969817/the-hobbit-an-unexpected-masterclass-in-why-48-fpsfails. For a helpful primer on high frame rate cameras and their various commercial uses from this same publication,
see Andrew Tarantola, “Why Frame Rate Matters,” Gizmodo, January 14, 2015, http://gizmodo.com/why-framerate-matters-16751531.
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thus, the “visual microphone” of their title.3 (SEE FIGS. 37–38) It should be emphasized, though, that, as
the researchers describe it, the camera does not function like a microphone—the object itself does, be it a
candy bar wrapper, a chip bag, a box of tissues, or what have you. To put it in the terms of classical film
theory, the MIT researchers were able to use the indexical trace of the heretofore invisible vibrations
found in the image to reverse engineer the sound that produced them, to make, in other words, a silent
image sound.
In this way, the visual microphone would seem to do precisely what the films I’ve examined in
this study do—render sound visible via its affection of a body of some sort—, only in reverse. That is, the
visual microphone moves from the realm of vision into the realm of hearing, to “find” the sound that
caused the object in the image to quiver. Robin James astutely notes, however, that there is a third level in
addition to image and sound at work here, and that is data. In the YouTube video the MIT researchers
produced to promote their findings, the final “proof” of their success in extracting sound from a soundless
image is not that the extracted sounds sound like a slightly nosier version of the original played during the
experiment; no, the final test for the experimenters is not that the sound they’ve extracted is
“recognizable” to a human subject but rather to a computer, more specifically, to the mobile app Shazam,
which uses a smartphone’s microphone to “listen” to music so as to “identify” the song playing.4 “The
visual microphone certainly ‘recovers sounds from objects,’” says James,
but it doesn’t necessarily or even primarily listen to them, at least in the traditional sense of
listening as attention to patterns of pressure generated by vibrating bodies. Instead of treating
sound as vibration, sound is a data stream that can be variously processed and crunched, either by
Shazaam [sic] or by some algorithm designed to infer the material properties of whatever
recorded object they’re studying. The data is processed in ways that abstractly resemble sound’s
material properties, but which are removed from sonic materiality. 5
3

Abe Davis et al, “The Visual Microphone: Passive Recovery of Sound from Video,” ACM Trans. Graph 33, no. 4
(2014): n.p.
4

Abe Davis, et al. “The Visual Microphone: Passive Recovery of Sound from Video.” YouTube video, 4:31, posted
August 4, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FKXOucXB4a8.
5

Robin James, “From ‘Video Phone’ to the Visual Microphone: Sound and the Ambivalent Politics of Feminist
New Materialism” (paper presented at a colloquium at McIntire Department of Music at the University of Virginia,
November 21, 2014). https://docs.google.com/document/d/1C5kWsdd5NKhNB_ctrJH4_r-floAm3vDvyG5ngtfQ94/edit.
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Sound is not something to be heard in the context of the visual microphone, for it arrives already
“translated” or “transduced.” James goes on to say that the Visual Microphone serves as an emblem of
what she sees as a problem within new materialist philosophy generally and in feminist strands of it
promulgated by Jane Bennett and Elizabeth Grosz particularly. She writes, “If new materialist ontology
can be embodied by things that don’t actually vibrate, if it can work in absence of material vibration, is
‘vibration’ itself just a metaphor for something like ‘life’ or ‘health’ as dynamic”?6 James describes the
sound processed and studied in the Visual Microphone experiments as “non-resonant sound,” which is, of
course, an oxymoron. A non-resonant sound is no sound at all.
James’ critique suggests the difficulty I’ve faced in this dissertation of striking a delicate balance
between sound as an audible, sensible phenomenon and sound as a conceptual frame or theoretical “lens.”
Throughout the dissertation, I’ve strived to take sound as a formal element within films that we (and the
characters onscreen) quite literally hear. (SEE FIGS 39–42) Take my discussion of Upstream Color in
Chapter 4 for instance. Carruth’s film depends entirely on sonic materiality: the re-creation of sounds by
sliding rocks on a pipe, the quest for a noise’s source, the touching of a utility pole so as to feel the energy
course within it. What’s more, sound makes literal the figurative “bond” of romantic love: as Jeff says,
he’s married to Kris even though no matrimonial ceremony has been performed. Indeed, sound is what
binds the entire network of the film.
Similarly, in Her, which was the central object of analysis in Chapter 1, sound operates on both
levels, literal and metaphorical, simultaneously. Familiar to any actor is the maxim “acting is listening,”
and if this is indeed the case, then Joaquin Phoenix’s performance in Her is a masterclass. He occupies
nearly every shot of the film, and more often than not, his scene partner is not physically in the room with
him. There are no eyes for him to gaze into, no body language to read, no touch to convey his affection.
The vast majority of the film is comprised of Theodore speaking and listening, most often with his head
hung downward, staring at nothing in particular. (SEE FIG. 39) Yet sound is also the means, indeed the
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only means, by which the film conveys Samantha’s purported materialization (“I can feel my body,” she
says between pants). There, in what I’ve termed, following Amy Herzog, a “soundful moment,” the image
is evacuated for more than a minute, and there in the dark, our couple, metaphorically speaking, incorporate. They achieve their impossible physical encounter solely via sound and listening.

Figure 39 - Theodore Listens to Samantha

Figure 40 - Morvern Communing with the Dead Via Earbuds

170

Figure 41 - Jack with a aluminum can telephone

Figure 42 - Jeff listens to The Sampler's recordings

The blackout in Her thus serves as an example of what I describe in Chapter 2 as a
“transfiguration” (Nietzsche), a change of form that happens at both the level of the film and the level of
human bodies. The abrupt deviation from conventional cinematic form announces or anticipates the
highly unusual affective change of state that is to come between the two lovers. Central to Chapter 2 was
a claim for the malleability and pliability of film form and bodily form, which I developed through the
use of Nicole Brenez’s “figural” method of criticism that treats both cinematic form and material bodies
as equally plastic figures, as clay to be molded over and over again. I concluded that chapter with a
(trans)figural analysis of the films of Lynne Ramsay, which in ways that have been largely missed by
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critics, feature repeating aesthetic elements that do not cohere into a meaningful pattern à la a motif or
auteurist signature. Instead, Ramsay tends to completely invert their significations within individual films
and even across texts. Water, as I demonstrated, is one such figure, which Ramsay on the one hand uses
to connote familial warmth, respite, cleanliness, and health, while on the other hand, she alternatively
deploys it to suggest death, carnage, and an omnipresent, ineludible melancholy. There is no better
example of these processes of inversion and revision than in the scene in We Need to Talk about Kevin in
which Eva’s face morphs under the water into that of her monstrous son as the two alternate roles of
victim and victimizer. Rather than a sonorous, comforting womb, water becomes the site of a disturbing,
if imagined, confrontation between mother and child.
Indeed, a thread ran throughout the dissertation that sought to complicate the forced alliance
between sound, water, and the feminine in philosophy and critical theory by locating instances within my
selected films that expose the flipside of that coin. In addition to the sink drowning scene in Ramsay’s
film, we see something similar in Upstream Color, where Kris is compelled for reasons she can’t explain
to dive for river rocks that she tosses into the bottom of an indoor swimming pool. We only later learn the
nature of this strange behavior: she is searching for the piglets that she believes to be her own offspring
and that have been drowned in the stream at the hands of The Sampler. Each time Kris dives to the
bottom of the pool and returns with a rock, she is in effect undertaking a grieving ritual, symbolically, and
futilely, pulling her dead children from the stream.
Along similar lines but in a vastly different film, I also attempted to chip away at some of the
normative aspects of Terrence Malick’s The Tree of Life in Chapter 3. The consensus critical reception of
the film was that it exhibits a fairly orthodox Judeo-Christian worldview in its tale of white,
heteronormative nuclear family in small-town 1950s Texas, complete with idyllic, Edenic shots of trees
and grass and the Oedipal longings of a pre-teen boy. Though I concur with many commentators about
these hoary aspects of The Tree of Life, I conduct a somewhat perverse reading that suggests that beyond
the surface iconography and familiar tropes is a much more philosophically rich film. I argued that The
Tree of Life operates according to a logic of doubling and coalescence that enacts at an aesthetic level a
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mode of elations consistent with both Jean-Luc Nancy’s ethics of listening, which describes the self as
existing both in and outside one’s body, and the neurophenomenological accounts of heautoscopy, a
particular form of autoscopic phenomena wherein one’s self is said to oscillate between two positions in
space. This doubling is made visible, I argued, in the film’s highly mobile camera, which tends to veer
away from the primary action of a scene without narrative motivation to examine in close-up the textural
details of Jack’s boyhood home. This would suggest, I argued, not a third-person point of view but a
subjective one, one, indeed, that moves about diegetic space as if it “belonged” to the adult protagonist as
he revisits his childhood environs. Yet, paradoxically, his adolescent self is most frequently the object of
that implied vision, which would indicate not one but two protagonists. This self-seeing is made manifest
in the final scene of the film, when nearly every major character is seen in doubled form, often wearing
different hair styles or clothing and even occupying the same frame simultaneously. Furthermore, this
curious interaction between selves, in fact, was evident throughout The Tree of Life in its voiceovers as
well, which indicates the degree to which the entire film is suffused with the soundful.
The overarching question this study pondered was this: how might we listen to images, or
differently, how might an attentiveness to sound as both a formal element of cinematic expression and as
a conceptual framework offer new ways to think about cinematic and bodily form? More often than not,
in the films considered herein, conspicuous deviations from conventional sound-image relations heralded
brief moments in which onscreen bodies underwent some sort of transformation: they doubled (The Tree
of Life), they coalesced (Her), they impossibly alternated position with others (We Need to Talk about
Kevin, The Tree of Life), they were affected from a vast distance by other bodies (Upstream Color). I’ve
argued throughout this study that in these moments, soundful affection is made visible as it plays out at
the level of the human body.
The aesthetic analyses I conducted in this dissertation are informed by various philosophies of
sound and diverse theories of the relationship between sound and image, but what unites them all is a
strong affinity between body, sound, and affect. Deleuze, the reader will recall from Chapter 1, develops
his theory of bodily sensation with recourse to acoustic terminology such as resonance, wave, amplitude,
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and vibration,7 and for him and Guattari, sensation carries with it the power to “de-form” the body, to
“de-subjectivize” the subject.8 Similarly, for Nancy, listening “resolve[s] [the body] into vibrations that
both return to itself and place it outside itself.” Drawing from Aristotle, he argues that sound is a sensual
realm of methexis, contagion, and participation between bodies.9 For Nietzsche, the visual arts are
redeemed only when they give visible form to music, that invisible Dionysian flux that breaks down
bodily barriers and restores humankind to its primordial unity. Steven Connor suggests something similar
when he describes the “wild phenomenology of sound” that precipitates a “mutative commixture” of
bodies and matter.10
All of these theories, of course, are abstract and based in speculative frameworks rather than in
observable phenomena. This is where quantum physics and neuroscience become especially helpful. As
the study of atoms and photons, quantum physics seeks to understand the mechanics of matter that happen
invisibly, imperceptibly around us all the time that would nonetheless seem utterly impossible. It boggled
the mind of Einstein, for instance, that affecting a particle in one location could immediately affect
another one despite the two particles not being in physical contact (“action at a distance” or “nonlocality”). Neuroscience, at least the subsection of it I’ve pursued here, likewise investigates that which
would seem impossible and that cannot be observed: that our bodies could be doubled, that we could be in
two locations at once—or that we could sense ourselves in such arrangements. In ways related to but quite
distinct from the philosophers I draw from in this study, the phenomenology of autoscopic phenomena
gives us a language that derives from lived experience to describe non-typical (but not exclusively or even
predominantly pathological) modes of self-relation. As Oliver Sacks suggests, these hallucinatory
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perceptions are far more common than we think, and people fail to report them only out of the stigma
associated with an “unsound” mind.11
The films I’ve taken up in this dissertation are philosophically valuable in that they, like quantum
mechanics and neuroscience, help us to reckon with the seemingly impossible, invisible interactions of
our bodies and those of others, defined broadly. They help us to see these invisible (but not at all
imperceptible) affections manifest themselves as changes in form—in both the bodily and cinematic
senses of the word. In other words, they reveal to us virtual possibilities of the body and of the self that
can scarcely be thought otherwise but that can potentially be actualized in “real life.” As my title
suggests, bodies—real, material ones as well as cinematic ones—sometimes take leave of their corporeal
moorings and dissipate or scatter out in all directions only to subsequently congeal into new forms or fuse
with other bodies into new amalgams. These changes in form are achieved only through the reception of
invisible forces—affects—that act upon the body. I am reminded of that abiding question of Deleuze and
Guattari’s. Paraphrasing Spinoza, they ask, “What can a body do?” For them, this is an unanswerable
question, for the body’s horizons are not defined in advance but rather increase or diminish as it is
affected from without. However, the films under consideration here, in showcasing seemingly impossible
interactions, transformations, and incorporations among bodies and subjects would seem to issue a partial
rejoinder to Deleuze and Guattari. What can a body do? These films answer: this, this, this, this, this, this,
this…
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